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Abstract 
This thesis atempts to demonstrate that, far from being of litle or even no importance 
as some authors have argued, the 1956 Suez Crisis was an event of great significance 
to the evolution of British and French policies towards membership of the European 
Communities. It identifies a  gap in the  historiographies  of the  Suez  Crisis and the 
European integration process, and seeks to fil it, while at the same time providing a 
new interpretation  of the link  between the two areas  of  historical focus.  Using 
manuscript sources from  English,  French and  American archives, as  wel as 
contemporary  media articles and  personal  papers, it  wil  present six  ways in  which 
Suez  directly influenced the  development  of  British and  French  policy towards the 
European  Communities:  by forcing the  British  government to review the country’s 
position in the world, by enhancing the career of Harold Macmilan, boosting that of 
Edward Heath, changing French atitudes towards the Common Market in late 1956, 
its role in the return to  power  of  General  de  Gaule, and the  development  of the 
French nuclear deterent. It wil conclude that not was Suez a significant factor, but 
that without it, there may not be a European Union today. 
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Chapter I: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
In  November  2016 the  world  wil mark the sixtieth anniversary  of the  1956  Suez 
Crisis; the  Anglo-French invasion  of  Egypt in response to that country’s leader, 
Colonel  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser’s  decision to  nationalise the  Suez  Canal  Company.1 
Four months after this, in March 2017 it wil be the sixtieth anniversary of the signing 
of the  Treaties  of  Rome,2 and January  2013  marked the fiftieth anniversary  of 
President Charles de Gaule’s veto of the first British application for membership of 
what is  now the  European  Union.3 Suez,  perhaps the  most  humiliating episode in 
British post-war history, has long been considered to be something of a taboo subject, 
and  outside academic circles the crisis is  not  wel  known in  Britain.4 Part  of the 
reason for this is the decision by Eden’s government to engage in an act of colusion 
with France and Israel to orchestrate an armed atack on Egypt. This colusion, known 
as the Protocol of Sèvres,5 put Britain at odds with much of the Commonwealth,6 and 
                        
1 ‘British Move into Egypt Reported’, Times, 31 Oct., 1956, p. 8. 
2 ‘Further Step in Uniting Europe’, Times, 26 Mar., 1956, p. 8. 
3 ‘General De Gaule Says Entry Wil Not Be In His Time’, Times, 19 Jan., 1963, p. 8. 
4 I. Black, ‘A Painful Lesson in Diplomacy’, Guardian, 31 Oct., 2006; D. Brown, ‘1956: Suez and the 
2 ‘Further Step in Uniting Europe’, Times, 26 Mar., 1956, p. 8. 
3 ‘General De Gaule Says Entry Wil Not Be In His Time’, Times, 19 Jan., 1963, p. 8. 
4 I. Black, ‘A Painful Lesson in Diplomacy’, Guardian, 31 Oct., 2006; D. Brown, ‘1956: Suez and the 
End of Empire’, Guardian, 14 Mar., 2001. 
5 For the  Protocols  of Sèvres see:  T.  Robertson, Crisis:  The Inside  Story  of the  Suez  Conspiracy 
(London,  1964);  M.  Semesh  &  S. Ilan  Troen (eds), The Suez-Sinai Crisis of 1956: Retrospective and 
Reappraisal (London,  1990);  A.  Shlaim, ‘The  Protocols  of Sèvres 1956:  Anatomy  of a  War  Plot,’ 
International Afairs 73, no. 3 (Jul., 1997), p. 509-530; S.C. Smith (Ed.), Reassessing Suez 1956: New 
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with the United States, whose intervention was decisive in ending the crisis.7 Indeed 
in the  history  of the  Anglo-American ‘special relationship’  Suez  has rightly  been 
portrayed as a particular low-point as wel a case study for the decline of Britain in 
relation to its American aly.8 
                                                                    
Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath (Aldershot, 2008); S. Ilan Troen, ‘The Protocol of Sèvres: 
British/French/Israeli Colusion Against Egypt 1956,’ Israel Studies 1, no. 2 (Fal., 1996), p. 122-139; 
D. Varble, The Suez Crisis 1956 (Oxford, 2003); G. Warner, ‘Colusion and the Suez Crisis of 1956,’ 
International Afairs 55, no. 2 (Apr., 1979), p. 226-239. 
6 For Suez, the British Empire and the Commonwealth see: J. Darwin, The End of the British Empire 
(Oxford,  1991); S.  Galpern, Money,  Oil,  and  Empire in the  Middle  East:  Sterling  and  Postwar 
Imperialism, 1944-1971 (Cambridge, 2009); W.J. Hudon, Blind Loyalty: Australia and the Suez Crisis, 
1956 (Carlton,  1989); L. James, The  Rise  and  Fal  of the  British  Empire (London,  2004); K.  Kyle, 
Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London,  1991); A.  Low  &  B.  Lapping, ‘Did  Suez 
Hasten the End of Empire?,’ Contemporary Record 1, No. 2 (1987), p. 31-33; W. Roger Louis, ‘Suez 
and  Decolonization:  Scrambling  Out  of  Africa and  Asia,’ in  W.  Roger  Louis (Ed.), Ends of British 
Imperialism:  The  Scramble for  Empire,  Suez  and  Decolonization (London,  2006); J.  Melady, 
Pearson’s  Prize:  Canada  and the  Suez  Crisis (Otawa,  2006); A.J.  Stockwel, ‘Suez and the  Moral 
Bankruptcy  of  Empire,’ History Today 56,  No.  11 (Nov.,  2006),  p. 48; M. Templeton, Ties of Blood 
and  Empire:  New  Zealand’s Involvement in  Middle  East  Defence  and the  Suez  Crisis,  1947-1956 
(Auckland, 1994). 
7 D.B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (North Carolina, 1991). 
8 For  Suez and the ‘special relationship’ see:  S.  Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American 
Power in the Middle East 1953-1957 (Chicago, 1992); C. Grayling & C. Langdon, Just Another Star? 
Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (London, 1988); C.C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis 
of 1956 (Baton Rouge, 1995); D. Nichols, Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis; Suez and 
the Brink of War (New York, 2011); W. Scot Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez 
Crisis (London, 1991); G. Warner, ‘The United States and the Suez Crisis,’ International Afairs 67, 




Historiography and Literature Review 
When considering the historiography of the Suez Crisis and Anglo-European relations 
we are in fact talking about several  distinct  but  occasionaly intertwined  bodies  of 
literature. Firstly we must consider works on the crisis itself for any reference to its 
impact on or the consequences for Europe. Next there are also the historiographies of 
Britain’s relationship with Europe,9 its relationship with France specificaly,10 as wel 
                        
9 M.  Camps, Britain  and the  European  Community  1955-1963 (London,  1964);  M.J.  Dedman, The 
Origins and Development of the European Union, 1945-95 (London,  1996); S.  George (Ed.), Britain 
and the  European  Community:  The  Politics  of  Semi-Detachment (Oxford,  1992);  S.  George, Britain 
and European Integration since 1945 (Oxford, 1991); S. George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the 
European Community (3rd Edition) (Oxford,  1998);  P.  Gowan  &  P.  Anderson (eds), The Question of 
Europe (London,  1997);  D.  Gowland  &  A.  Turner, Reluctant  Europeans:  Britain  and  European 
Integration 1945-1998 (Harlow,  2000);  D.  Gowland,  A.  Turner  &  A.  Wright, Britain and European 
Integration since 1945: On the Sidelines (London,  2010);  S.  Greenwood, Britain and European Co-
operation since 1945 (Oxford,  1992);  W.  Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and 
European Integration  1945-63 (Basingstoke,  1996); A.  Milward, The  United  Kingdom  and the 
European Community Volume I: The Rise and Fal of a National Strategy 1945-1963 (London, 2002); 
A.  Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(London,  1999);  H.  Young, This  Blessed  Plot:  Britain  and  Europe from  Churchil to  Blair 
(Basingstoke, 1999). 
10 P.M.H.  Bel, Britain  and  France  1940-1994:  The  Long  Separation (Harlow,  1997);  B.  Heuser, 
NATO,  Britain,  France  and the  FRG:  Nuclear  Strategies  and  Forces for  Europe,  1949-2000 
(Basingstoke,  1997); P.  Mangold, The  Almost Impossible  Aly:  Harold  Macmilan  and  Charles  De 
Gaule (London,  2006); H. Parr, ‘”The Nuclear Myth”: Edward Heath, Europe, and the International 
Politics  of  Anglo-French  Nuclear  Co-Operation  1970-3’, The International History Review,  Vol.  35, 
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as works on France’s post-war relationship with European integration.11 This situation 
has  both  benefits and  drawbacks:  On the  one  hand it ensures that there is an 
abundance of material to draw on, but on the other it makes it very dificult to draw 
broad historiographical conclusions. Nevertheless, while remaining aware of this, it is 
necessary to  draw  what conclusions are  possible and  use those to identify a 
historiographical gap where Suez and Europe are concerned. 
 
The late British historian Alan Milward identified two tendencies on the part 
of historians who have drawn links between the Suez Crisis and European integration, 
both  of  which  he asserted to  be incorect.  The first  was to  minimise  or  dismiss the 
influence  of  Suez  on the changes in  British atitudes towards  European integration, 
specificaly the notion of active British participation in this process. The second was 
to ascribe to Suez a significant role in altering the views of the French government to 
the  proposals that came  out  of the  Messina  Conference and  Spaak  Commitee 
                                                                    
No. 3 (2013), pp. 534-555; R. Tombs & I. Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: Britain and France, the History 
of a Love-Hate Relationship (London,  2007); J.W.  Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 
1945-1951 (Leicester, 1984). 
11 J.C.  Alain,  F.  Autrand,  L.  Bely,  P.  Contamine,  P.  Guilen,  T.  Lents,  G.H.  Soutou,  L.  Thois,  M. 
Vaïsse, Histoire  De  La  Diplomatie  Francaise (Paris,  2005); H.S.  Chopra, De  Gaule  and  European 
Unity (New Delhi, 1974); P. Guilen, ‘L’Europe remède a l’impuissance française? Le Gouvernement 
Guy Molet et la négociation des traits de Rome 1955-1957’, Revue D’Histoire Diplomatique, Vol. 102 
(1988), pp. 319-335, Translated by Nick Saunders and Dan Whyman; P. Guilen, ‘Europe as a Cure of 
French Impotence? The Guy Molet Government and Negotiation of the Treaties of Rome,’ in E. Di 
Nolfo (Ed.), Power in Europe? Volume II: Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins 
of the  EEC  1952-1957 (Berlin,  1992),  pp.  505-516; W.  Hitchcock, France  Restored: Cold  War 
Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hil, 1998); M. Vaïsse, ‘Post-
Suez France’, in WM. Roger Louis & R. Owen (eds), Suez (Oxford, 1989). 
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discussions in 1955 and 1956.12 To an extent Milward was corect in his portrayal of 
the literature that  has considered  Suez and  British  policy  on  European integration. 
Hugo  Young for instance in  his  1998  work This  Blessed  Plot:  Britain  and  Europe 
from Churchil to Blair explicitly denied any role for Suez in the British decision to 
apply for  EEC  membership in  1961.13 Richie  Ovendale,  Keith  Kyle,  Simon  Smith, 
Anthony  Gorst and  Lewis Johnman also rejected a causal link  between  Suez and 
Europe although in the case of these authors the view was that as the discussions and 
negotiations that  would result in the creation  of the  EEC and  EURATOM  were 
ongoing prior to  Suez, the crisis  was  merely a coincidence.14 John  W.  Young 
contended that the efects of Suez in many areas had been overstated, and the crisis 
does  not feature at al in  works  by  Sean  Greenwood,  Wolfram  Kaiser and the  2000 
tome writen by David Gowland and Arthur Turner.15 
 
Some  historians  have also claimed that the crisis served as a  point  of 
realisation for  British  policymakers that  Britain’s  position  was  not as strong as  had 
previously  been thought.  As a result, they  undertook a  period  of reappraisal, 
reconsidering  various aspects and facets  of  British  policy including the relationship 
with the European integration project. Authors including Stephen George and Stephen 
                        
12 A.S. Milward, The United Kingdom and the European Community Volume I: The Rise and Fal of a 
National Strategy 1945-1963 (London, 2002), p. 252. 
13 H. Young, This Blessed Plot (1999), p. 109. 
14 A. Gorst & L. Johnman, The Suez Crisis (1997); K. Kyle, Suez (1991); R. Ovendale, British Defence 
Policy since 1945 (Manchester, 1994); S.C. Smith (Ed.), Reassessing Suez (1998). 
15 D.  Gowland  &  A.  Turner, Reluctant Europeans (2000);  S.  Greenwood, Britain (1992);  W.  Kaiser, 
Using Europe (1996). 
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Bulmer have al made similar claims.16 Beyond this there is Milward’s view that Suez 
was a factor in the decision of Eden’s government to accept and formaly adopt Plan 
G in  November  1956.17 When the focus shifts to  France  we find similar approaches 
with the literature either crediting  Suez  with the  French  government’s  decision to 
reverse its erstwhile opposition to supranationalism and sign the Treaties of Rome in 
March 1957, or argues that as with Britain, Suez was a coincidence that had no impact 
at al  on the  EEC  decision in  Paris.  French  historians such  as Maurice  Vaïsse  and 
Robert  and Isobel  Tombs,  as  wel  as  German  authors  Clemens  Wurm  and Hanns 
Jürgen  Küsters have  put forward the thesis that  Suez  humiliated  France and the 
particular circumstances  of the  British  withdrawal and the  American  pressure that 
occasioned it left the impression in  Paris that  France could  not rely  on its  Anglo-
American alies. In order to remain a power of the first rank it must take the lead in 
creating a  united  Europe  under  French leadership.18 ‘Anglo-American’ authors, 
                        
16 S.  Bulmer, ‘Britain and  European Integration;  Of  Sovereignty,  Slow  Adaptation and  Semi-
Detachment’ in,  S.  George (Ed.), Britain  and the  European  Community:  The  Politics  of  Semi-
Detachment (Oxford, 1992), p. 5; L. Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis (1964), p. 200-201; S. 
George, Britain and European Integration since 1945 (Oxford, 1991), p. 44; S. George, An Awkward 
Partner: Britain in the European Community (3rd Edition) (Oxford, 1998), p. 10; P. Hansen, ‘European 
Integration, European Identity and the Colonial Connection,’ European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 
4 (Nov., 2002), p. 493. 
17 A.S. Milward, The United Kingdom (2002), p. 252. 
18 H.J. Küsters, ‘West Germany’s Foreign Policy in Western Europe 1949-58: The Art of the Possible’ 
in C. Wurm (Ed.), Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960 
(Oxford,  1995), p. 68-69;  P.  Guilen, ‘Europe as a  Cure  of  French Impotence?  The  Guy  Molet 
Government and Negotiation of the Treaties of Rome,’ in E. Di Nolfo (Ed.), Power in Europe? Volume 
II: Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC 1952-1957 (Berlin, 1992), p. 
505-516;  R.  Tombs  & I.  Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: Britain and France, the History of a Love-Hate 
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particularly  Alan  Milward and  Andrew  Moravcsik,  who  both  view  Suez as 
coincidental and irelevant to the shift in  French  EEC  policy,  on the  other  hand 
counter that Molet’s government had decided to sign the Treaties of Rome as early as 
September 1956 and so Suez was not a factor.19 
 
It is this author’s contention that  none  of the existing arguments about  Suez 
and  Europe are satisfactory.  The  works that  have  dismissed  Suez as  having any 
influence  on either  British  or  French  policies in  Europe are simply incorect.  The 
cabinet  meeting  on  8 January  1957  discredits  Young’s argument about the 
consequences  of  Suez  not  being  understood  by  1961.  Members  of the cabinet 
demonstrated clearly their awareness that  Suez  had  done serious  damage to the 
Anglo-American relationship,  with some  being  of the  opinion that there  must some 
change in the basis of it.20 Even backbench MPs were aware as evidenced by Patrick 
Gordon  Walker’s  newspaper article ‘How  Can We  Save the  Commonwealth?’21 In 
academic terms Young is corect that a certain amount of time should elapse between 
events and atempts to examine them so that  objectivity can  be ensured.  However, 
politicians and civil servants do not have the luxury aforded to academics and when 
confronted  by a  disaster such as  Suez, are required to react  quickly.  Moravcsik and 
                                                                    
Relationship (London,  2007),  p. 617-618;  M. Vaïsse, ‘Post-Suez  France’ in  WM.  Roger  Louis  &  R. 
Owen (eds), Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford, 1989), p. 335-337. 
19 A.S.  Milward, The United Kingdom (2002),  p. 261; A.  Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social 
Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (London, 1999), p. 119-121. 
20 TNA, CAB 195/16, C.M. (57) 3, ‘Minutes of Cabinet Meeting’ (8 Jan., 1957), p. 2-4. 
21 P. Gordon Walker, M.P. ‘How Can We Save the Commonwealth?’ News Chronicle, 8 Nov., 1956. 
Reproduced in TNA PREM 11/1096. 
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Milward’s arguments regarding France are similarly flawed. The French government 
may have intended to agree to the proposed Common Market by September 1956 but 
such an assessment runs counter to contemporary views found in Foreign Relations of 
the  United  States, articles in respected  media  outlets, and those  of  France’s lead 
negotiator at the  very  negotiations to  which  Milward and  Moravcsik refer.22 
Moreover, a  French  government could sign  whatever it  wished, it stil  needed 
ratification in the French Assembly to be of any efect and as that body had already 
rejected one such initiative, the European Defence Community, in August 1954 after 
it was agred by Piere Mendès France.23 
 
The Thesis 
This thesis  wil accordingly ask the folowing  question: In  what  ways could 
Suez  be  viewed as important to  British and  French  policy re-evaluations towards 
membership  of the  European  Communities?  This is a reflection  of the fact that the 
EEC  was  one  of the  defining features  of  Anglo-French relations  between  1955 and 
1963. For this reason this work wil interpret the phrase ‘membership of the European 
Communities’ in a  broader sense to include  French  policy  on  Britain’s  potential 
membership. Furthermore, although the main focus of the thesis is the period leading 
up to the first  British  EEC  membership application, the role  of  Edward  Heath 
including  his successful  bid in  1972  wil  be included  on the  grounds that  Suez  was 
responsible for his career going beyond the traditional trajectory of a Chief Whip, and 
                        
22 R.  Marjolin, Architect  of  European  Unity:  Memoirs  1911-1986 (Translated  by  Wiliam  Hal) 
(London, 1989). 
23 G.  Bebr, ‘The  European  Defence  Community and the  Western  European  Union:  An  Agonizing 
Dilemma,’ Stanford Law Review 7, No. 2 (Mar., 1955), p. 173. 
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because his eforts as the leader of the British bid in 1962 had a direct impact on his 
later work as Prime Minister. 
 
The British government was faced with several chalenges as the 1950s gave 
way to the 1960s. Macmilan remarked in 1957 that the British people had ‘never had 
it so  good’,24 but the economy  was  not  growing as  quickly as that  of the  Six, the 
economic value of Britain’s imperial markets was declining as was the eficiency of 
British industry.25 An ongoing conflict in Malaya and issues in Central and Southern 
Africa  provided  points  of contention  with the  Labour  Opposition and  within the 
Conservative  Government. In  November  1960 the election  of John  F  Kennedy 
signaled  potential changes to  Britain’s relationship  with the  United  States and the 
nature of the Cold War. Britain had been a nuclear power since October 1952 but it 
was  becoming increasingly clear that the  V-Bomber force  would soon  become 
obsolete in a world where Intercontinental Balistic Missiles had altered the strategic 
balance.  The  nuclear  deterent  was seen as the  most important element  of  British 
defence  policy  but  by  1960 the  British  government  was struggling to fund the 
development  of a  British  missile (Blue  Streak) and reaching the conclusion that it 
would be forced by economic necessity to seek the assistance of the United States.26 
Lastly, the return to power in France of General Charles de Gaule had added a further 
complication to many of these issues. The General was determined that France would 
                        
24 ‘More Production “The Only Answer” to Inflation: Prime Minister’s Plea for Restraint,’ Times (22 
Jul., 1960), p. 4. 
25 H. Pemberton, ‘Relative Decline and British Economic Policy in the 1960s.’ The Historical Journal, 
Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 989-1013. 
26 A.P.  Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: of Friendship, Conflict and the 
Rise and Decline of Superpowers (London, 1995), p. 120. 
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play a  more  prominent role in the  Atlantic  Aliance and  was  prepared to chalenge 
what he saw as the hitherto Anglo-American domination of it.27 
 
It wil be argued here that the Suez Crisis was important to British and French 
policies on the European Communities in three ways: Firstly, it precipitated a change 
of leadership in Britain, specificaly the end of Anthony Eden’s Premiership and the 
accession of Harold Macmilan to replace him. Secondly, Suez influenced the atitude 
of the French government towards the EEC; removing its opposition to participation 
in a supranational common  market and convincing it that  only through  membership 
and leadership  of such an  organisation, could  France ensure it remained a  power  of 
the first rank and  protect  what it saw as its  vital interests. In the context  of  France, 
Suez was also a factor in the return to power of General de Gaule through its impact 
on the  Algerian conflict, and  on the  French  decision to  develop an independent 
nuclear deterent of its own.28 Each of these was to be significant for the first British 
application for  membership  of the  EEC.  Thirdly, and as something  of a  postscript 
outside the main timeframe, Suez was instrumental in the rise to political prominence 
of Edward Heath, the man who took Britain into the European Communities in 1973. 
 
The  most immediate impact  of the  Suez  Crisis in terms  of  British atitudes 
towards  membership  of the  EEC  was the  destruction  of  Anthony  Eden’s  political 
career, the staling of R.A Butler’s, and the resulting rise of Harold Macmilan to the 
                        
27 C.A. Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations (2000), pp. 3-4. 
28 M.  Vaïsse, ‘Post-Suez  France’ in Suez  1956:  The  Crisis  and its  Consequences,  Eds, W.M.  Roger 
Louis & R. Owen (Oxford, 1989), pp. 335-337. 
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Premiership.29 What this change  meant  was that instead  of  having a  Prime  Minister 
who  was ambivalent about  European integration, and  hostile to the idea  of  British 
participation in supranational institutions, Britain now had a Prime Minister for whom 
the concept of a united Europe was desirable not only in the pragmatic context of the 
Cold  War,  but  precisely the sort  of  grand  high  political approach to a  problem that 
appealed to  his character.  Macmilan  did  not  believe in federalism any  more than 
Eden,  but  what set  him apart from  his  predecessor  was a  genuine  belief in a  united 
Europe. Macmilan had been an energetic member of the United Europe Movement in 
the late  1940s and  his contemporaries in  Britain and  outside  of it saw  him as a 
‘European’ politician.30 Europe was a subject that he thought about continuously and 
it  occupied  him irespective  of  whether  or  not it  was relevant to  his  ministerial 
functions. 
 
We  must  digress  briefly at this  point and address an issue that can  be 
problematic for scholars of Anglo-European relations when considering the views of 
the political figures intimately involved. A recuring feature of present day discourse 
on  Britain’s  membership  of the  European  Union, and a feature  of considerations  of 
men such as Macmilan, Eden, Wilson and Heath, is the idea of being ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ 
Europe, Europhile or Eurosceptic to give the curent terms. Edward Heath is relatively 
straightforward: his career was marked by a desire that Britain should play a ful and 
                        
29 A.  Horne, Macmilan:  The  Oficial  Biography:  Part I:  1894-1956 (20th Anniversary  Edition) 
(Basingstoke, 2008), p. 317. 
30 CPA,  CRD  2/34/1,  Conservative  Parliamentary  Foreign  Affairs  Commitee, ‘Report  of a  Meeting’ 
(19 Jul.,  1955),  p. 1; ‘The  Year is  1957’, The Economist (19 Jan.,  1957),  p.  180;  FRUS  1955-1957, 
Volume IV, Doc. 209 ‘Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington’ (11 Jan., 
1957). 
 12 
active part in the European Communities and his biographies and obituaries al stress 
his fervent  belief in an integrated  Europe.31 Macmilan,  Eden and also  Churchil are 
more complex and  defy easy  or convenient categorisation.  While  none  of them 
wanted a federal  Europe,  prefering a cooperative approach that retained  national 
sovereignty,  neither  were they  opposed to the idea  of a  united  Europe.32 Macmilan 
and  his  views  on  European  unity  has  been the subject  of some  debate amongst  his 
biographers with some claiming that he was no federalist (which he wasn’t), or that 
had he taken Britain into the EEC in 1962 it would have been detrimental to further 
integration,33 and others stressing his United Europe days and his atempt in 1952 to 
persuade Churchil and Eden to adopt a more positive approach to Europe.34 
 
What this thesis wil try to do therefore is to move beyond and avoid overly 
simplistic and general terms such as ‘pro-European’ or ‘Europeanist’ and instead take 
a  more  nuanced approach.  Does  Macmilan easily fit into such a category?  No: the 
balance of evidence would not support placing him in the same category as Edward 
Heath,  yet, it is similarly inaccurate to suggest that there  was  no  or litle  diference 
between Macmilan and either Eden or Butler when it came to European integration. 
Macmilan  was  no federalist - by  his  own admission  he  prefered a ‘confederal’ 
approach - but what can be said is that he was more positively inclined to the ideas of 
an integrated  Europe.  The  very concept excited  him, appealing to  his ‘Edwardian’ 
                        
31 J. Campbel, Heath (1993), pp. 112-113; P. Ziegler, Edward Heath (2010), pp. 116-117. 
32 D. Carlton, Anthony Eden (1981), p. 285; N. Fisher, Harold Macmilan (1982), p. 306. 
33 N.  Ashton, Kennedy,  Macmilan  and the  Cold  War:  The Irony  of Interdependence (Basingstoke, 
2002), p. 127; R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, The Macmilans (London, 1993), p. 281. 
34 J.W. Young, ‘Churchil’s ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ of European Union by Churchil’s Post-
War Government, 1951-1952,’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), p. 932. 
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character, specificaly the love  of  grand  high  political schemes and summit 
diplomacy. Perhaps the best way to distinguish between Eden and Macmilan is to say 
that for the former,  European integration  was a functional  problem, an issue to  be 
resolved as and  when it  became  necessary.  When  European integration  was  not a 
pressing concern,  Eden  was  not inclined to  devote  much time  or thought to it.  For 
Macmilan, it  was a constant concern, a subject about  which  he thought actively 
whether his ministerial role required it or not. 
 
Without  Suez,  or at least an event  of similar scale and character,  Macmilan 
would not have become Prime Minister. He was three years older than Anthony Eden 
and  was  not seen as the likely successor to the  Prime  Minister in the event that  he 
retired or resigned after losing a General Election. R.A. Butler had long been seen as 
the coming  man  but  Suez  was to  prove  his  undoing as  much as it  was  Eden’s.35 
Despite being considered the ‘heir apparent’, Butler was not universaly popular in the 
Conservative Party. He was seen as strong on domestic issues such as education and 
healthcare,  but  he  had an  unfortunate legacy as a supporter  of appeasement in the 
1930s and many  Conservatives felt that  he  was  not someone  who could  or  would 
defend  British interests  during a foreign  policy crisis.36 He  was  not in favour  of 
atacking Egypt but he neither acted with determination to prevent it, nor gave much 
indication  of strong support.  He  was also  deputising for  Eden  when the  decision to 
withdraw from Egypt was made under strong pressure from the US and he was thus 
associated  with it.  Macmilan,  during the informal leadership contest  was able to 
portray  Butler as  weak  where  British interests  were concerned  by referencing 
                        
35 E. Pearce, The Lost Leaders: The Best Prime Ministers We Never Had (London, 1998), p. 92. 
36 K. Kyle, Suez (1991), p. 534. 
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appeasement in  his speech to the  1922  Commitee and this  was suficient to ensure 
that the Cabinet and the Conservative MPs chose him to succeed Eden.37 
 
Macmilan was to a large extent responsible for the change in atitude on the 
part  of the  British  government to the  EEC. It  was  not an immediate change as  he 
himself did not support Britain joining it in 1956 and not al his policies and actions in 
this area  were  designed to  move  Britain closer to  membership.  He and  Peter 
Thorneycroft  originaly formulated the  British alternative  proposals for a  partial 
European free trade area, and  until  France  vetoed the idea in  November  1958, 
Macmilan atempted to create  one that included the  EEC.38 Macmilan’s  greatest 
impact on British policy towards EEC membership came in the summer of 1960. It is 
submited that he reached the conclusion at this point that Britain could not aford to 
remain  outside the  Common  Market and  began the  process  of convincing  his 
government that if terms compatible  with and acceptable to  Britain’s  EFTA and 
Commonwealth  partners could  be agreed,  Britain should sign the  Treaties  of  Rome. 
There is some dispute as to how early he reached this conclusion, with some authors 
contending that he did not make up his mind until a year later in 1961,39 but it is this 
author’s view, in line with those of Kristian Steinnes, Wolfram Kaiser, Richard Lamb 
and Helen Par, that it was May 1960 that was the crucial moment.40 In July 1960 he 
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reshufled  his cabinet and  promoted men  perceived to  be supportive  of  Britain as a 
member  of the  EEC, such as  Thorneycroft,  Soames and  Heath, to  positions  of 
responsibility. In the summer  of  1961  he finaly  persuaded  Parliament to approve 
negotiations led by Heath to determine on what terms Britain could join the Common 
Market. 
 
The second  way in  which  Suez changed the situation concerned  France 
directly and in so  doing influenced  both the  British  desire to join the  EEC, and 
provided two factors in the frustration of that desire in January 1963. France was as 
humiliated at Suez as Britain but reached a very diferent initial conclusion. Whereas 
the immediate  priority  of the  British  government  was to repair the  damaged 
relationship with the US, the French government concluded that the only way it could 
restore French prestige, and ensure it could defend French interests, was to conclude 
negotiations to create the  European  Economic  Community and  European  Atomic 
Energy  Agency (EURATOM).  Prior to the crisis, and even as late as 
October/November  1956, there  was considerable  doubt that  France,  which  had 
previously rejected supranationalism in the form  of the  European  Defence 
Community (EDC), would agree to create a customs union.41 The French government 
interpreted the  American response to the invasion  of  Egypt and the  veiled threat  of 
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nuclear atack by the Soviet Union as evidence that France could not rely on its aly if 
their interests were not aligned. French Premier Molet used this feeling to overcome 
previously  wel-established  opposition to the proposed  EEC and convince  doubters 
that France’s future lay in leading an integrated Europe.42 
 
In November 1954 tensions between the people of Algeria and the European 
colonists spiled over into what became the Algerian Uprising. France was determined 
to retain control  of  Algeria and the crisis there  was to influence  Suez.  Nasser  was 
known to  have  been  providing  moral, financial and  military support to the  National 
Liberation  Front (FLN) and  French leaders  determined that they could  only  hold 
Algeria if  Nasser  was first  overthrown.43 The  defeat in  Egypt  had something  of a 
reverse impact in Algeria. The French Army, which felt that it had been betrayed by 
the  government  of the  Fourth  Republic,  became  more  politicaly active and as the 
crisis in Algeria worsened the army launched a coup d’etat in May 1958 with General 
de Gaule returning to power as a result. Suez also provided French elites with further 
evidence that US support and protection were not guaranteed. That made possession 
of a  deterent a  national necessity and in  1960  France successfuly tested an atomic 
bomb.44 
 
The  French  decision to support the creation  of a common  market  made the 
EEC  possible and even though  British leaders initialy remained sceptical that it 
                        
42 R. Marjolin, Architect of European Unity (1989), p. 297. 
43 J. Talbot, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria 1954-1962 (London, 1981), p. 70. 
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would prove a viable construct,45 by 1958 this scepticism had been replaced by fear 
that the EEC would damage British trade interests within and outside of Europe, and 
threaten Britain’s relationship with the United States by replacing it as the US partner 
of choice.46 If there  was any  one factor that compeled the  British  government to 
accept the necessity of EEC membership it was the existence and growing strength of 
the  EEC itself.  Having tried and failed to  prevent its creation, subsume it  within a 
larger  European  bloc, and force it to adopt  more liberal  policies  by creating a 
competitor, Britain was left with only one option; to try to join it and hope to shape its 
policies to suit British interests. 
 
The return of de Gaule and the French nuclear deterent belong together to a 
certain extent.  This is  because  de  Gaule’s  desire that  France  develop a credible 
arsenal complicated the relationship between Britain and France on European maters. 
While the General had litle or no intention of alowing Britain to join the EEC at al, 
Macmilan’s decision at Nassau in December 1962 to purchase Polaris from the US 
provided  de  Gaule  with the excuse to  veto the  British  bid.47 In short,  de  Gaule’s 
return to  power  made it less likely that  Britain  would  be able to shape  European 
policy in  general to suits its interests,  or join the  EEC as the  French  President saw 
British involvement in the European Communities as likely to lead to US domination 
of them at the expense of France. The French deterent added a complicating factor to 
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relations between Britain and France and ultimately gave de Gaule a pretext to veto 
in January 1963. 
 
The final  way in  which  Suez impacted  British  policy towards the  European 
Communities can be summed up by two words: Edward Heath. Heath was as much a 
beneficiary of Suez as Macmilan but over a much longer timeframe, and he was to 
have an impact on British policy in both the short and longer term. During the crisis 
he was the government Chief Whip, which is a role not usualy suited to advancement 
to the most senior of Cabinet positions.48 He was wel respected within Whitehal but 
was largely  unknown  outside  of it, also a characteristic  of a  Chief  Whip.49 His 
handling  of two  backbench rebelions,  one from the left-wing  of the  Conservative 
Party angered by the decision to atack Egypt in the first place, and a later one by the 
right-wing which was angered by the decision to withdraw, brought him considerable 
credit and  one  of  his  biographers remarked that  Suez  was the  making  of  him.50 He 
initialy remained as  Chief  Whip  when  Macmilan  became  Prime  Minister  but in 
October  1959  was  promoted to  Minister  of  Labour.  Less than a  year later  he  was 
promoted again, this time given the title Lord Privy Seal and tasked with acting as the 
deputy to  Foreign  Secretary  Lord  Home.51 Heath in this capacity led the  British 
negotiating team in  Brussels and even though the  bid  was a failure,  he  personaly 
emerged  with an enhanced reputation in  Europe, evidence  of  Britain’s increasing 
desire to play an active role in the European integration process, and was awarded the 
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prestigious Charlemagne Prize for his contribution to European unity.52 Ultimately he 
was the Prime Minister who took Britain into the European Communities in January 
1973, ten years after the first bid was vetoed. It was Suez that brought him to public 
atention and gave him the opportunity to demonstrate his abilities, and he is to date 
the only former Chief Whip to have become Prime Minister, and one of only five to 
have held one of the other ‘Great Ofices of State’.53 
 
Historiographical Approach 
This thesis  wil approach the issue  of  Suez and its influence  on  British and 
French  policy evaluations towards the  European  Communities  by taking a ‘high 
political’ approach. ‘High Politics’ has been and can be interpreted in several diferent 
ways: The most common interpretation comes from studies of international relations 
and international politics and concerns the categorising of political issues according to 
their importance and or relevance to the survival of the state. This means that defence, 
policing, immigration and foreign  policy are seen as issues  of  high  politics,  while 
fiscal and social issues are seen as ‘low  politics’  on the  grounds that they  do  not 
directly concern state survival.54 The second interpretation  distinguishes  between 
opinion and  views at the level  of  national  governments  with those  prevalent in the 
wider electorate. In the context  of Irish  Home  Rule in  1888, James  Bulpit 
diferentiated  between the two  political levels  based  on the issues  with  which they 
were  predominately concerned. In this case,  he argued that  Westminster  was 
predominately concerned  with issues  of  defence and security,  while the electorate 
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focussed  more  on  what  he caled ‘participative  politics’, the extension  of the 
franchise, education and employment reform.55 To an extent the two interpretations 
are similar in so far as issues of defence are separated from more domestic concerns, 
although Bulpit’s suggests that the diferentiation is based on the focus of each level 
of political participation, as opposed to within them. 
 
A diferent interpretation wil be used here. To an extent, there wil be some 
overlap with the broad idea of Bulpit as regards a diferentiation of views at diferent 
levels of government, but this work wil distinguish between the two constituent parts 
of the  Westminster level; elected  political leaders  versus appointed  oficials, rather 
than  between  Westminster and the electorate at large.  This is a reflection  of two 
things: the first is that by the late 1950s the electorate paid more atention to and had 
strong  opinions  on issues  previously seen to  be the  preserve  of  government; the 
second that it is  dificult to  make a categorical statement as to the  opinion  of the 
British electorate on the desirability of EEC membership. The poling undertaken by 
Galup between 1957 and 1973 shows an electorate that was not entirely certain what 
its  opinion  was.  At  various  points  opinion  pols suggested support for  British 
membership of the Common Market, while at others, there seemed to be a preference 
for retaining Britain’s Commonwealth links.56 
 
The traditional interpretation of ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics has been a feature of 
the Anglo-European relationship in a historiographical sense. Both Harold Macmilan 
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and General de Gaule have had their motivations examined by historians who have 
debated  whether  or  not foreign  or economic considerations  were  paramount. In 
Macmilan’s case whether he took the decision to apply for EEC membership out of a 
fear that  Britain’s relationship  with the  United  States would sufer if it remained 
outside a European bloc that was steadily growing and that had the favour of the US 
government,57 or  because  he saw in the  EEC the  only  way to improve the  British 
economy and trade position.58 Similarly, de Gaule’s motives for keeping Britain out 
of the  Common  Market  have  been  debated  with some  historians arguing that the 
General feared  British  membership  would  open the  Communities to  American 
domination at the expense  of  France, and  others that  he  was  motivated  by  what 
Moravcsik termed ‘the price of wheat’.59 
 
This author is  of the  view that such  distinctions are at  best superfluous. It is  not 
possible to  distinguish absolutely  between foreign and economic considerations 
because they are intrinsicaly linked, interdependent.  The  1957  Defence  Outline  of 
Future Policy’, one of the most significant documents in the history of British defence 
policy stated thus: 
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Britain’s influence in the world depends first and foremost on the health of her 
internal economy and the success  of  her export trade.  Without these,  military 
power cannot in the long run be supported. It is therefore in the true interests of 
defence that the claims  of  military expenditure should  be considered in 
conjunction  with the  need to  maintain the country’s financial and economic 
strength.60 
 
In the context  of  1960-63 the  EEC represented a threat to  Britain’s  diplomatic ties 
with the US precisely because it was growing at a faster economic rate than Britain 
and so would represent a more viable long-term partner for Washington. Equaly, de 
Gaule’s supposed focus on economic considerations was based on his awareness that 
if Britain and Germany, whose economy was growing at a faster rate than France and 
which had long had greater industrial potential, were both inside the Common Market, 
France  would inevitably lose its position  of  dominance. In  1963  Germany  had the 
potential to be more powerful than France, but the later was stil seen as the stronger 
of the two, and it is significant that  Adenauer,  despite  his  desire to see  Britain join 
with the Six, was not prepared to jeopardise relations with France by trying to force 
its hand. 
 
In regards to the role  of  Civil  Service  oficials in the formulation  of  policy, 
this  work  would  not  disregard their influence,  but  maintain that it is  dificult to 
establish just  how  great that influence  was. In the aftermath  of  Suez the  Foreign 
Ofice atempted to persuade the government to pursue closer ties with Europe based 
on nuclear colaboration. Selwyn Lloyd presented his Grand Design to the Cabinet in 
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January 1957 but although his coleagues agreed that closer ties were desirable, they 
deemed the method advocated by the Foreign Ofice to be the wrong approach.61 Sir 
Frank Lee’s April 1960 report has been cited as instrumental in Macmilan’s decision 
that Britain should try to enter the EEC. Jacqueline Trat described it as ‘the definitive 
document that was to set Britain on a new course, not only in terms of trade but also 
in terms of Britain’s political role and outlook,’62 while D.R Thorpe stated that ‘There 
were many staging points of Macmilan’s Damascene journey towards conversion to 
the European idea, but the Lee memorandum was one of the most vital.’63 Although 
this author accepts the premise that Lee’s report was a factor in Macmilan’s decision 
that  Britain should seek  membership  of the  EEC, the  decision itself  was  made  by 
Macmilan, a reflection not only of his desire to maintain control of important policy, 
but of the position of the Prime Minister in the cabinet system.  
 
The  British cabinet system  works, in theory,  on the  basis  of colective 
decision-making.  The cabinet  meets, considers ideas and  papers, and  votes  on a 
course  of action such as in January  1957  when it considered and rejected  Lloyd’s 
Grand Design. However, although this is the basis of decision making in the British 
government, it is complicated  by the  powerful role  played  by the  Prime  Minister. 
Churchil, Eden and Macmilan were al Prime Minister who expected to control and 
dominate the agenda  of the  governments they led,  were  prone to interfering at 
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department level and  prefered  ministers  who  were  not strong enough to chalenge 
them  on  policy.  Churchil,  who  had to  be forced  out  of  ofice  by  his cabinet, 
considered Defence to his personal fiefdom and interfered continuously to the chagrin 
and annoyance  of  Macmilan  who  was in  1954/55 the responsible  minister.64 Eden 
was a foreign policy expert and although he was compeled to appoint Macmilan as 
Foreign  Secretary in  1955,  he replaced  him eight  months later  with  Selwyn  Lloyd 
who has been portrayed as maleable to the point of subservience.65 
 
Macmilan reached the decision in May 1960 that Britain must join the EEC if 
appropriate terms could be negotiated. He was not strong enough to simply order his 
cabinet to agree, and by July  1960  Lloyd  was teling  Gladwyn Jebb (Britain’s 
Ambassador to  France) that there  were stil  divergences  between  ministers  on  EEC 
entry,66 and the  House  of  Commons  on  25 July that the  government  was  not 
contemplating a  membership  bid.67 Macmilan  was, and  within two  days  he  had 
completed a significant reshufle  of  his cabinet that  has  been interpreted as a 
precursor towards an entry atempt.68 The reshufle included the  promotion  of  men 
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Role, ed. R. Aldous & S. Lee. (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 1. 
65 D.  Carlton, Anthony Eden: A Biography (London,  1981),  pp.  388-389;  D.R.  Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd 
(London, 1989), pp. 190-192. 
66 S.  Greenwood, ‘Not the  General  Wil  but the  Wil  of the  General:  The  Paris  Embassy and the 
European Debate, 1960,’ in The Foreign Ofice and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, ed. G. 
Johnson (London, 2009), p. 183. 
67 H. of C. Debs, Vol. 627, Cols. 1099-1219, ‘European Trade’ (25 Jul., 1960). 
68 M.  Camps, Britain  and the  European  Community  1955-1963 (London,  1964),  pp.  314-315;  G. 
Hutchinson, The Last Edwardian at No. 10: An Impression of Harold Macmilan (London,  1980),  pp. 
76-77. 
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known to  be sympathetic to  British  membership  of the  Common  Market, to 
significant  departments.69 This included  Christopher  Soames to  Agriculture,  Duncan 
Sandys to Commonwealth Relations, and Edward Heath as the deputy to new Foreign 
Secretary Lord Home.70 
 
Structure and Methodology 
The research  methodology  of this thesis makes extensive  use  of  primary 
source  material, the  bulk  of  which shal come from the  National  Archives  of the 
United  Kingdom.  The thesis  wil  make  particular  use  of the  Prime  Ministers  papers 
for the Conservative Government 1951-1964 (PREM 11), as wel as papers from the 
political  departments  of the  Foreign  Ofice (FO  371), those from the  Cabinet series 
CAB  128-131 and  CAB  134, and files relating to  Defence (DO and  DEFE) and the 
Treasury (T). In addition, files from the  Conservative  Party  Archive, located in the 
Bodleian  Library, and files from the archive  of the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Afairs. Two series of published documents wil also be consulted: Foreign Relations 
of the  United  States (FRUS)  1952-1954 (Volume  XII),  1955-1957 (IV and  XVI), 
1958-1960 (VI), 1961-1963 (XII); and the 1956 and 1963 tomes of the French series 
Documents Diplomatiques Français. 
 
In addition to the sources listed above, transcripts from Parliamentary Debates 
wil  be  used, as  wil  published  papers such as  defence estimates and  whites  papers, 
                        
69 S. Greenwood, ‘Not the “General Wil” but the Wil of the General: The Input of the Paris Embassy 
to the British “Great Debate” on Europe, Summer 1960,’ Contemporary British History, Vol. 18, No. 3 
(Autumn, 2004), p. 179. 
70 ‘Lord Home Foreign Secretary,’ Times (28 July., 1960), p. 10. 
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those relating to Maudling Negotiations, and the formation of EFTA. Further primary 
evidence wil be taken from the published volumes of Harold Macmilan’s diaries as 
wel as the autobiographies and  memoirs  of figures including  Macmilan,  Eden, 
Selwyn  Lloyd,  Edward  Heath, and  Robert  Marjolin.  The remainder  of the research 
material  wil  be  drawn from contemporary  newspaper and  periodical articles 
including The Times, Guardian, Economist, and Time, and secondary literature such 
as  biographies  of significant figures,  particularly  General  de  Gaule and  Edward 
Heath whose papers are unavailable at present, and the extensive works on the Suez 
Crisis, Anglo-European, Anglo-French, and Anglo-American relations between 1950 
and 1963. 
 
Much of the existing literature has either ignored the influence of Suez or made only 
very limited reference to it.  Works that  have claimed that  Suez caused  Macmilan’s 
government to undertake a review of its policies that resulted in the decision to seek 
closer ties  with  Europe  have  not supported this assertion  with  much  verifiable 
evidence. In order therefore to establish whether or not such a review occured, what 
prompted it, and what conclusions if any were drawn regarding Europe, it is necessary 
to examine the  oficial  papers.  The  1957  Defence  White  Paper  might  not  mention 
Suez explicitly, but by analysing the earlier drafts and the discussions that resulted in 
the final, published document, it is possible to see what influenced it and the people 
who created it. 
 
To return to the particular choice of sources, this work makes extensive use of 
the  published  volumes  FRUS and  DDF.  The  papers from the  National  Archives are 
useful for identifying the factors  behind  policy  decisions,  but they  only  give the 
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British  perspective.  By  using  DDF and  FRUS this  work can take a  broader  view  of 
Anglo-European relations and  deal specificaly  with aspects  of the existing 
historiography that focus on France, and on how British figures were viewed outside 
of Whitehal. For example, historians have long disagreed as to the extent of Harold 
Macmilan’s ‘Europeanism’  with some  disputing the  notion that  he  was in any 
meaningful  way ‘pro-European’.71 The record  of a  meeting in  Washington  DC 
between  US and  French  oficials in January  1957  demonstrates that several  of 
Macmilan’s contemporaries, in this case John  Foster  Dules and  Christian  Pineau, 
considered him to be a supporter of European unity and the most European member of 
the Conservative Party.72 The basis for Sir Alan Milward’s view that Suez influenced 
the Conservative government to adopt Plan G in November 1956 is supported by the 
account of the French Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Chauvel) who atributed 
an apparent shift in British policy to the Suez Crisis.73 
 
Beyond oficial papers from the UK, United States and France, the thesis also 
utilises contemporary media sources. These have several uses that have contributed to 
the  decision to include them. In the case  of  Edward  Heath,  Harold  Macmilan and 
others, articles from The Times, Guardian and other outlets provide a good indication 
of  how they  were  perceived  by their contemporaries.  Chapter  Six for example  uses 
                        
71 D. Carlton, Anthony Eden (1981), p. 285; D.R. Thorpe, Supermac (2011), p. 256. 
72 FRUS  1955-1957,  Volume IV,  Doc.  209 ‘Memorandum  of a  Conversation,  Department of  State, 
Washington’ (11 Jan., 1957). 
73 DDF  1956  Tome. III, ‘Chauvel to  Pineau’ (29  Nov.,  1956),  pp.  426-427.  Translated  by  Dan 
Whyman. 
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newspaper articles to demonstrate the extent to which Edward Heath’s public profile 
and political reputation were enhanced by his handling of the Suez Crisis.74 
 
Structuraly this thesis is  divided into seven chapters including this  one: 
Chapter Two acts as the first of a two part section that considers in detail the claims of 
some  historians that  Suez  was such a fundamental shock to the  British  government 
that it engaged on a process of review, leading to the policy of seeking closer ties with 
Europe.  Chapter  Two accordingly  deals  with the reasons for  Suez  being such a 
calamitous  defeat for  Britain. It considers the  Suez  Crisis in the context  of a 
phenomenon  known as ‘heuristics and  biases’; the idea that  people  view events 
through pre-conceived opinions until something occurs to bring their perception into 
line  with reality.  British foreign and  defence  policy  between  1945 and  1956  wil  be 
analysed so as to identify why Suez was so disastrous, and whether or not it is fair to 
say that the  British  government  had enough evidence to  perhaps  have acted 
diferently. 
 
Chapter  Three focuses  on the response  of the  Eden and  Macmilan 
governments to the events in  Egypt and tries to ascertain  whether there is any 
documentary evidence for the relatively  unsupported assertions  of  historians that a 
review occured after Suez that resulted in a greater focus on Europe. The chapter wil 
examine documents from the National Archives including the 1957 ‘Defence Outline 
of  Future  Policy’,75 the ‘Study  of  Future  Policy for  1960-1970’76 and two foreign 
                        
74 A  Student  of  Politics, ‘The  Ranks  Unbroken’, Sunday Times (11  Nov.,  1956),  p.  9; ‘Notes  of the 
Week: Revolt Dampened’, The Economist (8 Dec., 1956), p. 857. 
75 Cmnd. 124, ‘Defence Outline of Future Policy’ (Apr., 1957). 
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policy reviews;  one  on the state  of the  Anglo-American relationship; the  other  on 
Anglo-American interdependence.77 It  might seem strange that a thesis focussing  on 
British and  French  policy re-evaluations  of  EEC  membership should examine 
documents  on the  US-UK special relationship  but  what  Chapter  Three  wil 
demonstrate is that  Europe  was a  point  of contention  between the  US and  British 
governments. The US was frustrated that the British government seemed unwiling to 
engage positively with the process of European integration, while many in the Foreign 
Ofice felt that the US was simply demonstrating a lack of appreciation for the unique 
and  global role that  Britain  played.  Suez, as the chapter  demonstrates,  made  British 
leaders  more conducive to  American  wishes and the  policy  of interdependence 
reflected the fact that Harold Macmilan considered the Atlantic and European circles 
to be one and the same. 
 
Folowing on from the Macmilan-inspired policy of interdependence, Chapter 
Four  moves  on to the  ways in  which this thesis  believes  Suez  was  of the  most 
significance for the  Anglo-European relationship; the fal from  power  of  Anthony 
Eden and his being replaced by Macmilan rather than Butler. The chapter examines 
the impact  of  Suez  on  Macmilan’s  hopes  of  becoming  Prime  Minister, taking the 
view that  without at least some sort  of foreign  policy crisis those hopes  were slim. 
The views on Europe of Eden, Butler and Macmilan wil be considered and it wil be 
concluded that  Macmilan’s  more  positive atitude towards  European integration, 
                                                                    
76 TNA CAB 129/100, F.P. (60) 1 ‘Future Policy Study 1960’ (24 Feb., 1960). 
77 TNA  CAB  130/39, ‘The  Position  of the  United  Kingdom in  World  Affairs’ (1  May.,  1958);  CAB 
129/92, C. (58) 77 ‘The Effects of Anglo-American Interdependence on the Long-Term Interests of the 
United Kingdom’ (10 Apr., 1958). 
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reflected in  his  May  1960  decision to try to enter the  EEC,  was crucial to the 
evolution of British policy.  
 
Chapter Five takes the focus away from the British government and examines 
the efect  of  Suez  on  France. It takes the  view that the crisis  persuaded the  French 
government that its interests lay in  membership and leadership  of a  European 
Common  Market, and the  possession  of  nuclear  weapons. It also influenced the 
conduct of the Algerian Uprising and through this played a role in Charles de Gaule 
returning to  power in  May  1958.  As the chapter  demonstrate, each  of these  had an 
impact  on  Britain and its relationship  with the  European  Communities.  The first 
forced the  British  government to accept that  detachment  was  no longer a  viable 
prospect as this had been based on the assumption that the French government would 
never agree to the creation  of a supranational  organisation.  This, the return  of  De 
Gaule and the development of the French deterent turned Suez into something of a 
paradox: It set the  British  government  down the  path that ended  with the first 
application for EEC membership, and at the same time, set in motion the factors that 
would combine to frustrate it in this endeavour.  
 
Chapter  Six looks at the impact  of the  Suez  Crisis  on the career  of  Edward 
Heath. As Heath’s most long-lasting contribution to the Anglo-European relationship 
(his taking  Britain into the  EEC)  occured  outside  of the  main timeframe  of this 
thesis, the chapter is somewhat an addition.  Nevertheless, as  Heath’s career  was 
launched  by  Suez, and  his  unsuccessful atempt to lead the  Macmilan entry bid 
gained  him  much credit in  Europe, and  went some  way to convincing  European 
leaders that the British government was serious about membership, it is included here. 
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Chapter  Six  wil explore the role  Heath  played in  preventing the fal  of the 
Conservative government  during the crisis, the  origin  of the  views  on  Europe that 
made  him famous, and the  ways in  which  his actions  between  1960 and  1973 
contributed to Britain’s accession to the EEC. 
 
Overal, this thesis wil demonstrate that far from being a coincidental even of 
marginal  or  no relevance to the  Anglo-European relationship,  Suez  was an event  of 
considerable significance, and should be considered in a European context as it has an 
Anglo-American, and an imperial one. It was instrumental in the development of the 
careers  of two  Prime  Ministers;  one  of  whom (Macmilan) led  his country to 
accepting the  necessity  of  EEC  membership and atempted to achieve that 
membership; the other (Heath) was appointed to lead Macmilan’s negotiating team in 
1961, and succeeded in  1973  where  his  predecessor  had failed.  Suez  helped  Guy 
Molet convince the sceptical members of his government that France’s future lay in 
leading an integrated Europe, persuaded French leaders to accelerate the development 
of a  nuclear  deterent, and  helped  de  Gaule return to  power.  Lastly,  while it is  not 
viable to conclude that Suez caused an immediate reversal of British policy on EEC 
membership, it  did  provoke a reappraisal and in the longer-term set the  British 
government  on a road that led, eventualy and  despite significant  obstacles, to its 
membership of the modern European Union. 
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Chapter II: Perception vs Reality: The Suez Crisis 
 
Introduction 
One  of the two  main arguments in the existing  historiography  of  Suez and  Anglo-
European relations is that the crisis revealed to  British  policymakers the extent to 
which  Britain could  no longer  behave as if it were  one  of the  great  world  powers.1 
Britain, and  France  were  diplomaticaly isolated at the  United  Nations, and  were 
forced to end their invasion  of  Egypt  when it  had  barely started,  despite it enjoying 
initial  military success.  For this argument to  hold  up  under scrutiny, it  must folow 
that for  weakness to  have  been revealed, it  must  have  been assumed  by  British 
policymakers that the country  was in a  much stronger  position in the summer and 
autumn of 1956 than it fact was the case. This is an example of ‘perception vs reality’, 
the idea that there is  no  necessary link  between  objective ‘reality’ and  one’s 
perception of it. In political science this phenomena is known as heuristics and biases 
                        
1 S.  Bulmer, ‘Britain and  European Integration;  Of  Sovereignty,  Slow  Adaptation and  Semi-
Detachment’ in,  S.  George (Ed.), Britain  and the  European  Community:  The  Politics  of  Semi-
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5, No. 4 (Nov., 2002), p. 493. 
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and there is an extensive body of literature devoted to it.2 According to one example, 
from a June 2010 Scientific American article, 
 
 We assume that the external world maps perfectly onto our internal view of it—
an expectation that is reinforced  by  daily experience…That there should  be a 
match  between  perception and reality is  not surprising,  because evolution 
ruthlessly eliminates the  unfit. If  you routinely  misperceive  or even  halucinate 
and act on those misapprehensions, you won’t survive long in a world filed with 
dangers  whose avoidance requires accurate  distance and speed assessments and 
rapid reactions.3 
 
Henry  Kissinger (US  Secretary  of  State  1973-1977)  once  gave another relevant 
example of this phenomenon, although he did not describe it as such, when discussing 
the diferences between British and American foreign policy. Kissinger described the 
US realisation in the  1960s and  1970s that there  were limits to its  power as ‘a rude 
awakening’, implying that  US  perceptions  of itself and its power  had  not  been in 
synch  with reality.4 The  1956  Suez  Crisis further  demonstrates that this idea  of 
                        
2 e.g. A.  Tversky  &  D.  Kahneman, ‘Judgement  Under  Uncertainty:  Heuristics and  Biases’, Science, 
Vol. 185, No. 4157 (Sep., 1974), pp. 1124-1131; M. Bassin, ‘Inventing Siberia: Visions of the Russian 
East in the Early Nineteenth Century’, The American Historical Review,  Vol.  96,  No.  3 (Jun.,  1991), 
pp. 763-794. 
3 C. Koch, ‘Looks Can Deceive: Why Perception and Reality Do Not Always Match Up,’ Scientific 
American (24 June, 2010), htp:/www.scientificamerican.com/article/looks-can-deceive/ Accessed 5 
July 2014. 
4 H. Kissinger, ‘Reflections  on a  Partnership:  British and  American  Atitudes to  Postwar  Foreign 
Policy’, International Afairs, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982), p. 575. 
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perception faling  behind reality can  be as true in a  historical sense as it is in a 
scientific  one.  Britain’s actions in the  months that folowed  President  Nasser’s 
nationalisation  of the  Suez  Canal, culminating in the il-fated  Operation  Musketeer, 
were based on faulty assumptions about its diplomatic and military strength. Success 
in  Egypt  depended  on two things; the ability  of the  British  Armed  Forces to retake 
swiftly and  hold the  Canal,5 and the  government’s ability to ensure that if  Britain’s 
alies did not actively support an invasion of Egypt, they would at least not take steps 
to actively oppose one.6 
 
As events transpired, neither of these prerequisites was realised. The Chiefs of 
Staf  delivered a stark  negative  verdict  when asked if it  was  militarily feasible to 
immediately retake the canal, and so a  period  of  military  build-up  was  necessary.7 
Lacking the ability to  defeat the  Egyptians in the immediate aftermath  of 
nationalisation, it  was imperative that  British  diplomats either  persuade the  United 
States to support Britain, or prevent the United Nations and other international actors 
from insisting on a diplomatic solution that did not return the canal to Anglo-French 
ownership.8 What this chapter  wil  determine is the extent to  which  British 
policymakers failed to recognise that  Britain  was  not capable in  military and 
diplomatic terms,  of successfuly launching an aggressive  military  operation in the 
                        
5 R. Fulick & G. Powel, Suez: The Double War (Barnsley, 2006), p. 13. 
6 W.W.  Aldrich,  The Suez  Crisis a  Footnote to  History, Foreign  Afairs,  Volume  45, Issue  3 (Apr 
1967), p. 552. 
7 TNA,  CAB  134/1217,  EC.  56 (5), ‘Action  Against  Egypt – Outline  Plan,’  Memorandum  by the 
Chiefs of Staff’, p. 4. 
8 HMD vol. I (30 Jul., 1956), pp. 579-580. 
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face  of concerted  opposition. It  wil show that  Britain  overestimated its ability to 
influence the policy of the United States, and that its assumed position of leadership 
of the  Commonwealth  was similarly eroneous.9 To  do this it  wil analyse  British 
foreign  policy  between  1945 and  1956 and examine  how  much influence and 
leadership Britain actualy possessed. It wil also look at Anglo-European relations in 
this  period so as to set the contextual scene for the later chapters,  particularly as 
European  nations  were  broadly supportive  of the  Anglo-French invasion  of  Egypt, 
seeing it as an atempt to reassert European position and values at a time when these 
were perceived to be disregarded or marginalised by the superpowers.10 
 
In addition to examining  British  diplomatic strength  between  1945 and the 
Suez  Crisis, this chapter  wil also analyse  British  defence  policy so as to  determine 
how far apart the expectations of the Eden government were from the capabilities of 
the armed forces, and how this had come about. British economic policy however wil 
not  be examined  here.  While the  pressure that the  US  placed  on  Britain  was 
economic, refusing to sanction a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
support  Sterling,  British  policymakers  were  not  guilty  of failing to reconcile 
perception  with reality in this area. Internal  Treasury  documents and  Harold 
Macmilan’s contemporaneous entries in  his  diary  highlighted the risks and costs to 
the  British economy in launching a  military  operation such as  Musketeer, and  had 
Britain  not  overestimated either its diplomatic strength,  or the ability  of the armed 
                        
9 TNA PREM 11/1096, ‘UK High Commissioner in India to Commonwealth Relations Office’ (5 Nov., 
1956). 
10 TNA PREM 11/1143, ‘Adenauer to Eden’ (22 Nov., 1956); PREM 11/2002, ‘Gerbrandy to Eden’ (4 
Jan., 1957). 
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forces to retake the canal before diplomatic opposition could take efect, the economic 
issues would not have matered.11 
 
Suez and the ‘Three Circles’ 
Winston  Churchil coined this  phrase,  which  has  often since  been  used to  describe 
British foreign  policy after the  Second  World  War. In  Churchil’s  view,  Britain 
occupied a  unique  position at the centre  of three  geopolitical circles; the  Anglo-
American ‘special relationship’, the  British  Empire (or the remnants  of it) and 
Commonwealth, and continental  Europe.12 Having emerged from the  Second  World 
War victorious but economicaly dependent on aid from the United States,13 Churchil 
saw the three circles as  Britain’s  way  of compensating for the loss  of  much  of the 
Empire and remaining a  global  power.14 Although al three circles  were seen as 
essential to Britain, there was something of a hierarchy involved. Europe was seen as 
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Contemporary British History, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 2008), pp. 297-316. 
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Historical Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), p. 930. 
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the least important  of the circles,  while the  American and  Commonwealth links 
occupied pride of place.15 
 
The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ 
The term ‘special relationship’ has long been a fixture of coverage of British foreign 
and defence policy, and of Anglo-American relations. It has also been one of the most 
controversial  phrases  of the  modern era  with  many commentators expressing 
scepticism as to its  very existence, let alone its extent.16 Similarly, the ‘special 
relationship’ has been the subject of an extensive body of academic literature, some 
works taking a sceptical  view,17 while  others either  describing the relationship, 
particularly its high and low points, in a more dispassionate manner,18 or focusing on 
                        
15 F.  Bedarida, ‘Winston  Churchil’s Image  of  France and the  French’, Historical Research,  Vol.  74, 
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specific aspects of it.19 The Suez Crisis has often been seen as a particularly low point 
in the  history  of  Anglo-American relations.20 It  was the  United  States  who applied 
economic  pressure to compel  Britain (and  France) to  halt the invasion  of  Egypt  by 
refusing to sanction a British drawing from the IMF, and refusing to supply it with oil 
until  Operation  Musketeer  was ended.21 Equaly, and to  present the  American 
perspective,  Britain started a reckless  war and, in colusion  with  France and Israel, 
lied to its American aly.22 
 
The exchange of messages between Anthony Eden and President Eisenhower 
was indicative of the extent to which Britain and the US diverged; the anger, shock 
and  disapproval  of the  US, its  determination to insist  on  British  withdrawal  before 
even considering aid to  London, and the  desperate situation in  which  Eden found 
himself,  were al  more than clear.  On  30  October  Eisenhower  wrote to  Eden 
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expressing astonishment that  Britain  did  not consider  herself  bound  by the  1950 
Tripartite  Agreement, the  undertaking  by  Britain, the US and  France to inform and 
consult with each other in a combined efort to maintain the teritorial status quo in 
the Middle East.23 Eden’s response, which the President received during a conference 
between  Eisenhower and  his advisors including  Secretary of  State  Dules, reiterated 
this and the remarks  of  both  Eisenhower and  Dules include the later’s  view that 
Britain assumed that the US would feel obligated to render economic assistance rather 
than see it colapse.24 Eisenhower responded to this by questioning Britain’s value as 
an aly and remarked that the necessity to support the British was not as great as they 
supposed.25 A  week later and  Eden’s tone in telephone conversations  has a  hint  of 
desperation to it, seeking to  visit  Washington  DC,26 and  being rather anxious  when 
Eisenhower, on the basis of advice from his oficials, moved from being open to the 
idea,27 to agreeing to it  but  not the timing.28 In fact,  Eisenhower  was teling  Dules 
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that  Eden’s  visit should  be ‘contingent  on certain events taking  place in advance’,29 
those events  being a ceasefire and  Anglo-French  withdrawal from  Port  Said,  These 
conditions were communicated as such to Eden.30 
 
This chapter examines the extent to which the British government was aware 
of the scale of the disaster of Suez in the aftermath of its withdrawal under American 
economic and  diplomatic  pressure.  What  was clear though  was that  Britain  had 
gravely overestimated its ability to influence the US. It had believed that the special 
relationship  was such that  America  would acquiesce in its invasion  of  Egypt rather 
than see its economy colapse31 or it reduced to what Macmilan had described as the 
status of ‘another Netherlands’ if it was unable to reassert control over Suez.32 But it 
is necessary here to look back over the period 1945-1956 to determine whether or not 
the special relationship was in fact as close and subject to as much British influence as 
Britain’s actions at Suez would indicate. 
 
An incident during the Second World War best describes certain atitudes on 
the  part  of  Britain  when it came to  Anglo-American relations.  Macmilan  described 
the situation to  Richard  Crossman in terms  of the  British  being the  Greeks to 
America’s Rome, advising him to ensure that US oficials were always in a position 
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of authority while the British did most of the work. Alowing the Americans to think 
they were running things would enable the British to run them themselves.33 In 1944 
the  Foreign  Ofice  was  of a similar  opinion, seeking ‘to  make  use [of]  American 
power for  purposes  which  we regard as  good’.34 In the early  1950s  Anthony  Eden 
pursued a  policy  described  by  Ruane and  Elison as ‘power  by  proxy’35, in essence 
Britain  using  American  power to support  British interests.  This  was  based  on the 
premise that the  US  needed and  would welcome  British  guidance in its new role as 
the dominant member of the western aliance.36 Anthony Eden’s 1952 study ‘British 
Overseas Obligations’ had the folowing to say: 
 
Our aim should  be to  persuade the  United  States to assume the real  burdens in 
such organisations37, while retaining for ourselves as much political control –and 
hence prestige and world influence- as we can.38 
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An examination of both British and American sources for the period makes clear that 
such a  policy  had litle  prospect  of success as regards  Suez, and that  British 
experiences in  negotiations  with the  US  prior to  Eden’s study should  perhaps  have 
made that obvious. Although the post-war Labour government has been given some 
credit for the formation of NATO, the Truman Doctrine, and the European Recovery 
Program (Marshal  Aid),39 it cannot in  general  be said that these  were examples  of 
Britain influencing  US  policy. In each case the actions  of the  US  were  based  on a 
calculation of what was in America’s interest, particularly in the context of the Cold 
War, and there are several examples of British influence having no positive impact at 
al on the US. Within days of the end of the war against Japan in August 1945 the US 
had canceled Lend Lease40 and in 1946 passed the Atomic Energy Act, beter known 
as the McMahon Act, ending the wartime colaboration on the development of nuclear 
weapons.41 The  US  did  provide a substantial loan to  Britain in  December  1945,  but 
while  British  negotiators such as John  Maynard  Keynes felt that  Britain’s  wartime 
sacrifice should  merit continued financial assistance from the  US,  neither their 
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American counterparts,  nor the  American  public,  were agreeable.42 Moreover, the 
loan was conditional on Sterling being made a fuly convertible curency within one 
year, and the abolition  of the system  of imperial trade  preference,43 two conditions 
that  were condemned  by  Conservative  Members in the  House  of  Commons.44 It 
should be pointed out that the US chose not to force either condition when it was clear 
that  Britain could  not  viably comply in a short space  of time,45 but the fact remains 
that  US aid to  Britain  did  not come for free, and that  past colaboration and shared 
wartime sacrifice counted for less than Britain thought it should. 
 
After the Conservatives returned to ofice in 1951 there was litle change and 
the US showed neither the need, nor the desire, for British guidance. In several areas 
British influence  over  US  policy  was  negligible.  The  British  position  during the 
discussions  over a  Middle  East  Command  was that a  British  general should  be in 
command, and they  wanted the same  person to also  hold the command  of  NATO’s 
south-eastern flank.46 The  American record  of a  meeting  between  Churchil and 
President  Eisenhower  on  8 January  1952 shows  Churchil and  Eden repeatedly 
stressing the  necessity that the final communiqué  make clear the  determination  of 
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Britain and the US to work together in the Middle East – but also that the US could 
not agree to  one  oficer  holding two separate commands.47 The  overal tone  of the 
respective positions is that the British participants were markedly more eager to stress 
Anglo-American agreement than were the Americans. Eisenhower did state that it was 
important that both sides understood each other, but it is clear that understanding the 
position  of the  UK and agreeing  with it was not the same thing.48 An  11  February 
leter from the Secretary of Defence to the Secretary of State advocated the opposing 
of British two-hat (a British general holding the Middle East and a NATO command 
simultaneously)  proposals, and that the  UK should  not even  be informed  of the 
creation  of a  State  Department-Defence  Department  working  group  until the  US 
position  on  Middle  East  Command  had  been finalised.49 A  National Inteligence 
Special  Estimate  dated  17  March  1952  detailed the  problems  with the  proposed 
Middle  East  Defence  Organisation, specificaly linked the issue  of  Egyptian 
participation to  British acceptance  of  withdrawal from the  Canal  Zone,  detailed  US 
concerns about Arab opinions regarding the UK, and speculated that Arab cooperation 
with MEDO could lead to a reduction of British and French influence in the region.50 
 
These US accounts, and the views expressed by American oficials in private 
and in  discussions  with the  British,  do  not support  Eden’s idea that  Britain could 
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harness  American  power to the  benefit  of  British  policy.  American  opposition to 
British  proposals, the  desire to exclude  Britain from their  Working  Group, and the 
prospect  of the  US  using  MEDO to increase its influence in the  Middle  East at the 
expense  of  Britain strongly suggest the  opposite.  This is the argument  of  Steven 
Freiberger whose work presented Anglo-American relations in the Middle East as the 
US atempting to reduce  British influence and replace it as the  dominant  western 
power.51 Britain faced a similar lack of success in shaping American policy over the 
European Defence Community,52 and over military relations with Australia and New 
Zealand. In the same vein that Britain favoured the creation of an integrated military 
organisation in the Middle East, it advocated the creation of a South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation.  The  US supported the  development  of the  military capacities  of 
Australia and  New  Zealand and concluded the  ANZUS  Pact, a tripartite agreement 
between it,  Australia and  New  Zealand that commited the  US to the  defence  of its 
alies, but was not prepared to go beyond this and commit to a regional pact.53 
 
It is  not  possible  within the limits  of this  work to explore the ful scope  of 
Anglo-American relations between 1945 and the Suez Crisis. However, the immediate 
post-war loan negotiations, and the making of the Middle East Defence Organisation 
and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, are three examples that demonstrate the 
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extent to which the British notions of influencing and shaping American policy were 
wholy  unrealistic.  The  US  was  not completely indiferent to  Britain and  was  more 
than prepared to render assistance, but America was not prepared to sacrifice its own 
interests so as to conform to the idea of a special relationship, nor was it amenable to 
the sort  of  pressure and influence that  Eden and  others  believed it would  be.  Suez 
was, of course, a significant event that demonstrated the extent to which Britain could 
neither rely on the US when their interests were not aligned, nor shape its policy to 
Britain’s advantage.  However,  given the  nature  of  Anglo-American relations in the 
decade leading  up to the crisis, it is somewhat surprising that  British  policymakers 
should have assumed that America would acquiesce in such a dubious undertaking as 
Operation Musketeer. 
 
The Empire and Commonwealth 
In June 1952 Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, wrote his memorandum British 
Overseas  Obligations. In addition to statements regarding  Britain  not  being a self-
suficient economic unit and that the non-Communist world faced an external threat, 
Eden made the folowing statement about Britain’s position in world afairs: 
 
Secondly,  withdrawal from a  major commitment  would afect the international 
status of the United Kingdom. By reducing the value of the United Kingdom as a 
partner and aly, it would undermine the cohesion of the Commonwealth and the 
special relationship  of the  United  Kingdom  with the  United  States and its 
European partners and other alies. Their atitude towards us wil depend largely 
on our status as a world Power and upon their belief that we are ready and wiling 
to support them. It is evident that in so far as  we reduce  our commitments and 
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our power declines, our claim to the leadership of the Commonwealth…wil be, 
pro tanto, diminished.54 
 
The above paragraph contains within it elements of two British assumptions specific 
to the Commonwealth: The first was that Britain’s leadership of the Commonwealth 
was an established fact rather than its  own self-perception.  The second  was that the 
Commonwealth as an institution  was as important to its  members as it  was to the 
United Kingdom. Suez revealed both of these assumptions to be deeply flawed.  
 
Implicit in the assumption of leadership was the belief that Britain could guide 
the  policies  of  Commonwealth  members in the same  way that it could those  of the 
United States. Krishnan Srinivasan wrote in a 2006 article Nobody’s Commonwealth? 
The  Commonwealth in  Britain’s  Post-imperial  Adjustment that the  Commonwealth 
had been designed by Britain to provide a surogate for colonial rule, an instrument to 
replace formal empire  with a  British sphere  of influence.55 Of significance to this 
discussion is the role  of the  Baghdad  Pact.  Conceived as a  way  of  preventing an 
increase in  Soviet influence in the  Middle  East,56 the  Pact included  Pakistan in its 
membership and that country retained close defence links with the United Kingdom, 
theoreticaly adding a further rationale for any  British assumptions  of support from 
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Karachi in  1956.57 In the event,  on the former ‘white’  dominions  of  Australia,  New 
Zealand and  South  Africa supported  Britain at  Suez.58 Sir  Sidney  Holand,  Prime 
Minister of New Zealand 1949-1957, messaged Eden to the efect that Britain was not 
without friends and that New Zealand expressed ‘profound admiration of you and al 
you  have  done leading  up to and  during these extremely  dificult  days’.59 Holand’s 
Australian counterpart Sir Robert Menzies wrote to Eden that in his view an Anglo-
French  withdrawal away from the  Canal  Zone  would leave it  unprotected, and that 
public opinion in Australia was ‘steadily consolidating in favour of action you have 
taken’.60 The majority of the Commonwealth however was appaled at the atack on 
Egypt and the reactions of India and Pakistan were of particular concern. 
 
India and  Pakistan  were  both  members  of the  Commonwealth, although this 
situation  was  not  one  of enormous conviction. India  had  been sceptical about the 
benefits of membership and concerned that it might limit its practical independence. 
Pakistan, for its part, was a member of the Baghdad Pact and was wary of the threat it 
perceived from India. The reluctance of Britain to elevate the dispute between India 
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and Pakistan over Kashmir to an issue that concerned the Commonwealth as a whole 
was a source of frustration to Pakistan, and its religious links with Egypt meant that 
there existed a gulf between the sentiments of the Pakistani populace (more inclined 
to support  Egypt) and its  government that saw its  military aliance  with  Britain as 
essential for its defence. Neither Pakistan, nor India were consulted by Egypt before it 
nationalised the  Suez  Canal and  neither country agreed  with that action  once they 
became aware of it.61 However, the decision of Britain and France to launch a war of 
aggression against Egypt provoked a very angry response in New Delhi and Karachi. 
On November 3rd the UK High Commissioner in Pakistan (Acting) telegrammed the 
Commonwealth  Relations  Ofice (CRO) the  details  of  his  meeting  with  Prime 
Minister Suhrawardy. The later informed him that public opinion in Pakistan was that 
the  UK  had endangered the safety  of al  minor countries and that the  Baghdad  Pact 
could not survive if one member was guilty of aggression. Suhrawardy also told the 
Commissioner that if the  UK  did  not accept the  UN  Mandate then  Pakistan  would 
withdraw from the  Commonwealth  on the  grounds that  membership  would  be 
inconceivable if the organisation was headed by an aggressor nation.62 The next day, 
November  4th, the  Commissioner  despatched an additional telegram in  which  he 
relayed the words of a statement made by Suhrawardy that there was strong feeling in 
Pakistan that events in Egypt constituted a threat to the entire Muslim world.63 
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Suhrawardy  himself  wrote to  Anthony  Eden  on  November  4th detailing  his 
opinion on Britain’s actions in Egypt and the folowing is of particular significance: 
 
While we understand how acute have been your anxieties over the situation in the 
Middle East we find ourselves unable to support action the United Kingdom and 
French Governments have chosen to adopt in that behalf. Egypt’s recalcitrance in 
ariving at a setlement satisfactory to  Users  being a consideration apart, the 
present  outbreak  of  hostilities in  Middle  East is entirely responsibility  of 
Israel…In these circumstances  public  opinion throughout the  world  must  hold 
Israel as a  wanton aggressor.  That the  United  Kingdom and  French 
Governments…should  have seen fit to impose terms  on  Egypt far  more severe 
than those imposed  on Israel is a consideration  which  must cause  deep 
resentment throughout the Muslim world, to which we in Pakistan cannot remain 
indiferent. It is tragic that  Suez  Canal,  which intervention  was  designed to 
defend has been blocked, not as a result of war between Israel and Egypt, but as a 
result  of  Anglo-French aerial atack  on  Egyptian  military targets…we cannot 
condone  or  uphold this resort to force, especialy  when the  United  Nations is 
already seized  of the  mater. I  would, therefore,  most earnestly request  you to 
reconsider course of action…The first requirement in retrieving situation, to my 
mind, would be to accept verdict of General Assembly. Refusal to do so would 
not  only shater the  very concept  of  which  United  Nations is  build,  but  wil 
render  our  position, as a  member  of the  Commonwealth and  Baghdad  Pact, 
increasingly dificult.64 
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India’s atitude was broadly similar to that of Pakistan. The UK High Commissioner 
in India (Malcolm Macdonald) conveyed the views of certain Indian political leaders 
to the British government in a series of telegrams on November 5th. The first briefly 
conveyed some answers Prime Minister Nehru had given to corespondents including 
that ‘he considered  Anthony  Eden’s explanations  of  Anglo-French action “totaly 
unconvincing and unsatisfactory”’, and that he could not say if the British action had 
weakened Commonwealth ties. Of particular note was the reference to Nehru’s tone 
being angry  when  he stated that  war  was  being  waged  by  Britain and  France  on 
Egyptian soil when what had happened was that Israel atacked Egypt.65 In the second 
Macdonald recounted two meetings he had with U.N. Dhebar, President of the ruling 
Congress  Party,  who told  him that  Britain’s  hitherto strong reputation in  Asia  had 
been completely  destroyed  by its actions in  Egypt.  Moreover, the  Commissioner 
reported that  Britain’s friends in  Egypt  were stunned and shocked  by its  policy, 
viewing it as contrary to UN and other treaty obligations and likely to defeat British 
atempts to strengthen its influence in the Middle East. The Commissioner added his 
own assessment including a  warning that there  were  growing  demands that India 
leave the  Commonwealth and that if a  diference  of  opinion  with  Britain continued 
the Indian government might not be able to oppose such demands.66 A third telegram 
advised the CRO that in Macdonald’s opinion, Dhebar was corect when he predicted 
a reduction in  British influence in  Asia, and that ‘if  our  policy is  not  quickly 
modified…our reputation in India and beyond wil sufer ireparable damage’.67 
 
                        
65 Ibid, ‘UK High Commissioner in India to CRO’ (5 Nov, 1956, 07:50). 
66 Ibid, ‘UK High Commissioner in India to CRO’ (5 Nov., 1956, 09:39). 
67 Ibid, ‘UK High Commissioner in India to CRO’ (5 Nov., 1956, 10:26). 
 52 
The diplomatic exchanges with members of the Commonwealth reveals much 
in the context  of the  post-war  period.  The first is that there appeared to  be at least 
some semblance of recognition that Britain retained a position of influence within the 
Commonwealth even if that fel short of formal leadership. Suhrawardy refered to the 
Commonwealth  being  headed  by an aggressor in the context  of  Pakistan’s  position 
within it and  Dhebar remarked to  Macdonald that  prior to  Suez  Britain  had  great 
influence in Asia, more in fact than even the United States.68 The second, and more 
significant in the context of Suez, was that influence or leadership did not mean that 
Commonwealth countries would simply folow Britain’s lead. Suez demonstrated that 
quite conclusively.  What  maters  here is  whether  or  not there is any evidence to 
suggest that British leaders should perhaps have behaved diferently when it came to 
action against Egypt and the sentiments of the rest of the Commonwealth. 
 
In  diplomatic, economic and  military terms the  Comonwealth  was  of 
paramount importance to  Britain and this is reflected in several instances  between 
1945 and 1956. In 1955 and 1956 agreements were reached to supply Pakistan with 
five destroyers and loan HMS Chivalrous for four years, and to sel an aircraft carier 
to the Indian Navy.69 In each case the rationale for reducing the number of available 
ships to the  Royal  Navy  was the  need to ensure that India and  Pakistan remained 
dependant  on the  UK for the acquisition  of  military equipment.  The  British 
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government spent considerable time in the aftermath of India’s independence striving 
to ensure that it remained in the  Commonwealth, a  multilateral rather than  bilateral 
efort involving Canada among other nations and a reflection that Britain needed the 
support  of  other  members  of the  Commonwealth.70 India required especial care 
because while it agreed to remain a member, it did not consider the Commonwealth to 
be  more important than its  own interests and ability to  pursue those independently. 
Nehru for example,  while in  ofice, insisted that sovereignty and equality  of the 
member states  be  direct  principles  of the  Commonwealth itself.  While  Pakistan 
repeatedly tried to  make  Kashmir a topic  of  Commonwealth  discussions, India 
steadfastly refused to alow its  disputes  with  Pakistan and  other  members  be 
discussed, let alone setled at the Commonwealth level.71 
 
There are two examples of the care that Britain took, and in fact had to take, 
when it came to the sentiments of Commonwealth members. The first was the Anglo-
American loan negotiations of 1945/1946, which included an American demand that 
in exchange for a loan,  Britain abandon its system  of imperial  preference.  As the 
Dominions (Canada,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa and  Australia)  had extensive 
economic interests in imperial preference it was not practical for Britain to treat the 
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loan issue as a  purely  bilateral  one  between itself and the  United  States.72 
Accordingly,  Britain  was compeled to  undertake  negotiations  while  dealing  with 
demands for information from  Commonwealth  members concerned that any 
agreement signed by Britain that included the abolition of imperial preference would 
undermine their own interests.73 The second concerned the coronation of Elizabeth I 
and the precise wording of the Accession Proclamation. Philip Murphy’s 2006 article 
‘Breaking the Bad News: Plans for the Announcement to the Empire of the Death of 
Elizabeth I and the  Proclamation  of  Her  Successor  1952-1967’  detailed the 
complications that arose in  1936  over the atendance  of the Irish and  South  African 
High  Commissioners at the  Accession  Council and the signing  of the  Accession 
Proclamation, and stressed the concern in the Foreign Ofice that there should be no 
repeat in 1952.74 Of particular importance in 1952 was the oficial title with which the 
new monarch would be proclaimed. Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, convened 
a commitee and considered a suggestion by the Indian High Commissioner (Menon) 
that he could only sign if the phrase ‘Head of the Commonwealth’ was inserted, on 
the grounds that India was a Republic and so the Queen was not Head of State.75 The 
Cabinet considered  Brook’s conclusions and although  Churchil  objected to the 
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removal of the term ‘Imperial Crown’ the resulting proclamation was worded in such 
a way that it took considerable care over Commonwealth sensibilities.76 
 
The impact  of the  Suez  Crisis  on  Britain’s  Commonwealth relations is a 
further instance  of  how  British  policy seemed to either  be  unaware  of  diplomatic 
reality, or was pursued despite it. Throughout the period 1945-1956 Britain displayed 
a  particular regard for the  Commonwealth, and atached  great importance to it in 
economic, diplomatic and military terms. Furthermore, it was an organisation that was 
theoreticaly led by Britain and so should perhaps have been an entity that could be 
relied  upon for support.  Suez  demonstrated that this  was  patently  not the case. 
Suhrawardy refered to  British leadership  of the  Commonwealth and the  Baghdad 
Pact but made it clear that Pakistan was opposed to Suez and advocated leaving the 
Commonwealth over the issue. What is so remarkable about Suez, in this context, is 
how the  British  government that  had taken such care to avoid  ofending 
Commonwealth feeling over something as seemingly benign as the precise wording of 
a Royal Proclamation (that did not even technicaly apply to several members), could 
engage in  behaviour so egregious that it  nearly split the  organisation in  which it 
placed such great stock and value. Eden’s and Britain’s explanations for the atack on 
Egypt were rejected by Commonwealth members such as India and Pakistan, and as 
with the  United  States, any sentimental atachment to  Britain,  or amenability to 
cooperating closely  with it on the  part  of the  Commonwealth, to say  nothing  of the 
notion of British leadership, was insuficient to overcome the shock and anger that the 
invasion of Egypt had generated in Commonwealth capitals. 
                        
76 TNA, PREM 11/39, ‘C. (52) 22, ‘Form of Accession Proclamation: Note by the Cabinet Secretary’ 
(6 Feb., 1952). 
 56 
Europe 
Europe occupies a diferent position when considering Suez as an instance of the gap 
between perception and reality. This diference is rooted in two things: the first, that 
Europe  did  not  occupy as  much importance as the  United  States  or the 
Commonwealth in British foreign policy,77 and second, that Europe in fact supported 
Britain and France over Suez. The European powers were significant in the context of 
the  Cold  War, and  European integration  was an issue in  which  Britain took a 
considerable, if somewhat  passive and  occasionaly  obstructive, interest.  Oliver 
Wright,  UK  Ambassador to  Denmark and later the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
portrayed  British atitudes at the time as contemptuous,  based  on the  view that the 
European idea would not succeed and was a ludicrous plan.78 Winston Churchil was 
among those  who  had long advocated a  united  Europe, seeing it as the  best  way to 
ensure  peace  on the continent, and in the aftermath  of the  Second  World  War this 
concern  became even  more  pressing than it  had ever  been.79 Nevertheless,  British 
policymakers  were  of the  view that  Britain  did  not  occupy the same  position as its 
European neighbours. It was the only wartime European beligerent who had not been 
invaded and or occupied during the war, and saw itself as a world power rather than 
merely a European one, a reflection of the fact that it retained a large Empire and had 
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global military and  diplomatic commitments.80 This  was reflected in  Britain’s 
response to the various European initiatives between 1945 and 1956. 
 
Labour’s  Foreign  Secretary,  Ernest  Bevin,  has  been credited  with  playing a 
leading role in the European acceptance of the Economic Recovery Program (Marshal 
Aid) and the creation  of  NATO and the  Organisation for  European  Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC, now the OECD).81 However, while Britain was keen to support 
intergovernmental approaches to European unity, the Labour government rejected the 
Schuman  Plan,  which created the  European  Coal and  Steel  Community (ECSC) in 
June  1960.82 Herbert  Morison  made the famous comment that the  Durham  Miners 
would  not  wear it83 (the  Schuman  Plan), and the  government’s  objection  was to 
agreeing in principle to any sort of supranational body that would limit the power of 
Parliament, as a precondition to negotiations.84 Although the Conservative Opposition 
criticised the government in the House of Commons Debate in June 1960, notable for 
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the first parliamentary speech given by Edward Heath,85 this had al the halmarks of 
party  politics rather than a  deeply-held  diference in  principle, and  once the 
Conservatives returned to  ofice in  1951 they showed  no  more  wiling than  Labour 
when it came to British participation in supranational institutions.86 
 
One of the first things done by Churchil’s government in regards to Europe was the 
issuing  of a  memorandum  by the  Prime  Minister in late  November  1951.  Churchil 
maintained that  while  he favoured a  united  Europe,  he  had  never envisaged  Britain 
should become an integral part of a European Federation, nor ever supported such an 
idea.87 Britain should  not  obstruct  European integration  but favour it and seek the 
support of the United States in that endeavour. However, what is particularly striking, 
although  not surprising, about  Churchil’s  memorandum is the listing  of  Britain’s 
priorities.  
 
Our first object is the unity and the consolidation of the British Commonwealths 
and  what is left  of the former  British  Empire.  Our second, the “fraternal 
association”  of the  English-speaking  world; and third,  United  Europe, to  which 
we are a separate closely- and specialy-related aly and friend.88 
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Pro-European Conservatives, most notably Harold Macmilan, atempted to convince 
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to adopt a more positive 
line  on  European integration,  but  were  unsuccessful.89 Under the leadership  of 
Churchil, and then Eden from 1955, Britain’s rebuf to Europe took its most famous 
forms; the rejection  of the  European  Defence  Community, and the  Messina-Spaak 
discussions.  As  with  most areas  of scholarly interest,  Britain and  European  defence 
has seen traditional arguments countered in recent  years  by revisionist approaches. 
Sean Greenwood is one scholar who has presented a traditional argument, namely that 
British hostility to the proposed EDC was a factor in that project’s demise in August 
1954.90 Others such as Kevin Ruane and Eden biographer David Duton have adopted 
a revisionist approach that contends that  Eden  was far from  hostile to the  EDC, 
merely feeling that  Britain could  not  participate  but that  he  nevertheless took a 
positive approach to it.91 Leaving aside the issue  of  Eden’s  personal  views  on 
European integration which are dealt with in Chapter Four, the issue that concerns us 
here is the continuing view that Britain could not participate in the EDC even though 
it supported its creation. The same cannot be said about the Messina Conference and 
the negotiations that folowed it. 
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More than any  other event in the  years  1945 to  1956, the  discussions at 
Messina and the  Spaak  Commitee  have  demonstrated  Britain’s reluctance to  be an 
active participant in the integration process. The phrase ‘missing the boat’ epitomises 
British  policy and its consequences in this  particular  period and reflects a  view that 
Britain might have had more success in Europe over the longer term if it had been a 
member from the start and thus able to influence its  direction and  development.92 
British leaders  were initialy slow to realise the significance  of the  Messina 
discussions. Anthony Eden and R.A. Butler were both scathing in their dismissal of 
the Messina Conference. Butler claimed that Eden had told him he was bored by the 
Messina  discussions,93 and  he  himself  described them as ‘some archaeological 
evacuations in an  old  Sicilian town that  need  not concern  Britain’.94 Even  Harold 
Macmilan was slow to realise the significance of Messina, although as a diary entry 
mentions  Spaak’s  pessimism as  wel it is  perhaps not too surprising.95 The  British 
government  was invited to send representatives to  participate in the  discussions  but 
decided to dispatch Russel Bretherton, a minor oficial from the Board of Trade, in 
an  observer capacity instead.96 Bretherton  had a  very limited remit and  was either 
asked to leave or withdrawn in November 1955.97 
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By the spring of 1956 Macmilan and Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of 
Trade, were among those in the government who realised that their earlier scepticism 
as to the dangers of the Messina discussions might have been an eror. Macmilan for 
instance sent  numerous  messages to  Treasury  oficials  warning that remaining 
disinterested was not an option. In one such message he argued: 
 
Are  we just to sit  back and  hope for the best? If  we  do that it  may  be  very 
dangerous for us; for perhaps Messina wil come of after al and that wil mean 
Western Europe dominated in fact by Germany and used as an instrument for the 
revival of power through economic means.98 
 
On  7 July a  memorandum signed  by the two  ministers  warned that although it  was 
uncertain  whether the eforts  of the  Six to establish a  Common  Market  would 
succeed, Britain would be faced with problems in commercial policy if they did and 
Britain remained  outside.99 On  27 July  Macmilan and  Thorneycroft  distributed a 
paper to the cabinet advocating  what an inter-departmental report caled ‘Plan  G,’ a 
partial  European  Free  Trade  Area.100 This  would cover al commodities except 
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foodstufs and  over a ten-year  period tarifs,  protective  quotas, export controls, and 
export subsidies would be progressively abolished.101 The atraction of this plan was 
that it would enable Britain to retain its trading links with the Commonwealth while 
not being discriminated against by the Six.102 
 
Plan G  has  had a  mixed reputation among  historians  when considering its 
motives in the context of the Messina discussions. Sean Greenwood portrayed it as an 
atempt to sabotage the Common Market discussions,103 while Martin Schaad argued 
that if sabotage was the purpose, then  one  of several alternative  plans  would  have 
been adopted.104 Whether or not it was designed to scupper the Common Market, the 
British  government  did  not initialy accept the  plan.  Lord  Home in  his capacity as 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations urged caution in September 1956: 
 
 I must warn my coleagues that Plan G could lead to a permanent loosening of 
the  Commonwealth  bonds and through that to a  weakening  of the  United 
Kingdom as a world Power, and this is an important consideration we must take 
into account even if Commonwealth governments do not press it upon us at this 
stage.105 
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Alan  Milward, and several  other  historians  who  have referenced  his  work, asserted 
that the Suez Crisis was responsible for the decision of the government to adopt Plan 
G in  November  1956.  He  used  unpublished  notes taken  by the then  Permanent 
Secretary to the  Cabinet,  Sir  Norman  Brook,  which included the  words  of  Lord 
Salisbury to the efect that Suez had made him revise his previous opposition to Plan 
G.  Milward  wrote that  Salisbury  had  opposed  Plan  G  on the  grounds that it  would 
weaken  Britain’s imperial trading links  but that  Suez  had convinced  him that these 
were  not as strong as  he  had thought and that a slight  move towards  Europe  was 
necessary.106 Relying on a source that is dificult to access and verify is course a risk 
but there is other evidence to support both the specifics of the source Milward used, 
and the  more  general  point that  he  made.  On  13  November  Lords  Salisbury and 
Kilmuir remarked in Cabinet that: 
 
In earlier  discussion, they  had  made some reservations.  The support for these 
proposals  which  had since  been  publicly expressed  both at  home and  overseas, 
taken in combination  with recent international  developments,  had  gone far to 
dispel the doubts they had previously entertained.107 
 
The cabinet  minutes as  published  do  not  give as  much  detail as  which specific 
objections  Salisbury and  Kilmuir  had expressed,  but, the reference to a change  of 
view and international  developments  would seem to support Milward’s account  of 
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Brook’s papers. This was not the first time that Suez and Plan G had been considered 
together by the cabinet. On 18 September the cabinet engaged in a lengthy discussion 
of  Macmilan and  Thorneycroft’s  proposals and the summation includes the 
folowing: 
 
The  Cabinet-…Agreed that a final  decision  on  whether to agree  with these 
proposals must now depend on the course of the Suez Canal dispute and that, in 
any even,  no final  decision could  be taken  until there  had  been further 
opportunity for reflection on the points made in the Cabinet’s discussion and the 
views of other Commonwealth countries were known.108 
 
Further evidence is to be found in both the account of the French Ambassador on the 
debate on Plan G in the House of Commons on 26 November, and the debate itself. 
Chauvel observed the debate and cabled Pineau that he felt recent events (Suez) were 
a factor in the  proposals for a  partial free trade area.109 Macmilan’s speech that 
opened the debate did not contain anything that this author can see would prompt such 
a comment, however, the response of Harold Wilson, then Shadow Chancelor, does. 
The folowing could explain Chauvel’s comment: 
 
I do not think any hon. Member opposite can deny that what Western Europe is 
primarily interested in today is oil. The right hon. Gentleman wil not, I am sure, 
seek to deny his share of the responsibility in the desperate situation which has 
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been forced on Western Europe…The first thing I want to say about it is that it is 
not in any  way a  panacea for the economic ils either  of this country  or  of 
Western Europe.110 
 
A further  passage that  may  have resonated  with the  French  Ambassador is the 
folowing from Geofrey Rippon’s contribution to the debate: 
 
One  positive result  of the  Suez crisis is that it  has given a  new impetus to 
European co-operation. I think it is a fact  of the  highest significance that the 
interuption  of the flow  of  oil,  which is a common threat, is  being  met  by 
concerted action. Some years ago, President Auriol of France said: “Europe must 
unite herself if she wishes to recover and live, and if she does not want American 
assistance to  be a  gesture  without future  or a  humiliating charity”. I think that 
recent events  have  given emphasis to  his  words…The  nations  of  Europe today 
are learning the lesson that they must stand together in defence of their common 
interest, in the last resort, nobody else wil be prepared to do it for them.111 
 
Europe  was  never considered as important a  geopolitical area as  were the 
United States and the Empire/Commonwealth, the two circles that were seen as giving 
Britain a world role rather than a merely European one. Yet, at Suez, it was the circle 
that Britain by turns dismissed and even atempted to harass that was supportive of its 
actions in Egypt. European nations had accepted US aid, were members of NATO and 
thus alies of the US, yet, there was a sense in Europe that the new bipolar world order 
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dominated  by the  US and  USSR  did  not suficiently take  European concerns and 
interests into account.112 In  defending their colonial interests in  Egypt,  Britain and 
France were seen as defending European values as a whole, a view borne out by the 
diplomatic cables. The former Dutch Prime Minister, Pieter Gerbrandy, cabled Eden 
to the efect that he felt Britain had been betrayed by the US, which was described as 
having torpedoed a sound action and pursued an incomprehensible policy.113 Konrad 
Adenauer responded to Eden’s gratitude for German support by stating that one stands 
by one’s friends114 and was reported by the Foreign Ofice to have spoken to Molet 
of the  danger  of the superpowers  dealing  with each  other  over the  heads  of the 
European  powers.115 In fact, the  French account  of the  Adenauer/Molet  meeting 
quotes the German Chancelor as blaming the US for the Suez Crisis in addition to his 
views on the extent to which it and the USSR considered European interests.116 
 
Suez was predominately a diplomatic defeat for Britain and one that exposed 
the limits  of its influence and significance  globaly.  The  Three  Circles  Policy  was 
predicated on the belief that as Britain occupied a special position at the very centre, 
and was in efect the common link between them, it could use that to influence policy 
to its benefit. The pursuit of power by proxy with the United States is an example of 
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this. In the event, the two circles in which it placed the most importance were the ones 
that  deserted it in  Egypt. Its perceived leadership  of the  Commonwealth  did  not 
prevent outrage, particularly in India and Pakistan, both of whom considered leaving 
the organisation itself. The final blow was dealt by the United States and the comment 
by  President  Eisenhower that  Britain  was  not as indispensable as it believed,117 
provides compeling evidence that in launching an atack on Egypt in the belief that 
no US  opposition  would folow,  UK  perceptions  were indeed lagging far  behind 
reality. It is  now  necessary to consider the second  part  of this argument; the  British 
Armed Forces at Suez. 
 
Operation Musketeer 
The second aspect  of the  Suez  Crisis as an instance of  perception  versus reality 
concerns the British armed forces. The crisis as a whole is treated as a failure, disaster 
and  humiliation for  Britain,  yet  historians  do  not seem to agree  when it comes to 
Operation  Musketeer, the  Anglo-French atack  on and invasion  of  Egypt.  Major 
Patrick Neky, in a 1991 Monograph for the School of Advanced Military Studies in 
Fort Leavenworth considered it to be a failure, while M.H Coles, writing in the Naval 
War Colege Review fifteen years later took the view that it was militarily sound, but 
undermined  by  political interference.118 Roy  Fulick and  Geofrey  Powel take a 
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slightly more nuanced view in so far as they consider Musketeer a failure, but add that 
given the state of the armed forces it could not possibly have succeeded.119 
 
This author takes the view that in order to judge Operation Musketeer it is first 
necessary to understand what it was supposed to accomplish, and to consider whether 
it is evaluated on military terms alone, or in conjunction with the diplomatic side of 
the equation. If the aim  was simply to retake the  Canal then it is  perhaps fair to 
conclude that if diplomacy had not intervened then, based on the performance of the 
Army,  Navy and  RAF in the few  days in  which they  were actively engaged against 
Nasser’s forces, the  Canal  would  have  been retaken.  The  Egyptian  Air  Force and 
Navy  were  neutralised  quickly and efectively  by their  Anglo-French counterparts, 
and while the land force encountered resistance, the poor terain had aided this: in any 
case the Egyptians were being pushed back by the time of the ceasefire. 
 
In trying to determine the success or failure of Musketeer it is pertinent to ask 
the folowing  question:  Was the  military  operation a failure  because  of  diplomatic 
intervention by the United States, or was said intervention only possible and efective 
because the British armed forces were not able to retake the Canal quickly enough for 
it to be forestaled? 
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What Did the Government Require the Armed Forces to Do? 
The  precise aim  of  Eden’s  government  has  been a source  of controversy since the 
immediate end  of the crisis itself.  Oficialy,  which is to say  publicly,  Britain and 
France were determined to regain control of the Canal so as to maintain freedom of 
passage as enshrined in Article One of the 1888 Convention of Constantinople.120 The 
Cabinet  discussions  make clear that in fact there  were two  possible, and in  military 
terms contradictory, objectives: the retaking of the Suez Canal, and the removal from 
power  of  Colonel  Nasser.  Anthony  Nuting described  Eden’s  pronouncement in the 
immediate aftermath of the nationalisation that he wished to topple Nasser.121 Howard 
Dooley asserted that regime change in Egypt was a cornerstone of British policy from 
1955,122 and both Anthony Eden in a telegram to Eisenhower, and Harold Macmilan 
in a memorandum, advocated military action to remove Nasser.123 
 
In his report on Operation Musketeer, the commander of the 2nd British Corps, 
General Stockwel, afirmed the need for consistent political direction and stated that 
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the planning sufered from the lack thereof.124 The oficers in charge of the military 
operation were aware that the government desired regime change and were obliged to 
spend several  months seeking clarification that  did  not arive  until  25  September.125 
This clarification  did  not explicitly advocate regime change and the final, approved 
version of Operation Musketeer envisaged a landing at Port Said (Alexandria would 
have  been a  beter site if an atack  on  Cairo  were an  objective),126 suggesting that 
ultimately, the  government setled for retaking the canal rather than changing the 
Egyptian  government.127 At the  Cabinet  meeting caled in response to the 
nationalisation of the Canal, Eden asked the First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbaten, what 
was available for an immediate  military response.  Although  British forces in the 
Mediteranean included a substantial surface force  of  warships and  1200  Royal 
Marine Commandos in Cyprus that could have blocked the canal, the view of General 
Templer,  Chief  of the Imperial  General Staf,  was that  1200 lightly armed 
commandos could  not  hold  ground against armoured formations.128 The  Chiefs  of 
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Staf formaly stated in August that a commando and or parachute assault on the canal 
would not be feasible until mid-September at the earliest.129 
 
Eden’s enquiry  might,  of course,  have  been simply a  question asked  by a  politician 
with litle to  no idea  of the state  of  his country’s  military  needing to formulate a 
response and asking a senior commander.  However,  when  we examine the  1956 
Statement  on Defence  we can see that in fact, an immediate  military response  was 
precisely what the armed forces were expected to be able to do. The document itself 
ran thus: 
 
We  must, in the  military field,  put the emphasis  on forces  which are flexible, 
mobile,  wel-trained,  wel-equipped and  versatile.  They  must  be ready for 
immediate action;  we can  no longer rely  on  meeting  our  needs for  men  or 
munitions  by  mobilising reserves  of  untrained  manpower  or  of industrial 
capacity…The forces required to support  our  present strategy  have, therefore, 
four roles to fulfil…(ii)  They  must  be capable  of  dealing  with  outbreaks  of 
limited war should they occur.130 
 
It can be argued that the Statement on Defence is primarily a political document that 
reflects more the desired capabilities of the armed forces than their actual capabilities. 
But as it is an  oficial  paper it represents  government  policy and therefore the roles 
expected  of the service  branches.  Eden’s enquiry to  Mountbaten suggests that the 
                        
129 TNA CAB 134/1217, E.C. (56) 5 ‘Action Against Egypt –Outline Plan: Memorandum by the Chiefs 
of Staff’ (16 Aug., 1956), p. 4. 
130 Cmnd. 9691, ‘Statement on Defence 1956’ (Feb., 1956), pp. 4-5. 
 72 
government expected the Army, Navy and RAF to be able to quickly try to retake the 
Canal. Moreover, there is the added, diplomatic dimension. In purely military terms 
the  British armed forces  were  more than capable  of retaking the canal.  The relative 
ease  with  which the  Egyptian  Navy and  Air  Force  were  neutralised, and the 
performance of the landing force in the limited time it was engaged, suggest that the 
Egyptian  military  would  not  have  been strong enough to  prevent  British 
reoccupation.131 Whether  or  not it  would  have  been feasible to  hold  onto the canal 
indefinitely is another  mater, and  not  within the  purview  of this study.  What is 
relevant is that the requirement  was  not simply to retake the canal,  but to  do so 
quickly. The balance of international opinion at the start of the crisis was favourable 
to  Britain and  France.132 However, as time  went  on and  Egypt  was able to 
increasingly  demonstrate that its  pilots  were capable  of running the canal  with  no 
threat to international freedom  of  passage,  world  opinion  began to change.133 It  was 
this requirement for speed that the armed forces were unable to meet. 
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Why Could This Not Be Accomplished? 
The reason that the  Armed  Forces  were  unable to retake the  Canal  quickly  was 
because their state of readiness in no way reflected that detailed in the 1956 Statement 
on Defence. At the onset of the Crisis Britain had more than 770,000 men and women 
in uniform, and the defence budget in 1956 was more than double that of only eight 
years  before, a legacy  of the rearmament  programme launched in response to the 
outbreak  of the  Korean  War.134 The  British contribution to the  Anglo-French 
taskforce included 45,000 troops, 31 RAF and 13 Fleet Air Arm squadrons, and more 
than  200  naval  vessels including five aircraft cariers.135 It took several  months for 
that force to  be  built  up and there  was  no  question  of an atack  on the  Canal  Zone 
before  mid-September.  There are two reasons for this:  Military  doctrine  beyond the 
control  of the  government, and the state  of the services in terms  of training and 
equipment  which  were.  As regards  military  doctrine,  British  planners  had learned 
certain lessons from the experiences  of the  Second  World  War.  The first  was that 
lightly armed assault troops could  not hold  ground  when  opposed  by  numericaly 
superior  opponents in  possession of armour.  This  was a  direct legacy  not  only  of 
Operation  Market  Garden (the  Alies’ atempt to  punch through  German lines at 
Arnhem), but also of the German airborne invasion of Crete in 1941.136 The German 
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parachute assault  was successful  but sustained such  heavy casualties that the 
Wehrmacht refused to  use them in such a  manner again.  The  British  First  Airborne 
Division  was trapped in  Arnhem  by  German  Panzer  units and forced to  break  out 
having taken  heavy casualties.137 The second important lesson taken from the two 
World  Wars was that a successful  naval invasion required a  massive  build-up  of 
forces including air and naval power deployed in support of the land forces. The raid 
on Dieppe in 1940 and the Galipoli Campaign of the First World War, both disasters, 
had made this clear, as had the successful invasion of Normandy in June 1944. 
 
The second reason for the inability  of the armed forces to retake immediately the 
Canal and for the long  period  of  build-up is their  general state  of readiness in the 
summer of  1956.  The  1956  Statement  had this to say  on the expected roles  of the 
Army and the Royal Navy: 
 
The Army wil be primarily organised so that it can bring force to bear quickly in 
cold or limited war…Strategic reserves must be maintained and must be capable 
of rapid transportation to the scene of trouble for cold or limited war tasks…In 
limited  war  we  plan to  make immediately available in any  part  of the  world a 
force  of aircraft cariers equipped  with  modern aircraft and supplemented  by 
cruisers and escorts.138 
 
The 1955 Statement on Defence contained this statement: 
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Our reduced commitments in  Trieste,  Korea and the  Middle  East  now  make it 
possible to rebuild a strategic reserve of land forces in this country. Coupled with 
the  mobility  of the  Navy and increasing  use  of air transport, this  wil  greatly 
increase  our ability to exercise  our  world-wide responsibilities efectively and 
economicaly.139 
 
 Despite the sentiments in the two Statements the services were not in the position to 
immediately support a land force engaged in a limited  war.  Leaving aside for a 
moment the whole British land contingent for Musketeer and focussing instead on the 
much smaler initial assault force envisaged  by  Eden and  Mountbaten, the  Royal 
Navy  Amphibious  Squadron  had  only the capacity to  move  part  of the  Commando 
Brigade.140 Moreover, there was no available hospital ship to treat any wounded, and 
the  RAF  was in a similar  position to the  Navy in that it  had  only enough transport 
aircraft to  move a fraction  of the  Parachute  Brigade.141 Beyond transportation there 
were further impediments to a fast atack to retake the  Canal.  A large  proportion  of 
the Army’s frontline units were in Germany as part of the British Army of the Rhine 
(BAOR), and the elite assault forces, the  Royal  Marine Commandos, and the 
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Parachute Brigade were being used in Cyprus as auxiliary infantry,142 with the later 
in the position of not having done any parachute training in around eleven months.143 
 
To return to the issue of the overal force for Operation Musketeer, Britain’s 
wartime experiences mandated the build up of a force large enough to make the initial 
landing, establish and hold a beachhead, and break out towards the overal objective, 
while supported by naval vessels and aircraft for air superiority and ground atack. It 
took the  Services several  months to  put together the force  designated for  Operation 
Musketeer.  The  problems faced  by the  planners, apart from  political interference, 
were similar to those that  precluded the commando-and-parachute raid  desired  by 
Eden; inadequate training, lack of transportation, and the distances involved. We have 
already noted the fact that the Royal Navy Amphibious Squadron could not move the 
entire  Commando  Brigade at  once,  but the  problem  went  much further than that. 
There  was  no  headquarters ship that could service a formation larger than a 
Brigade,144 and even  when the entire fleet  of  Bustard  Landing  Ship  Tanks (LSTs) 
were  mobilised, it  was  necessary to requisition  24  private liners and  50  merchant 
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ships.145 The RAF was in a similar position and the Joint Planning Staf recommended 
that civilian BOAC and other charter aircraft be requisitioned.146 
 
The lack of transportation was one particularly acute problem. The other was 
the question of where the taskforce should be gathered and from where it should set 
of to the  Canal  Zone.  The  nearest  British facilities  were  on  Cyprus  but  neither the 
airfields  nor the  ports  had the capacity for a taskforce the size  of  Operation 
Musketeer.  Bases in  Libya and Jordan  were ruled  out  on the  grounds that the 
respective states would not alow British forces to strike another Arab country from 
their teritory. Therefore the nearest base big enough to accommodate the forces was 
Malta,  which  was  nearly  1200  nautical  miles from  Port  Said.  RAF  units could  use 
airfields  on  Cyprus  but they  would  have  been  operating at their  maximum range 
reducing their efectiveness in an air superiority  or  ground-atack role.147 The  only 
recourse for adequate air cover was therefore the build up of a large carier force and 
at the onset of the crisis the Navy only had one carier batle group, based on HMS 
Eagle, in the Mediteranean. It was therefore necessary to reinforce Eagle with four of 
its older and smaler contemporaries HMS Bulwark, HMS Albion, HMS Theseus, and 
HMS Ocean, the later two being of World War Two vintage and converted to troop 
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carying.148 In any case it was August before Theseus and Ocean were able to set sail 
for the Mediteranean.  
 
It is worth reiterating before we continue to an examination of why there were 
such  discrepancies  between the  Statements  on  Defence and the actual state  of the 
armed forces in July 1956, the necessity for Britain of being able to retake the canal 
quickly. The statements made by Anglo-American observers and by participants such 
as Macmilan,149 atest to the intention of Eden’s government to use force rather than 
diplomacy, as  does the colusion at Sèvres.  The  deal reached  on  October  24th was 
intended to provide a pretext for atacking Egypt.150 
 
Why Were the Armed Forces in this State? 
At the conclusion  of the  Second  World  War  Britain  had approximately five  milion 
men and women under arms with another four milion in supply and production.151 In 
financial terms, the  budget for the  Armed  Forces in  1946  was approximately 
£1,667,000,000.152 These figures represented the  peak  of the  wartime economy and 
were  unsustainable  once the  war  had ended.  The  Labour  Government  of  Clement 
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Atlee that took ofice in July 1945 had an ambitious social program that made high 
levels  of  defence spending (18.8%  of the  national income) impossible, and  Britain 
was, in any case, virtualy bankrupt and dependent on financial aid from the United 
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As the two  graphs indicate, both the  defence  budget and the  uniformed 
manpower  numbers  were roughly  halved  between January  1947  when they  were at 
£1600  Milion154 and  1.4  Milion155 respectively, and  April  1950  when they  were 
approximately  £781  Milion156 and  720,000.157 While the manpower (uniformed) 
went  down consistently in this  period, the  budget in fact reached its lowest  point in 
1948 and gradualy increased each year thereafter. There were several reasons for this, 
the most prominent of which was an increased focus on equipment and research after 
1949, particularly in 1950/1951.158 
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The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 saw an end to the period of defence 
reductions.  The  1951  Statement  on  Defence announced a three-year rearmament 
program projected to cost as much as £4700 Milion.159 The same document stressed 
that almost half of the projected expenditure would be on production, and included the 
folowing. 
 
As regards equipment, the  Forces  have, for the last five  years lived largely  on 
their stocks; and there is now urgent need of an increased production programme 
concentrated  mainly  on increasing their fighting strength…We shal introduce 
new types of equipment as rapidly as possible…Combat vehicles of new design 
wil be introduced, and there wil be notable improvements in the supply of new 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft  weapons and equipment…We shal also see that the 
Services  have the stores, clothing and equipment required to enable them to  be 
ready for operations immediately upon mobilisation.160 
 
The statements above stand in marked contrast to the situation in which the Services 
found themselves in the summer and autumn of 1956. The post-crisis report writen 
by the commander  of the  2nd Corps  devoted considerable time to the lack  of 
operational readiness  on the  part  of the  units involved in  Operation  Musketeer, and 
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made particular reference to the Batalion Anti Tank gun.161 The apparent reason for 
this is to be found in the 1952 Statement which asserted, ‘since the programme was 
started the economic position has seriously deteriorated and severe measures have had 
to  be taken in the civil sector  of the economy…It also  means the  programme  must 
take more than three years to achieve.’162 The documents for 1953 and 1954 refered 
back to this, stating that even though in 1952 the government had concluded that the 
rearmament  programme  would  have to  be extended  by  one  year to completion in 
March 1955, further study throughout 1952/1953 had demonstrated that even this was 
beyond the resources of the country, and that the programme would have to be spread 
over an even longer period.163 
 
The references to the economy are concerned  with  Britain’s  balance  of  payments 
deficit and the level  of  gold reserves.  Butler as  Chancelor  of the  Exchequer after 
1951 reduced public spending and scaled back the rearmament programme launched 
by the Labour Government in 1950 on the grounds that it was too expensive.164 The 
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1954  Statement contained a further  paragraph  of relevance and significance  here, 
particularly with regard to the equipment in use during the Suez Crisis: 
 
No substantial addition wil be made to mobilisation equipment and war reserve 
stocks of stores and ammunition but the balance of items within existing stocks 
wil be improved.165 
 
An additional factor in the lack  of transportation equipment  was the  decision  of the 
government throughout  1955 and  1956 to sel  or loan  naval equipment to 
Commonwealth and  European alies.166 In July  1955 the  Majestic  Class  Aircraft 
Carier  HMS Majestic was sold to  Australia, several  others in that class and  others 
were sold to  other  NATO  or  Commonwealth alies, and in February  1956 an 
agreement was reached whereby five destroyers were sold to Pakistan for between £1 
Milion to  £1.5  Milion.  The statement  made  by the  First  Lord  of the  Admiralty 
concerning the  Destroyers  deal  with  Pakistan is  particularly iluminating in this 
respect: 
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The Pakistan Government had now asked for two destroyers which had already 
been  modernised to avoid the  delay in  waiting for the  older  destroyers to  be 
refited. Two modernised destroyers…could be made available but their transfer 
would reduce the number of ships in the Royal Navy’s operational reserve.167 
 
Despite the risk to the size of the fleet’s operational reserve the Cabinet decided that 
the proposed sale should go ahead.168 It would be ahistorical to accuse the government 
of a  mistake  based solely  on  hindsight,  yet it is  undeniable that  one  of the  biggest 
obstacles to the quick retaking of the Canal by Anglo-French forces was the lack of 
transport capacity.  Both  destroyers and aircraft cariers could  be and  were  used for 
troop carying; HMS Theseus and HMS Ocean were so utilised during the Crisis, and 
it  does raise the  question  of  how events  might  have  gone  had several  weeks and 
months not had to be spent requisitioning private liners for use by the Navy. 
 
Conclusion  
Earlier in this chapter the question was posed whether Britain’s defeat at Suez was the 
result  of  diplomatic  opposition  preventing the successful conclusion  of a  military 
operation,  or  whether the inability  of the armed forces to  quickly retake the canal 
alowed time for the  marshaling  of suficient  diplomatic  opposition.  This author 
would conclude that it was a combination of both. Eden’s government reached a very 
quick  decision to  pursue  military rather than  diplomatic  options to regain control  of 
the Suez Canal, motivated, in part, by its desire to depose Nasser and demonstrate that 
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Britain was stil a power of the first rank. It made litle atempt to hide this from its 
principal aly, the United States, and seemed to misinterpret US policy and the actions 
of Eisenhower and Dules, neither of whom were enamoured of the Egyptian dictator, 
but both of whom opposed a war in the Middle East.  
 
British success therefore depended on two things: either the diplomatic acquiescence, 
if not active support, of the US for military action, or, retaking the Canal and possibly 
toppling Nasser before US opposition could become so efective that it forced Britain 
to halt. Neither of these conditions was realised and when we delve more deeply into 
Britain’s diplomatic and military position in the summer of 1956 it is clear why the 
Suez  Crisis  was an example  of  perception  not  matching  objective reality.  British 
defence  policy  had reduced the  Armed  Forces to the  point  where their capabilities 
bore litle resemblance to  what  was expected and  needed  of them in  Egypt. 
Furthermore,  Britain’s  diplomatic aims  were rendered inefective  by the fact that it 
did  not  possess the influence in  Washington that it believed.  The  Empire and 
Commonwealth provided litle in the way of counterbalance, while European opinion 
was  not seen as  particularly important in  Westminster and  Whitehal.  Eisenhower’s 
words to his aides about Britain’s value as an aly if it behaved in a certain way are 
one such indicator  but there  were  numerous instances  between  1945 and  1956 that 
suggested British influence over US policy was ilusory at best. 
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Chapter III: The Suez Crisis and British Policy 





The  preceding chapter  began to establish the case for the  Suez  Crisis  being an 
instance of the phenomenon whereby perception lags behind objective reality. These 
gaps are important,  because they shape subsequent actions. In the  words  of  Kristen 
Renwick, ‘our perception of ourselves in relation to others efectively delineates and 
sets the  domain  of  options  we find available.’1 The  policy  of  Eden’s  government in 
the summer and autumn of 1956 was based on eroneous perceptions, specificaly that 
the armed forces could retake the  Suez  Canal  before  Egypt  demonstrated that there 
was  no cause for international concern at its seizure  of control, and that if  Britain 
atacked  Egypt in an atempt to regain control  of the canal, its influence  over the 
United  States and the  Commonwealth  would  be suficient to ensure that it could 
present it as a fait accompli. Unfortunately for this design the US, incensed (as was 
much  of the  Commonwealth),2 at  Britain’s  duplicitous  behaviour  with  France and 
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Israel, the lack  of consultation  before  Britain  went to  war, and  with  President 
Eisenhower seeking re-election to the  Presidency, refused to support  Eden and 
brought  diplomatic and economic  opposition to  bear against  Britain, forcing it to 
withdraw from Egypt in disgrace.3 
 
In the introduction to this thesis  we  drew atention to  one  of the existing 
historiographical arguments regarding the Suez Crisis and British policy revaluations 
towards the  European  Communities; that  Suez revealed  weaknesses in  Britain’s 
position that forced the  government to  undertake a fundamental re-examination  or 
reappraisal  of that  position, that led, in turn to the  decision to seek closer ties  with 
Europe.4 The other argument highlighted was that Suez was a coincidence and of litle 
or no significance and relevance to Britain’s European policy, on the grounds that it 
either occured too close to it for its ramifications to be fuly understood, or that the 
important events  were  ongoing  prior to the start  of the crisis.5 This thesis takes the 
                        
3 D.B.  Kunz, ‘When  Money  Counts and  Doesn’t:  Economic  Power and  Diplomatic  Objectives’, 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), pp. 451-462. 
4 S. George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 3rd Edition (Oxford, 1998); S. 
George, Britain  and  European Integration since  1945 (Oxford,  1991);  S.  Bulmer, ‘Britain and 
European Integration: Of Sovereignty, Slow Adaptation, and Semi-Detachment,’ in S. George (Editor), 
Britain  and the  European  Community:  The  Politics  of  Semi-Detachment (Oxford,  1992);  P.  Hansen, 
‘European Integration,  European Identity and the  Colonial  Connection’, European Journal of Social 
Theory, Vol. 5 (Nov., 2002), pp. 483-498. 
5 H. Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchil to Blair (Basingstoke, 1999), p. 109; 
A. Gorst & L. Johnman, The Suez Crisis (Abingdon, 1997), p. xi; R. Ovendale, British Defence Policy 
since  1945 (Manchester,  1994),  p.  133;  K.  Kyle, Suez:  Britain’s  End  of  Empire in the  Middle  East 
(London,  1991);  S.C.  Smith, Reassessing  Suez:  New  Perspectives  on the  Crisis  and its  Aftermath 
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view that  neither interpretation is adequate to explain the significance  of  Suez to 
Anglo-European relations. Dealing with the arguments of those who have diminished 
the influence  of  Suez, the formation and subsequent success  of the  European 
Economic Community was certainly one of the reasons behind the British decision to 
apply for membership of it a scant five years after rejecting such an option, and it is 
true that the  negotiations that resulted in its creation  were  ongoing  before  Nasser 
nationalised the Suez Canal Company. However, they were simply negotiations and, 
as  wil  be  demonstrated in  Chapter  Five, they  hung in the  balance  when the crisis 
ended.6 
 
Moreover, as wil be examined in Chapter Four and Chapter Six, Suez was a 
significant factor in the rise of Harold Macmilan and Edward Heath. Macmilan was 
of course the Prime Minister, who made the first, and unsuccessful, EEC entry bid in 
1961,7 and  who appointed to lead it  his protégé Edward  Heath, the  man  who took 
Britain into Europe in 1973.8 Chapter Five wil consider Suez in a French context and 
wil  demonstrate that  without the crisis it can  be  doubted that there  would  be a 
European  Union  on early twenty-first century lines at al.  Moreover, through its 
impact on the Algerian Uprising and subsequent return to power of General de Gaule, 
and the development of the French nuclear deterent, Suez played a further and, in the 
context of Macmilan’s entry bid, a decisive role in Britain’s relationship with Europe. 
                                                                    
(Aldershot,  2008);  A.  Low  &  B.  Lapping, ‘Did  Suez  Hasten the  End  of  Empire?’ Contemporary 
Record, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1987), pp. 31-33. 
6 See Chapter Five. 
7 See Chapter Four. 
8 See Chapter Six. 
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It is therefore simply not a realistic argument to contend that Suez had no impact on 
Anglo-European relations. 
 
This  being the case, there is stil the  mater  of the arguments already  put 
forward that Suez caused a review of British policy after 1957. The late Alan Milward 
saw  Suez as influencing the  British  government’s  decision to adopt  Plan  G in 
November  1956 and  described  Lord  Salisbury,  Lord  President  of the  Council, as 
being convinced by the crisis that the Imperial and Commonwealth links were not as 
strong as previously believed.9 David Gowland, Arthur Turner and Alex Wright, who 
also linked Suez to the adoption of Plan G, noted a memorandum writen by Anthony 
Eden in the last days of his Premiership in which he speculated that closer ties with 
Europe might be a consequence of Suez, and stated that the Foreign Ofice made an 
unsuccessful atempt to turn British policy in a European direction.10 Apart from this, 
there has been no documentary evidence put forward for the claim that Suez caused a 
reappraisal that in turn led to closer British ties with Europe. Neither Stephen George, 
nor Stephen Bulmer provided any supporting evidence and the reader is left to assume 
that such a link should be taken as read. 
 
It is, therefore, the  purpose  of this chapter to examine the case for  Suez  having 
provided such a shock to  British  policymakers that they embarked  upon a  period  of 
review and re-appraisal and  decided to take a  more active role in the  European 
movement. In order to do this, three research questions wil be asked and examined: 
                        
9 A. Milward, The United Kingdom and the European Community Volume I (2002), pp. 252-262. 
10 D.  Gowland,  A.  Turner,  &  A.  Wright, Britain  and  European Integration  Since  1945:  On the 
Sidelines (London, 2010), pp. 48-49. 
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1. Did the crisis make clear to British policy makers the relative weakness of the 
country’s world position? 
2. Did the British government undertake a re-appraisal subsequent to this? 
3. Is there any evidence to support the assertion that the Suez Crisis influenced 
the evolution  of British  policy towards  membership  of the  European 
Communities? 
 
Our examination  of the first  of these  questions  wil analyse the  discussions and 
memoranda  generated  by the  government in the aftermath  of the  Suez  Crisis.  The 
previous chapter established that  Suez could be seen as instance  where  perceptions 
were flawed and events so  demonstrated.  The aim  with this  question is to see  what 
evidence there is that  ministers and  oficials  were aware  of the scale  of the reverse 
that Britain had sufered at Suez, and, if so, in which context. 
 
Looking at the second  question  wil alow  us to  progress to the issue  of 
whether  or  not the  government,  having realised the  damage  wrought  by  Suez, then 
embarked  upon a re-appraisal  of  Britain’s  diplomatic and  military  position. It  wil 
examine the  1957 ‘Defence  Outline  of  Future  Policy’,11 the  1960 ‘Study  of  Future 
Policy for  1960-1970’,12 and two foreign  policy studies, ‘The  Efect  of  Anglo-
American Interdependence on the Long-Term Interests of the United Kingdom’,13 and 
                        
11 Cmnd. 124, ‘Defence Outline of Future Policy’ (Apr., 1957). 
12 TNA CAB 129/100, C. (60) 35 ‘Future Policy Study, 1960-1970’ (29 Feb., 1960). 
13 TNA CAB 129/92, C. (58) 77 ‘The Effects of Anglo-American Interdependence on the Long-Term 
Interests of the United Kingdom’ (10 Apr., 1958). 
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the 1958 ‘Position of the United Kingdom in World Afairs’.14 Both of the later two 
documents were included as part of the larger study on future policy, but as they were 
published in  1958, and so  precede the  greater  work into  which they  were 
incorporated, they  wil  be considered separately.  Furthermore, as the concept  of 
interdependence  wil feature in a later  part  of this chapter  when considering the 
development  of  Britain’s  policy  on  Europe, the relevant study should  be considered 
on its own merits. 
 
The answers to the third, and  most significant,  question  wil focus  on any 
conclusions that  may  have  been  drawn in the short-term and the longer-term.  More 
specificaly, it wil analyse the proposed re-appraisal for evidence that closer ties with 
Europe occupied a more prominent position in policy terms. Furthermore, it wil seek 
to  distinguish  between the idea  of closer ties  with  Europe as an alternative to the 
existing links  with the  United  States and the  Commonwealth, the  Atlantic and 
Imperial circles  of  British foreign  policy, and closer  European links as  part  on an 
overal,  broader approach to  British  policy,  particularly  with regard to  Macmilan’s 
policy  of  Anglo-American interdependence. It is important to  make this  particular 
distinction, as it has been a tendency on the part of many authors who have considered 
Suez and ‘Europe’, and  diminished any link  between the two, to cite  Macmilan’s 
desire to repair and then strengthen the  Anglo-American aliance as evidence that 
Suez did not result in closer European ties.15 Such an interpretation is, in this author’s 
opinion,  based  on a flawed  understanding  of  Macmilan’s  policies and  on  British 
                        
14 TNA CAB 130/39, ‘The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs: Report by Officials’ (1 
May., 1958). 
15 D. Gowland et al, Britain and European Integration (2010), p. 49. 
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foreign  policy in  general.  Neither  was intended to  be a zero-sum  game, and this 
chapter  wil  demonstrate that in fact it  was the  desire to strengthen ties with 
Washington that led to the change in British policy on European integration. 
 
Did the crisis make clear to British policy makers the 
weakness of the country’s world position? 
At first glance this question would appear to have an obvious answer: yes. How can 
there be a re-appraisal and a change in policy based on that if the Suez Crisis had not 
made clear to British policy makers the country’s relatively weak position? However, 
a  more  detailed analysis is required. It  bears  mentioning  here that there is also the 
question  of  degrees  when it comes to awareness. It  does  not  necessarily folow that 
because the British government was aware of the impact of Suez in a general sense, it 
was aware  of al the consequences and the true extent  of them.  Similarly, a 
government can  be aware that an event such as  Suez can  have  negatively impacted 
relations  with another  power,  but  not  yet appreciate the ramifications  beyond that 
relationship, or in fact how it had happened in the first place. For these reasons it does 
bear asking the question and seeking an analytical answer to it. 
 
The  wider  world certainly considered  Suez to  have  been a  disaster, and that 
Britain had been humiliated. There is more than suficient evidence available from the 
papers in the  National  Archives to support an assertion that  Suez  did in fact  make 
clear to British policy makers the relative weakness of the country’s position. The first 
such indicator is found, appropriately enough, at the conclusion  of the  Suez  Crisis 
itself. The Chancelor, Macmilan, made clear to the Cabinet in November 1956 that, 
 93 
in the face  of  American  opposition, continuing  with the  Suez  operation  was 
economicaly unviable.16 Macmilan’s actions here have been a source of controversy.  
He was one of the more hawkish members of the Cabinet when it came to planning 
and executing Operation Musketeer,17 but, his statement to the Cabinet about a run on 
Sterling, the reason  given for  halting the  operation, saw  him  described  by  Harold 
Wilson as ‘first in, first out’.18 Brendan Bracken was even more scathing, describing 
him as ‘the leader of the bolters’.19 It has even been suggested that Macmilan’s whole 
posture at Suez, and more pertinently, his actions in urging military action, and then 
withdrawal,  were a  Machiavelian atempt to  depose  Eden,20 a charge that  wil  be 
examined further in  Chapter  Four. However, and irespective  of  whether  or  not 
Macmilan was being entirely straightforward and honest when he made the economic 
case for withdrawal to the Cabinet, it is stil reasonable to conclude that in economic 
terms  Britain could  not continue  Operation  Musketeer in the face  of  American 
opposition.  The  Cabinet accepted  his assertions and the  decision to abandon the 
invasion is evidence enough that it  was aware  of the  precariousness  of  Britain’s 
position.21 
 
                        
16 TNA CAB 134/4108, C.M. (56) 90 ‘Minutes of Cabinet Meeting’ (28 Nov., 1956), p. 3. 
17 TNA CAB 134/1217, E.C. (56) 9 ‘Action Against Egypt’, Note by the Chancelor of the Exchequer 
(7 Aug., 1956), pp. 27-29; L. James, The Rise and Fal of the British Empire (London, 2005), p. 579. 
18 D.R. Thorpe, Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmilan (London, 2011), p. 364. 
19 A. Horne, Macmilan 1891-1956: Volume I of the Oficial Biography (Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 440-
441. 
20 D. Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis (London, 1988), p. 43. 
21 TNA CAB 134/4108, C.M. (56) 90 ‘Minutes of Cabinet Meeting’ (28 Nov., 1956), p. 3. 
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A second indicator of decision makers’ changing views is to be found in the 
memorandum that  Eden circulated in  his last  days as  Prime  Minister.  He stated 
forthrightly that Britain had to learn the lessons of Suez and re-examine its areas of 
influence. Economic and scientific issues were cited, as were doubts about the value 
of bases in Tripoli, and the continuing military commitments in Malaya and Ceylon 
(Sri  Lanka).22 It is,  however, the folowing  phrase that is  of  most relevance and 
significance here: 
 
The conclusion of al this is surely that we must review our world position and 
our  domestic capacity  more searchingly in the light  of the  Suez experience, 
which has not so much changed fortunes as revealed realities.23 
 
In  practical terms, Eden’s  political career  was  over at the  point  he  wrote  his 
memorandum, yet he was formaly stil the Prime Minister, and, despite the damage 
done to  his reputation,  his  voice  was stil an influential  one.  His  words are 
unambiguous in their assertion that Suez  was a  point  of realisation and that lessons 
needed to be learned from the whole episode. 
 
It  might  be relevant to ask at this  point  why it took  Suez to  demonstrate to 
Eden that Britain was not as strong as it had once been. The answer to this question is 
that it  was  not this crisis alone that  made  Britain’s  vulnerability apparent.  Eden’s 
actions in the summer  of  1956  were  governed  by two  overlapping ideas  directly 
related to just that sense  of  weakness: an acute awareness  of just  how  precarious 
                        
22 TNA PREM 11/1138, ‘Thoughts on the General Position After Suez (28 Dec., 1956), pp. 1-5. 
23 Ibid, p. 5. 
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Britain’s economic position was; and an overestimation of his and his government’s 
ability to overcome this. He knew that the longer Egypt held onto the Suez Canal the 
harder it  would  be for  Britain to regain it,  particularly if  Egypt  was able to 
demonstrate that its formal control did not threaten either free usage of the canal, or 
its eficient running. His initial reaction was to request a fast atack on the Canal Zone 
by commando and parachute units, but having been advised that this was not possible 
for two  months,  Eden  was compeled to engage in  diplomatic  negotiations  until 
France and Israel ofered him an alternative. Britain was not as strong as it had been 
fifty  years earlier, a fact  Eden  was aware  of, and  yet that  did  not  prevent  him from 
acting as  he  did at  Suez.24 While  Foreign  Secretary in  1952  he implied a similar 
approach, aware  of al  Britain’s  weaknesses, in  his  paper ‘British  Overseas 
Obligations’, which began thus: 
 
The object of this paper is to consider the tasks to which the United Kingdom is 
commited  overseas and to examine  where if anywhere  our responsibilities can 
be reduced so as to bring them more into line with our available resources.25 
 
Eden’s failure, and that  of  his  government,  was  not in  believing that  Britain could 
behave as a  nineteenth century  gunboat  power  with impunity: it  was  overestimating 
Britain’s ability to compensate for the fact that it could not, and use the influence it 
felt it retained to achieve its goals. 
 
                        
24 A. Eden, ‘Britain in World Strategy’, Foreign Afairs, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Apr., 1951), p. 342. 
25 TNA  CAB  129/53,  C (52)  202, ‘British  Overseas  Obligations:  Memorandum  by the  Secretary  of 
State for Foreign Affairs’ (18 Jun., 1952), p. 1. 
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Before the focus shifts to the second research  question, ‘did the  British 
government  undertake a reappraisal?’ there is the  Cabinet  discussion  on  8 January 
1957 to consider. Under discussion was Selwyn Lloyd’s ‘Grand Design’,26 which wil 
be  discussed in this chapter  when considering the third research  question.  The 
relevance  here is  not that  Cabinet rejected the specifics  of  Lloyd’s  proposals,27 nor 
that its reasoning was the potential damage to relations with the United States, but that 
it showed how aware the Foreign Ofice was of the fact that Suez had already caused 
a rupture in the special relationship.  Salisbury,  Lord  President  of the  Council, 
remarked that the government’s ‘main aim at the present time should be to repair the 
breach which had been made in Anglo-American relations by the Suez dispute’.28 
 
In each  of the three instances  highlighted  here, it is clear that the  British 
government was aware that Suez had damaged Britain’s position. Even so, opinions 
difered as to  how to react.  While  Eden  was  of the  view that  more  general lessons 
needed to be learned, the Cabinet in January 1957 felt that the damage to the Anglo-
American special relationship was the most serious problem to have arisen from the 
crisis and one that needed to be rectified as soon as possible. 
 
                        
26 TNA  CAB  129/84,  C.P. (57)  6 ‘”The  Grand  Design”  Co-operation  With  Western  Europe: 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’. (4 Jan., 1957), pp. 1-6. 
27 TNA, CAB 195/16, C.M. (57) 3, ‘Minutes of Cabinet Meeting’ (8 Jan., 1957), pp. 2-4. 
28 Ibid, p. 3. 
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Did the British government undertake a review subsequent 
to this? 
The second issue to  be addressed is  whether  or  not the realisation that  Suez  had 
caused significant damage to Britain was folowed by a period of re-examination and 
re-appraisal. It should be noted that governments periodicaly review aspects of policy 
in a variety of areas,29 and assuming that because a review takes place after an event, 
it must have been caused by it, risks the logical falacy that is post hoc ergot propter 
hoc. That being said, it certainly does not folow that an event such as Suez would not 
influenced any subsequent review, be it the nature, content, or conclusions. In the four 
years folowing the Suez Crisis there is substantial evidence to support the assertion 
that the British government embarked upon a period of re-examination, focussing on 
Britain’s  world role and its defence capabilities.  The task  here to examine this 
evidence so as to establish how far, if at al, the crisis was either a direct cause, or if it 
influenced the review and its conclusions in any way. 
 
The  most  notable such reviews  were the  1957  Defence  Review,30 and the 
‘Study  of  Future  Policy for  1960-1970’.31 The  more  general economic reviews  wil 
not  be examined, as they  were, foreign  policy crises  notwithstanding, a  yearly 
                        
29 Cm  7948, ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review’ 
(October,  2010),  pp.  1-75;  Cm  8122, ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ (June, 
2011), pp. 1-83. 
30 Cmnd.  124, ‘Defence  Outline  of  Future  Policy’ (Apr.,  1957),  pp.  1-14;  Cmnd.  230, ‘Future 
Organization of the Army’ (Jul., 1957), pp. 1-9. 
31 TNA CAB 129/100, C. (60) 35, ‘Future Policy Study, 1960-1970’ (29 Feb., 1960), pp. 1-58. 
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occurence and not an economic equivalent to the Defence Review or Future Policy 
Studies. In addition to the future policy study, there are two other studies that are of 
significance; the 1958 Foreign Policy Review,32 and the study on Interdependence.33 
Although they can  be treated as separate  documents, and  wil  be examined as such, 
this author considers them to be constituent parts of the wider future policy study. The 
first  meeting  of the commitee, tasked  with the creation  of the future  policy study, 
caled for ‘a review  by the  Foreign  Ofice,  Commonwealth  Relations  Ofice, and 
Colonial  Ofice  of  our aims region  by region, and the resources required, and  now 
devoted to achieving them.’34 The fifth meeting, held on May 6th 1958, presented the 
Foreign  Ofice  paper and considered its content and implications.35 The  Defence 
Review predated the creation of the Future Policy Commitee and so cannot be seen in 
the same  vein, and thus is treated as an entirely separate instance  of  government 
review. 
 
1957 Defence Outline of Future Policy 
The first instance of a government review after Suez is the 1957 ‘Defence Outline of 
Future Policy’, delivered to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, Duncan 
Sandys, in April 1957. Defence reviews are not a particularly frequent occurence: the 
                        
32 TNA CAB 130/39, ‘The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs: Report by Officials’ (1 
May., 1958). 
33 TNA CAB 129/92, C. (58) 77 ‘The Effects of Anglo-American Interdependence on the Long-Term 
Interests of the United Kingdom’ (10 Apr., 1958). 
34 TNA CAB 130/39, ‘GEN 624/1’ (6 Dec., 1957), p. 1. 
35 TNA CAB 130/39 ‘GEN 624/5’ (6 May., 1958), pp. 1-7. 
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2010  Strategic  Defence and  Security  Review, for instance,  was the first since  1998. 
They tend to  be commissioned  when an incoming  government is seeking to change 
certain aspects  of  government  policy,  usualy  public spending,  or in response to 
events that greatly alter the diplomatic and strategic landscape, such as the end of the 
Cold  War.  Sandys’  paper came a  year after the  1956  Defence  White  Paper,36, and 
began by stating that the shape of the armed forces was a product of the Korean War, 
and the re-armament program it  precipitated. It  did  not  mention  Suez specificaly, 
instead refering to the ‘changing nature of the Communist threat’ as the cause.37 This 
would suggest that Suez had no influence or impact on the study itself. The prevailing 
historiography on the Defence Review, summated for instance in Ovendale’s work on 
British  defence since  1945,  places this in the context  of the  move from expensive 
conventional forces, to the cheaper nuclear deterent.38 
 
However, the fact that Suez is not mentioned by name in the final document 
does  not rule  out it  having any influence at al.  For  many  years after the crisis, the 
very name Suez became a taboo term in oficial British circles39 and it more common 
to find the term ‘recent events’ in documents where the subject is either raised, or is 
of relevance. Moreover, there are two indicators that this author believes indicate the 
influence of Suez. The first is the folowing paragraph: 
 
                        
36 Cmd. 9691, ‘Statement on Defence 1956’ (Feb., 1956), pp. 1-32 . 
37 Cmnd. 124, ‘Defence Outline of Future Policy’ (Apr., 1957), p. 5. 
38 R. Ovendale, British Defence Policy since 1945 (Manchester, 1994). 
39 K. Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London, 1991), p. 3. 
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Britain’s influence in the world depends first and foremost on the health of her 
internal economy and the success  of  her export trade.  Without these,  military 
power cannot in the long run be supported.40 
 
While it is important to avoid a post hoc ergot propter hoc argument, it is reasonable 
to conclude that Suez was a factor here. Although ongoing operations in Malaya and 
the recent Korean War meant that Suez was not Britain’s only military commitment in 
the 1950s, it was, nonetheless, the only one where economic dificulties necessitated 
its abandonment.  The  Cabinet  decided to cal a  halt to Operation  Musketeer  when 
presented  with  Macmilan’s stark assessment that it  was economicaly  unviable.41 
Furthermore, a report  by the  Chiefs  of  Staf,  dated  16th January  1957, cites ‘recent 
events in the  Middle  East’ to stress the importance  of the region to  Britain 
economicaly, and the  need to  maintain  Britain’s ability to  protect  Aden.42 The 
importance of a sound economy and the references to it in the Defence White Paper 
have already  been  highlighted,  Britain’s responsibilities in the region,  particular in 
respect to  Aden, feature in it also.43 The  various  branches  of the armed forces also 
conducted their own reviews in a manner that is relevant here, and which contributed 
to the Defence White Paper: Suez is a feature in many of them. The review of the air 
transport force cited recent events as  having emphasised importance  of speed  of 
                        
40 Cmnd. 124, ‘Defence Outline of Future Policy’ (Apr., 1957), p. 5. 
41 TNA CAB 134/4108, C.M. (56) 90, ‘Minutes of Cabinet Meeting 28 November 1956’, p. 3. 
42 TNA DO 35/7127, C.O.S. (57) 2G, ‘Importance of the Arabian Peninsular: Note by the War Office’ 
(16 Jan., 1957), p. 1. 
43 Cmnd. 124, ‘Defence Outline of Future Policy’ (Apr., 1957), p. 4. 
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movement in limited  war,44 and a study  of  operational requirements for limited  war 
actualy  named  Suez and the  need to take advantage  of lessons learned for future 
planning.45 
 
Further and more compeling evidence is to be found in the Cabinet discussions when 
the study  was  being formulated.  At a  Cabinet  Meeting  on  18th  March  1957, the 
discussion  of the  White  Paper turned to the  proposal to  withdraw two  Teritorial 
Army Divisions then used as a NATO reserve46 and the folowing point was raised: 
 
The extent to  which  Teritorial  Army formations should  be available for 
emergency service  overseas should  perhaps  be reconsidered in the light  of 
experience during the Anglo-French operation against Egypt.47 
 
One of the many factors that bedeviled the planners of Operation Musketeer was the 
high ratio  of  national servicemen to regulars in certain  Army formations.48 They 
lacked the experience and quality of the front-line, regular units stationed in Germany 
and the White Paper’s reference is a warning against relying on them again. Richard 
                        
44 TNA DEFE 5/73, C.O.S. (57) 33, ‘Long-term Defence Review: Air Transport Force’ (5 Feb., 1957), 
p. 4. 
45 TNA DEFE 5/73, C.O.S. (57) 17, ‘Operational Requirements For Emergencies or Limited War in the 
Ministry of Defence: Note by Major-General W.G. Stirling’ (11 Jan., 1957). 
46 TNA CAB 129/86, C. (57) 69, ‘Statement on Defence 1957: Draft’ (15 Mar., 1957), p. 6. 
47 TNA CAB 128/31, C.C (57) 21st Conclusions, ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’ (18 Mar., 
1957), p. 5. 
48 R. Fulick & G. Powel, Suez (2006), pp. 31-32. 
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Vinen’s recent  book National Service: A Generation in Uniform 1945-1963 devoted 
an entire chapter to Suez which included accounts by national servicemen of some of 
their atempts at rebelion (although  he states that  most soldiers  had  no  particular 
opposition to the war) such as deliberately working slowly so as to impede Operation 
Musketeer.  The subsequent chapter  on ending  national service cites the crisis as a 
medium term influence ‘because it exposed some  of the fantasies  on  which  British 
pretensions to  military  grandeur  had  been  based’.  The same chapter cites the crisis’ 
bringing  Harold  Macmilan and  Duncan  Sandys to the fore as further evidence  of 
Suez’ role in the end of national service.49 
 
The final  piece  of evidence comes from the  5th January edition  of The Economist, 
which included the folowing passages: 
 
In itself, it should  be admited, the  Suez campaign  proves  nothing  new. It  has 
rather, with its consequences and its cost, served as a catalyst, alowing to form 
the  widespread  belief –to  which  Mr  Macmilan’s remarks at the last  NATO 
meeting added shape- that this country has been carying more than its fair share 
of the  defence  burden; that it  has been spending too  much too  wastefuly,  on 
many  objectives that  were  never  practical anyway; and that it  must spend less 
henceforward.50 
 
Although the final  draft  of the  Defence  White  Paper  does  not contain a  direct 
reference to Suez, the status of the crisis as a taboo term, the indirect influence in the 
                        
49 R. Vinen, National Service: A Generation in Uniform 1945-1963 (London, 2014), p. 366. 
50 ‘The Way to Cut Defence’, The Economist (5 Jan., 1957), p. 9. 
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economics  of  defence  policy, the contemporary article in The  Economist and the 
references in the  Cabinet  papers adds  up to suficient evidence for this author to 
conclude that the crisis played at least some role in most of these documents, as wel 
as shaping key aspects of British defence policy after 1957. 
 
Study of Future Policy for 1960-1970 
The best indicator of a review or re-examination of Britain’s position and policy after 
Suez is the ‘Future  Policy Study  1960-70’,  published in  February  1960. It 
encompasses the 1958 foreign policy review; ‘The Position of the United Kingdom in 
World Afairs’; and another 1958 study on Anglo-American relations that laid out the 
policy  known as interdependence.  The foreign  policy review and  Anglo-American 
study wil be assessed here first before the wider Future Policy is analysed. 
 
‘The  Position  of the  United  Kingdom in  World  Afairs’ contains  numerous 
paragraphs and  phrases from  which the influence  of  Suez can  be seen.  The first 
paragraphs  note  Britain’s reduced status compared to its imperial  heyday in the 
nineteenth century, specificaly the point that unlike the 19th Century, Britain could no 
longer impose its wil abroad. Of particular significance is the folowing: 
 
We must therefore be more ready to improvise, to adapt our tactics to changing 
situations and be quick to take advantage of fleeting opportunities to strengthen 
or improve our position almost anywhere in the world. We shal not maintain our 
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influence if we appear to  be clinging  obstinately to the shadow  of  our  old 
Imperial power after its substance has gone.51 
 
This  was a shift in tone from  previous statements.  Ruane and  Elison, in their  2004 
article ‘Managing the Americans: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmilan and the Pursuit 
of “Power by Proxy” in the 1950s’, detail three foreign policy reviews in 1952, 1956 
and the  1958 review  under  discussion, and atribute the contrast  between the  1958 
review and its two predecessors to the ‘enervating economic legacy of the disaster of 
Suez’.52 
 
The study  on interdependence, circulated to the  Cabinet  by  Selwyn  Lloyd in 
April 1958, is unambiguous where Suez is concerned. Section D, ‘The Implications of 
Interdependence’, asserts that the  United  Kingdom  would  benefit  greatly from the 
policy and is stark in its assessment that Britain’s ability to have its way in the world 
depended on acting in conformity with US interests. ‘Against her opposition we can 
do very litle (e.g., Suez)’, the document argued. Further, but less explicit, reference to 
Suez came  with the statement that it  was  beneficial that there  be an agreed  Anglo-
American  policy in the  Middle  East, rather than  both countries  pursuing individual 
and perhaps opposing policies.53 Suez was a watershed moment for Anglo-American 
relations, and these conclusions, along with the Cabinet deliberations in the aftermath 
                        
51 TNA CAB 130/139, ‘The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs’ (9 Jun., 1958), p. 1. 
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(Autumn, 2004), p. 147. 
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of the crisis,  highlight the extent to  which the  government considered the  breach in 
the special relationship to be the most serious consequence of the crisis.54 
 
Turning  now to the  wider  Future  Policy  Study,  Suez is, as  with the  Defence 
Review, not mentioned specificaly. Aside from the crisis being considered something 
of a taboo subject in  oficial circles, it should also  be  noted that three  years  had 
elapsed between it and the publication of the Future Policy Study. In this period, the 
Six had signed the Treaties of Rome establishing EURATOM and the EEC,55 Britain 
had atempted and failed to create an al encompassing  European  Free  Trade  Area, 
and  had, in  1960, joined  with six  of the  non  EEC  European  powers to found the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA).56 In the context of the Cold War, in 1957 
the  U.S.S.R successfuly tested an Intercontinental  Balistic  Missile57 and 
subsequently launched  Sputnik, the  world’s first artificial earth satelite.58 Sputnik 
itself  did  very litle that should  have  made the  West  nervous,  but it represented a 
perceived inferiority  on the  part  of  western science and technology and sparked a 
                        
54 TNA CAB 195/16, C.M. (57) 3, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting (8 Jan., 1957), p. 3. 
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brief frenzy  of  perceived inferiority  known as the ‘Sputnik  Syndrome’.59 In  1958 
Britain and the  US signed the  Mutual  Defence  Agreement,60 and in  1959 the  US 
successfuly tested its own ICBM.61 It is not surprising therefore that Suez was not be 
mentioned  by  name,  given the events in the intervening  years that could influence 
British policy. 
 
This is  not to say that there  was  no  discernible  Suez influence in the  Future 
Policy Study. On the contrary, there were at least two areas in which such influence 
could  be seen.  Part I  of the study focused  on  Britain’s economic resources and 
describes, in the context  of the  Sterling  Area, the fact that  Britain  has the  most 
vulnerable economy  of al the  major  powers.62 The study  went  on to state that 
‘experience in the last  10  years  has shown  how  vulnerable sterling is and  how 
damaging sterling crises are to the  United  Kingdom’s foreign  policy and  military 
position’.63 This can  only  be a reference to  Suez as there  was  no  other event in the 
1950s that precipitated a sterling crisis. Abadan in 1951 and the nationalisation of the 
Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Company  was a  major crisis for  Britain,  but  did  not result in a 
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sterling crisis, and  Britain’s economy  was  not in such a  parlous state that it was 
unable to despatch a sizeable contingent to the UN force in the Korean War.64 
 
Part II of the study details the objectives of Britain’s foreign and strategic policy and 
has this to say: 
 
Our ability to  maintain the influence  of the  United  Kingdom  wil  depend 
increasingly upon the way in which the national efort in defence and economic 
aid is fited in with those of our friends to further common objectives. We shal 
have less freedom of action to cary out exclusively national policies.65 
 
As  with  parts  of the  Defence  Review, the link to  Suez  was indirect, and rested  on 
Suez having been the only event in the 1950s where Britain tried to act in a manner 
reminiscent of its Victorian heyday, finding itself forced to accept this was no longer 
viable. More conclusive evidence is found in the sections on Britain’s alies, and its 
spheres  of influence.  The aliance  with the  US is stressed as  being  of the  utmost 
importance, but not ‘a law of nature,’66 and reference is made to sharp diferences in 
the Middle East and over British colonialism, although the two powers’ disagreements 
over Iraq in  1958 and 1959 cannot  be ruled  out as a cause for the statement.67 The 
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portrayal of the Commonwealth, its reliability, and British leadership68, also seem to 
suggest the influence  of  Suez,  which  not  only saw  Britain  unable to command the 
support it assumed its leadership  would  provide,  but came close to  destroying the 
organisation itself.69 
 
To conclude our examination of the second research question, it is clear that 
not only did the British government conduct a comprehensive re-examination of the 
country’s role and position, but that there is equaly compeling evidence for the claim 
that it was at least in part inspired by the Suez Crisis. The Defence Review of 1957, 
while  not  mentioning  Suez explicitly, contained several references to economic and 
diplomatic issues that suggest its involvement, and further evidence of the influence 
of the crisis is found in the  discussions and  documents that led to the study’s 
publication.70 The  Study for  Future  Policy, the  more al-encompassing review, 
similarly  made repeated reference that can  only  have  been inspired  by  Suez.  The 
Foreign Policy Review of 1958, and the study on interdependence, contain many of 
the same points, and, when the Cabinet discussions in the aftermath of the crisis are 
considered alongside the studies, the influence of Suez is clear to see. Suez may not 
have been the sole motivation, but to suggest it was irelevant would certainly be wide 
of the mark. 
 
                        
68 Ibid, pp. 26. 
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Is there any evidence to support the assertion that the Suez 
Crisis influenced the evolution of British Policy towards 
membership of the European Communities? 
 
This third  question is the  most important  of the three and is also the  more 
complicated, as there are two elements to it. Is there evidence to support the view that 
Europe  occupied a  more significant  position in and  of itself?  And is there evidence 
that other policy decisions and priorities caused by Suez included a European element 
that accorded it greater significance than before? 
 
The first aspect to consider is the extent to  which  Europe  was considered as an 
alternative to the special relationship or the links with the Commonwealth. An article 
in The  Economist in January  1957 certainly  detected some semblance  of this and 
stated: 
 
The cause  of closer association  with  Europe  has received  many  new recruits in 
recent months and on cannot escape the suspicion that too many of them regard it 
as an alternative, almost as a riposte against the aliance with the United States, 
Canada, and the rest of the world.71 
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Documents from the  Conservative  Party  Archive  would seem to support this 
interpretation. A meeting of the parliamentary party’s Foreign Afairs Commitee on 
14  November  1956 saw several  Conservative  MPs express  dissatisfaction  with the 
conduct  of the  US  during the crisis.  Peter  Smithers,  MP for  Winchester and later 
Parliamentary  Under  Secretary  of  State at the  Foreign  Ofice, as  wel as  Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe,72 made the folowing remarks: 
 
Have  never  based  my atitude to  America  on sentimental  grounds,  but  had 
believed that  American  would  never stand aside if this country’s  vital interests 
were at stake. Recent events have convinced me that this was no longer a valid 
assumption…As a result  we  must turn  urgently to the consolidation  of  our 
relations with Europe; for example, through such initiatives as the creation of a 
free trade area in association  with the  Common  Market.  By  moving closer to 
Europe,  we stood the  best chance  of improving  our relations  with the  United 
States. 
 
A second MP, Bernard Braithe, agreed with Smithers’ remarks, but stated that as far 
as the US was concerned, no initiatives should be expected and that Britain must take 
the lead in restoring relations.73 
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As far as the  Parliamentary  Conservative  Party  was concerned there is 
evidence that supports the claims made in The Economist, showing that a turn towards 
Europe  was in the  minds  of  MPs as a result  of the  Suez  Crisis.  What then  of the 
Government and the Cabinet? In late November, Macmilan presented the proposals 
for a Free Trade Area to the House of Commons. The French Ambassador observed 
his speech and commented to the French Foreign Secretary that he felt simple party 
politics  was  not the  only  motivating factor in  what appeared to  him to  be a shift in 
British policy. He suggested that recent events, by which he meant Suez, were a factor 
as  wel.74 This  may  have come from the speech  made  by  Geofrey  Rippon, later 
Heath’s chief negotiator in 1972, but then a new MP, who said: 
 
One positive result of the Suez crisis is that it has given a new impetus to 
European co-operation. I think it is a fact  of the  highest significant that 
interuption  of the flow  of  oil,  which is a common threat, is  being  met  by 
concerted action. Some years ago, Preident Auriol of France said: Europe must 
unite herself if she wishes to recover and live, and if she does not want American 
assistance to  be a  gesture  without future  or a  humiliating charity. I think that 
recent events have given emphasis to his words.75 
 
The  memorandum  prepared and  distributed  by  Anthony  Eden,  described 
earlier in the context  of  British awareness  of the  damage  of  Suez, concludes  with a 
comment  on the future  directions that  Britain could  go in  order to recover from the 
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crisis.  Until recently this  memo  had received litle to  no atention,76 despite the 
folowing section: 
 
The conclusion of al this is surely that we must review our world position and 
domestic capacity  more searchingly in the light  of the  Suez experience,  which 
has  not so  much changed  our fortunes as revealed realities.  While the 
consequences of this examination may be to determine us to work more closely 
with  Europe, carying  with  us,  we  hope,  our closest friends in the 
Commonwealth in such  development,  here too  we  must  be  under  no ilusion. 
Europe wil not welcome us simply because at the moment it may appear to suit 
us to look to them. The timing and conviction of our approach may be decisive in 
their influence on those with whom we wish to work.77 
 
Although  he  was in  his last  days as  Prime  Minister,  Eden  was stil an 
influential figure, and the  passage  demonstrates that a turn towards  Europe  was 
certainly in the mind of senior members of the government. It should be noted though 
that,  given the  humiliation that  Eden  had sufered at the  hands  of  President 
Eisenhower,78 there  may  have  been a certain  degree  of  biterness that  may  have 
prompted this  particular statement.  Nevertheless,  Eden,  while  not as  personaly 
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invested in the special relationship as  Churchil  or  Macmilan,  both  of  whom  had 
American  mothers and a familial afinity  with the  US,  was similarly  not  positively 
inclined towards  Britain  participating in the  European integration  process.  His  1952 
study ‘Britain’s Overseas Obligations’, did not even mention the Schuman Plan and 
the European Coal and Steel Community, let alone advocate a re-orientation of British 
policy in that direction.79 Similarly, while Prime Minister, Eden seemed uninterested 
in the developments at Messina,80 and declined the ofer of Molet for late entry to the 
talks and the ofer of union with France.81 
 
To return to the issue of a more ‘European’ policy being in the minds of senior 
government figures,  on January  8th the  Cabinet considered ‘The  Grand  Design’, a 
paper presented by the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd. The paper did not mention 
Suez by name, although John Young and Nigel Ashton saw it as a direct result of the 
crisis.82 Moreover, ‘The Grand Design’ did say that in 1957: 
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An industrialised country with 50 milion inhabitants is no longer large enough 
or powerful enough to produce and man the weapons required for modern war, 
nuclear  or conventional.  A country  which  wishes to  play the role  of a  great 
Power must not only possess certain conventional forces. It must also make and 
have the power to use the whole range of thermo-nuclear weapons, including the 
megaton bomb… Britain cannot by herself go the whole distance. If we try to do 
so we shal bankrupt ourselves. The choice is therefore clear. We must stop short 
with an insuficient stockpile and inadequate means of delivery or we must seek 
to achieve our end by other means.83 
 
The other means that Lloyd refers to, and goes on to describe are the pooling 
of  nuclear information  between  Britain and the  Six.  Combined, in  his eyes, these 
seven  nations  would comprise  more than  210  milion  people  with considerable 
industrial capacity.  Moreover, joint  military association  would also entail a closer 
political association, although Lloyd explicitly ruled out supranational machinery not 
responsible to the  national  governments.84 The  Cabinet  discussed the  paper  on 
January 8th 1957 and although the specifics of the proposals were rejected, the Lord 
President  of the  Council,  Defence  Secretary and  Commonwealth  Secretary spoke  of 
the  potential  harm to relations  with the  United  States,85 the  minutes conclude that 
there  was a consensus in favour  of examining closer association  with  Europe.  To 
quote the minutes themselves: 
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In  discussion there  was  general agreement that a fresh initiative towards closer 
European co-operation should  not  be  based  on  proposals for co-operation in 
development  of  nuclear  weapons…On the  other  hand, strong support  was 
expressed for the  general concept  of closer association  between the  United 
Kingdom and  Western  Europe…The  Anglo-American aliance  was  vital to the 
security of the free world; but the Suez Crisis had made it plain that there must be 
some change in the basis of Anglo-American relations.86 
 
Gowland, Turner and Wright have refered to an atempt by the Foreign Ofice to turn 
British policy towards Europe, one rejected by Macmilan in favour of devoting time 
to repairing the US aliance.87 ‘The Grand Design’ was part of this atempt and while 
the  Cabinet  discussion  quoted above supports the  view that closer association  with 
Europe  was a  policy  option, it  was  ultimately rejected  on the  grounds that it  would 
risk the special relationship. Lord Salisbury cited the crisis, as evidence that moves in 
the  direction  of  Anglo-European  nuclear relations  without consulting the  US  would 
finaly undermine the aliance.88 
 
This is  not,  however, to  be taken as evidence for the  validity  of counter-
arguments that  dismiss  Suez as an event that influenced the  Anglo-European 
relationship. It is fair to say that relations with the United States were given primacy, 
but to  dismiss the influence  Suez  on this  basis is flawed, and  based  on a 
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misunderstanding of British policy under Macmilan, and, in point of fact, the basic 
tenets of the Three Circles Policy itself. At its most fundamental, the policy stressed 
that Britain was at the centre of three areas of geo-political influence. But for Britain 
to occupy this special position and to maintain it, was required to maintain a balance 
between them: 
 
Our power and influence in the world depends, our own national strength apart, 
upon  our  position as the common link  between the three systems; the  Anglo-
American, the  Commonwealth and  Western  Europe.  Whilst the aim  of  British 
policy must be to develop the strength of each association, it is essential, if we 
are to remain a pivot that we should keep al three in balance and not develop one 
to the detriment of others.89 
 
This was stated British policy, but it was Britain’s views of the prospects for ‘Europe’ 
that gave rise at the time, and subsequently, to the perception that the Three Circles 
were a zero sum exercise, that when it came to Europe, British policymakers took the 
view that deepening ties would mean doing so at the expense of either the Atlantic, or 
more often the Commonwealth aliance.90 Until the mid 1950s, Britain maintained a 
detached atitude towards  European integration fearing that specific  moves, be they 
nuclear colaboration  of the sort advocated  by  Selwyn  Lloyd,  or joining the  Six at 
Messina in the creation  of a customs  union,  would fataly  damage the special 
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relationship,  or the  Commonwealth.91 In this respect,  portraying  British  policy 
towards the European circle as being of the least value is reasonable. But after 1957 
this interpretation  became less accurate, and it appears to this author as though the 
curent literature has taken Macmilan’s preference for close ties with the US to mean 
that nothing  had realy changed.92 It is this  post-Suez interpretation that this author 
seeks to chalenge. 
 
What  made the  post-Suez  period  diferent  was that  Macmilan  not  only 
understood the central tenet  of the  Three  Circles,  he actively  pursued  policies that 
stressed the fact that they  were intertwined.  Anglo-American relations  were  his 
number  one  priority in foreign  policy,93 but  Europe  was  his second, and,  most 
importantly, he considered both areas, along with the Commonwealth, as part of an al 
encompassing western aliance, or Atlantic community, interdependent as it were.94 It 
is here that we return to the Future Policy Study, and the study on Anglo-American 
interdependence. In the  Cabinet  meeting that rejected the specifics  of  his ‘Grand 
Design’, Selwyn Lloyd made the folowing point: 
 
The  Suez  Crisis  had  made it  plain that there  must  be some change in  basis  of 
Anglo-American relations. It was doubtful whether the United States would now 
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be  wiling to accord  us alone the special  position  which  we  had  held as their 
principal aly during the war. We might therefore be beter able to influence them 
if we were part of an association of powers which had greater political, economic 
and military strength than we alone could command. We ought to be in a position 
to deal  with the  United  States  Government  on equal terms; and if that  position 
had now to be founded on economic strength and military power, we must seek it 
through a new association with other countries.95 
 
This point may not have caried the day for Lloyd’s proposals, but they are a 
recuring theme in many of the documents that deal with British foreign policy after 
Suez.  The  policy  of interdependence recognised  many things that  British 
policymakers  had  previously ignored,  marginalised,  or just  not  been fuly aware  of. 
Prior to Suez, the US wish that Britain engage fuly with the moves towards European 
integration  had  been taken as evidence for  one  of the  more  bizare instances  of 
delusion  on the  part  of the  Foreign  Ofice, and to an extent even  Macmilan.96 This 
was the idea that Britain could guide the US in its new role as leader of the Western 
bloc. The views of the United States on Europe were dismissed in this regard as proof 
that it did  not fuly appreciate  Britain’s  global role and was set apart from its 
continental neighbours. By 1958 this had changed. Suez had demonstrated the danger 
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to Britain in acting against US wishes,97 and the interdependence document made the 
point that the  US  welcomed  British  moves into  Europe,  but  wished that they  were 
more  numerous, and that they  had accomplished  more.98 Furthermore,  while 
recognising the  dangers  of appearing to  be an  American satelite, the  document 
stressed that if Britain played its proper part in Europe, it would remain an invaluable 
aly to the  United  States. It also stressed that if  Britain remained isolated from 
Europe’s  political leadership, its value  would  diminish and the  US  might  bypass 
Britain and deal directly with Europe,99 a point made in the ‘Study for Future Policy’ 
as wel.100 
 
This last  point  was a  prevalent theme, and it is certainly  one reason for the 
British  decision to seek  membership  of the  Common  Market in  1961/1962.  The 
interdependence study  was  writen  during the abortive and  unsuccessful  Free  Trade 
Area  negotiations in  1958, and advocated that  policy rather than  EEC  membership. 
Nevertheless, one aspect of Macmilan’s decision to apply for the later was a fear that 
Britain did not possess enough influence with the United States, a point made by his 
biographers, scholarly  work  on  Anglo-European relations, and in  Macmilan’s  own 
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‘Grand Design’.101 1960 was a bad year for Macmilan and for Britain. The failure of 
the Four Power (United States, U.S.S.R., UK, and France) summit in Paris in 1960, in 
which he had invested much time and political capital, depressed the Prime Minister, 
and forced  him to conclude that the influence  he felt  he and  his country  possessed, 
counted for nothing in the face of superpower intransigence.102 It was this, more than 
anything else, that  persuaded  him  of the  necessity of seeking  membership  of the 
Common Market. However, as can be seen from the Cabinet discussions, the ‘Study 
of Future Policy’, and the idea of interdependence, it owed much to the experience of 
the Suez Crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter  has sought to examine the argument  put forward  by  historians that the 
Suez  Crisis acted as  point  of realisation,  providing a shock to the system that 
prompted the  British  government to  undertake a re-appraisal  of the country’s  world 
position, a re-appraisal that led to a change in  British  policy in  Europe in favour  of 
closer ties.103 Accordingly it asked three  questions:  was there any evidence  of 
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awareness  on the  part  of the  government as to the  disaster  of  Suez;  was there any 
evidence  of a re-appraisal  of  Britain’s  world  position;  was there any evidence that 
closer ties with Europe was an outcome? 
 
It is clear from an examination  of  primary and secondary evidence, 
particularly that  drawn from the  National  Archives at  Kew, the  Conservative  Party 
Archive in Oxford, and the published volumes Foreign Relations of the United States 
and Documents  Diplomatiques  Français, that  not  only  was the  British  government 
aware  of the  disaster that  had  befalen it,  but that it  very  quickly embarked  upon a 
process of fundamental review. Eden’s January 1957 memo stated this in the clearest 
possible terms, and the  Cabinet  drew similar conclusions.104 The articles cited from 
The  Economist demonstrated that  press and  public  were similarly aware  of the 
implications of the Suez debacle, and it is unlikely that the Cabinet was unaware of 
them. The article by Gordon-Walker was after al, atached to a file from the PREM 
11 series (the Prime Ministers papers for the Conservatives’ years in power between 
1951 and 1964). 
 
It is similarly clear that Britain did embark upon a period of re-appraisal, and, 
moreover, that Suez was certainly a factor that contributed to it. The 1957 ‘Defence 
Outline  of  Future  Policy’  did  not  mention  Suez in the final  draft,  but  not  only  do 
certain sections suggest a Suez influence, the discussions in Cabinet refer to the crisis 
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and link it to  decisions afecting the  deployment  of  Teritorial  Army  units in 
Europe.105 Further evidence can  be found in the studies  by the armed forces that 
contributed to the White Paper itself.106 Beyond the realm of defence policy narowly 
defined, the influence of Suez can be found in the ‘Study of Future Policy’,107 and it 
was directly refered to in two foreign policy documents that were subsumed into it: 
‘The Position of the United Kingdom in World Afairs’108 and ‘The Efects of Anglo-
American Interdependence on the Long-Term Interests of the United Kingdom’.109 
 
It  was the extent to  which  Suez could  be said to  have  prompted a shift in 
policy towards Europe that is the most important issue considered in this chapter: here 
the  basic tenets  of  British foreign  policy in the  post-war  period, and their 
interpretation by historians, assume great significance. If one accepts the premise that 
the Three Circles were essentialy a zero sum game, where Europe was sacrificed so 
as to preserve the special relationship and Britain’s Commonwealth links, then a shift 
in European policy would have to have involved a conscious decision to use Europe 
as an alternative. Although precisely such a decision was advocated by Eden, and by 
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Selwyn Lloyd’s ‘Grand Design’, the government rejected it fearing the efects on the 
special relationship. This, and Macmilan’s preference for repairing and furthering the 
aliance with America, would seem to suggest that Ovendale and Young were corect 
in downplaying the influence of the Suez Crisis.  
 
However, this is  not the case.  As  has  been established,  while  Britain’s 
treatment  of the  European circle suggests some semblance  of zero sum calculation 
prior to Suez, asserting that it continued to do so after the crisis is based on a flawed 
understanding  of the  Three  Circles  Policy, and the  manner in  which  Macmilan 
conducted  British foreign  policy  while  Prime  Minister.  The  Three  Circles  were at 
heart an exercise in  balance and  Macmilan,  despite  giving  primacy to  Anglo-
American relations, was in his own words a firm believer in interdependence. He saw 
Europe as  part  of an al encompassing  Atlantic  Aliance, and  his  policy  of 
interdependence, in part inspired by the experience of Suez, stressed the importance 
of closer ties  with  Europe.  This  was  predominately  based  on accepting that  US 
insistence on Britain playing its part in the integration process was not evidence that it 
did  not  grasp  Britain’s  world, rather than  European, role, and that if for  no  other 
reason, Britain risked losing its special relationship to the US if it remained apart from 
the EEC. It has also been noted that the Cabinet’s rejection of Lloyd’s ‘Grand Design’ 
was a rejection  of the specifics  of  his  proposals. In fact, the  Cabinet accepted the 
general premise that Suez had made it clear that a European option was necessary in 
case US policy continued to be hostile to British interests.110 Finaly, there is evidence 
that members of the Conservative Party responded to Suez with criticism of American 
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policy and saw Europe as a potential alternative,111 and the French Ambassador to the 
United Kingdom detected the spectre of Suez in the proposals for a Free Trade Area 
that Macmilan presented to Parliament in November 1956.112 
 
To conclude,  on  balance there is  more than enough evidence to support the 
assertion that the  Suez  Crisis  prompted a re-appraisal  of  British  policy that, via 
interdependence and the  Anglo-American special relationship, eventualy led to 
Macmilan’s decision in 1961 to apply for membership of the EEC. This was by no 
means the only way in which Suez influenced the nature of Anglo-European relations: 
Macmilan’s  own emergence as  Prime  Minister, the rise  of  Edward  Heath, and the 
influence  of the crisis  on  French  policy in  Europe,  were further instances  of the 
impact of the crisis, and the wil be the focus of subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter IV: The Suez Crisis and British Policy 
Towards Membership of the European Communities: 
Harold Macmilan 
 
I have no doubt whatever that the crisis destroyed what chances Mr Butler had. 
This seems to me to be an indisputable fact. Mr Butler may have been unfairly 




In the  previous chapter  we examined  one  of the existing arguments  put forward  by 
those historians who saw a role for the Suez Crisis in the evolution of British policy 
towards European integration. The chapter determined that an immediate consequence 
of Suez was a rise in anti-American sentiment that advocated orienting British policy 
towards  Europe as an alternative. It also explored the actions taken  by the  British 
government in the immediate aftermath  of the crisis and identified a  distinct 
awareness  of the  damage that it  had  done to  Britain’s  position in the  world and 
extensive evidence of a period of reappraisal. While it is not realistic to conclude that 
Europe was seized upon as a policy alternative to existing links with the US and the 
Commonwealth, the short-term emphasis on repairing the damage done by Suez to the 
aliance  with  United  States  was to  have a longer-term impact  on  British  policy 
towards  membership  of the  European  Communities, through  Macmilan’s  policy  of 
interdependence.  This chapter  wil  now take this idea and examine  how the fal  of 
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Anthony Eden and his replacement by Macmilan rather than Butler was of particular 
and long-lasting significance to British policy. 
 
Macmilan’s rise to power at the expense of Eden and Butler was one of the 
most immediate consequences of the Suez Crisis, particularly in the context of British 
policy on Europe. The reasoning behind this assertion is that while Macmilan was not 
a supporter  of a ‘federalist’  or ‘supranational’  Europe,  he  has long enjoyed a 
qualified, but not unchalenged,2 reputation as a broadly pro-European politician.3 He 
was a founding member of Churchil’s United Europe Movement and a delegate at the 
1948  Congress  of  Europe. In the early  1950s  he, along  with  other  Conservatives 
positively disposed towards Europe, lobbied Churchil and Eden, without success, to 
adopt a  more  positive approach to  European integration than that  displayed  by the 
previous Labour Government.4 He was also considered by his contemporaries inside 
and  outside  of  Britain to  have  been among the  most  pro-European  members  of the 
Conservative Party, and someone determined to take Britain into Europe.5 
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In  ofice as  Prime  Minister  he fundamentaly altered  British  policy towards 
membership  of the  European  Communities.  He  moved it away from the scepticism 
and occasional hostility that had been the halmarks of the Atlee, Churchil and Eden 
administrations to the point where a mere five years after Eden’s government declined 
to participate at Messina, Macmilan’s opened negotiations with the Six to determine 
on what terms Britain could join the EEC. Not al of Macmilan’s actions and policies 
in Europe were designed to move Britain closer to the Six, in fact his early atempts to 
create a free trade area, and the creation of EFTA were designed in opposition to the 
new  Common  Market,  but, in the summer  of  1960  he came to the conclusion that 
membership  was in  Britain’s interest.  Accordingly  he  began a  year-long  process  of 
trying to convince  his  Cabinet, the  Conservative  Party, and  ultimately the  House  of 
Commons of that. In July 1960 he reshufled his cabinet, a move interpreted widely as 
a precursor to an EEC bid, moving known pro-Europeans such as Heath into strategic 
positions.6 In January 1961 he circulated his ‘Grand Design’,7 a document that clearly 
demonstrated  his  view that  Britain  must seek  membership  of the  EEC, and even 
though General de Gaule vetoed his bid in January 1963, Macmilan had established 
Britain as a country  destined to join the  European  Communities.8 Furthermore  by 
promoting Heath and placing him in charge of the negotiations, Macmilan furthered 
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the career  of the  man  who, as even  de  Gaule  predicted,9 would succeed  where  he 
himself had failed, and take Britain into the Common Market. 
 
Counter-Factual History 
It is this author’s contention that  Britain’s relationship  with and  policy towards 
Europe would not have undergone the fundamental changes it did between 1957 and 
1963 had Harold Macmilan not become Prime Minister. This assertion is to a certain 
extent a counterfactual argument, as we cannot know for certain how Eden or Butler 
would have acted after January 1957, yet that is not to say that there is no place for it. 
Counterfactual  history  has long  been a contentious subject. Jeremy  Black’s first 
example  of it in Studying  History is  Edward  Gibbon’s consideration  of an Islamic 
victory at the Batle of Tours, although he credits the emergence in the 1960s of the 
American Cliometric School with counterfactuals becoming more widespread.10 Nial 
Ferguson in Virtual History asserted that counterfactuals tend to be found (sometimes 
even if only implicitly) in revisionist, anti-consensual works that seek to chalenge the 
idea that  history is  deterministic in  nature.11 Ferguson  diferentiated  between two 
types of counterfactual, those that are products of imagination and lack an empirical 
basis, and those that ‘test  hypotheses  by (supposedly) empirical  means’.12 Martin 
Bunzl,  writing five  years after  Ferguson,  described two  diferent  kinds  of 
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counterfactual  history, the  ‘good’ and ‘bad’, the  diference  being the  presence  or 
absence of an historical grounding.13 
 
There are many authors who have taken a markedly diferent view. E.H Car 
refered to counterfactuals as ‘parlour  games’,  E.P  Thompson  used the  phrase 
‘unhistorical shit’, and  Randal  Colins  described ‘analyticaly  particularistic turning 
points’ as demonstrating a ‘negative imagination’.14 More recently, Richard Evans in 
Altered Pasts considered the arguments of Ferguson and others who took a relatively 
positive view of counterfactuals, but concluded that they are essentialy flawed on the 
very  grounds that they claim  validity.  Specificaly, that a counterfactual starts at a 
particular  point and then  presents a  diferent scenario  based  on something  diferent 
happening, but making a set of assumptions that only one path is possible: 
 
This  moment  of  decision is conceptualised as a  moment contingency,  when 
things  might easily  have  gone in a  diferent  direction from the  one they actualy 
took…But this involves a  huge range  of assumptions about  how  history…operated. 
These assumptions  necessarily eliminate contingency rather than  underlining its 
importance and influence…’contingency cuts two ways’, for if we have contingency 
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at the  outset  of a counterfactual speculation, then  we  must also  have it in the early 
middle, the  middle and the late stages, indeed al the through.  Thus ‘contingency is 
not a train one can get on or of at wil’.15 
 
As  we  have  noted, there is a certain  degree  of counterfactual reasoning 
implicit in the argument that Macmilan’s ascent to the premiership was a significant 
moment for Anglo-European relations. It is predicated on the belief that neither Eden, 
nor  Butler,  would  have  done so  much to change  British  policy  on  Europe and so 
would seem to  make certain assumptions regarding  how either  man  would  have 
behaved if events had gone diferently. However, in line with Ferguson and Bunzl’s 
arguments about an empirical basis, it is submited that in actual fact, and cognizant of 
there being no certainty, there is plenty of evidence to support the assertion that had 
Eden  or  Butler  been  Prime  Minister  between  1957 and  1963 the  nature  of  Anglo-
European relations would have been diferent. This is based on the known views on 
Europe  held  by  both  men, and in the case  of  Eden  how  he approached  European 
integration and British participation therein when he was Foreign Secretary and then 
Prime Minister. 
 
Anthony Eden was not necessarily hostile per se to European integration, but 
in  opposition and in  ofice  he  displayed litle interest  beyond cooperation at the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). His 1957 memorandum 
with the  prescient comment  on  moving closer to  Europe  being a  potential 
consequence  of  Suez suggests a certain  pragmatism,16 but  biterness against the  US 
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and much of the Commonwealth cannot be ruled out as contributing factors, and there 
is  nothing else to suggest  he  would  have altered  British  policy  had  he remained in 
ofice.  Overal  his  views and  policies are  perhaps  best  understood as an example  of 
Britain’s  overal  posture in this  period,  benign  detachment.  Butler  was an  outright 
sceptic  where  European integration  was concerned.  Europe  does  not appear in  his 
memoirs, nor do his biographers devote much time to it in the context of his career. 
He  held a seat in an agricultural constituency and thus reflected the anti-Common 
Market views of his constituents in rural, hence agricultural, Essex. His most notable 
contributions to the issue  were  his  dismissive comments about the  Messina 
Conference.17 
 
Macmilan’s pro-European credentials, despite some scepticism on the part of 
biographers as to  how  genuine they  were, and  when combined  with  his  political 
pragmatism, facilitated the change in  British  policy  on  European integration. 
However, without the Suez Crisis it is almost inconceivable that he would ever have 
been in a  position to  have the impact that  he  did.  Anthony  Eden  had long  been the 
heir-apparent to Churchil and at the time that the wartime leader finaly retired, but 
Macmilan was not seen as a likely successor.18 His age was a factor against him, as 
was  his lack  of cabinet seniority.  Once  Eden  became  Prime  Minister  his chances  of 
becoming leader seemed to have been just as remote. Macmilan was three years older 
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than the Prime Minister and if Eden remained in ofice for at least four or five years, 
Butler was seen as the man likely to be the next Conservative leader.19 
 
Suez  was essential for  Macmilan.  The stress  of the failed  operation and the 
accusations of colusion and lying to Parliament made Eden’s position untenable and 
he was unable to remain in ofice. Macmilan and his conduct during the crisis have 
been the source of considerable controversy, with accusations leveled at him that he 
manipulated the aftermath of the crisis firstly to ensure Eden’s downfal, and then his 
own accession.  His speech to the  Conservative  1922  Commitee likened accepting 
Nasser’s occupation of the Canal as akin to the appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini 
in the 1930s. Butler had supported the appeasement policy in the 1930s and was also 
seen as weak over Suez. There were some existing doubts on the part of the Cabinet 
and the  party about  Butler irespective  of  Suez;  his support  of appeasement in the 
1930s was one factor, another was a perception that he was excelent at framing party 
policy, but not a suitable Prime Minister. His 1955 budget, that took sixpence in the 
pound of of income tax barely 3 months before the General Election was widely seen 
as political cynicism, and he received much criticism for it.20 As a result, despite the 
press  predicting that  Butler  would the  next  Prime  Minister, the  overwhelming 
preference of both the Conservative backbench and the Cabinet was for Macmilan.21 
Macmilan  had  been  one  of the  most aggressive  members  of the  Cabinet  over  Suez 
and had also played an instrumental role in the decision to withdraw. Yet he managed 
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to turn these positions, which should have alienated both wings of the party, into the 
support necessary to ensure that he, not Butler, succeeded Eden. 
 
Macmilan the Suez Crisis 
Macmilan became leader of the Conservative Party after the resignation of Eden in 
January  1957,  yet, and remaining conscious  of the risks  we identified earlier in 
making counterfactual arguments, this alone  does  not tel  us how significant  Suez 
was. There are too many questions that would need to be answered for this issue to be 
explored fuly within the bounds of this work so the discussion on the impact of Suez 
on the change of leadership in the Conservative Party wil be reduced to the folowing 
three: 
 
1. How likely  was it that  Macmilan, rather than  Eden,  would  have replaced 
Churchil in April 1955? 
2. Could he have become Prime Minister after Eden without Suez, or at least a 
crisis of a similar nature? 
3. How did Suez remove Eden and help Macmilan defeat Butler? 
 
The first question is relatively straightforward; Macmilan had litle to no chance of 
succeeding Churchil instead of Eden. However, to state it was completely out of the 
question  would  be  unwise, as it  would involve ignoring the circumstances  of 
Churchil’s retirement and the state  of the  Conservative  Party at that time. 
Biographers of both Eden and Macmilan have claimed that the later harboured some 
ambitions to succeed Churchil in 1955. D.R Thorpe is one of these and although he 
recounted a conversation between Macmilan and Lord Beaverbrook, that appears in 
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Macmilan’s  diaries,  he  presents  no  other evidence to suggest any leadership 
ambitions (however faint) that  Macmilan  may  have  had.22 The conversation as 
reproduced in Macmilan’s diary entry for 23 April 1953 ran thus: 
 
When Churchil goes there wil be a contest for the leadership of the Party. There 
wil be an Eden section; there wil be a Butler section. You may easily slip in, as 
Bonar  Law  did  between  Chamberlain and  Walter  Long.’ ‘Yes’ I replied, ‘but 
who is to  be  my  Max  Aitken’.  He laughed at this.  Quite an amusing and 
stimulating  medicine, to  be taken in  very smal  DOSES, at two  or three  year 
intervals.23 
 
Max Aitken was the given name of Lord Beaverbrook and Macmilan’s reference was 
to the role  he apparently  played in  Bonar  Law’s accession in  October  1922.  The 
passage tels  us  very litle regarding any leadership ambitions  on the  part  of 
Macmilan. On the one hand the fact that Beaverbrook spoke as he did could be taken 
to suggest  he at least felt that the idea  had crossed  Macmilan’s  mind,  on the  other, 
Macmilan’s reference to amusement and that it should be taken in smal doses could 
be refering to his opinion of Beaverbrook’s suggestion. Thorpe claimed that later in 
life  Macmilan regreted  not  having succeeded  Churchil  himself and felt that if  he 
had, the Suez Crisis would have had a diferent outcome.24 
                        
22 D.R. Thorpe, Supermac (2011), p. 296. 
23 HMD  vol. I (23  Apr.,  1953).  Cited in  P.  Cateral, The Macmilan Diaries Volume I: The Cabinet 
Years 1950-1957 (Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 225-226. Al future diary references wil be from this source 
unless  otherwise stated and al folowing references  wil  be  HMD  vol. I (Date  of  Entry),  Page 
Numbers. 
24 D.R. Thorpe, Supermac (2011), p. 299. 
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Apart from the conversation with Beaverbrook which is of rather limited use, 
the body of evidence actualy points towards Macmilan having no ambitions of any 
kind, and acting  under the assumption that  Eden  would replace  Churchil.  He  was 
intimately involved in the long and  drawn  out  process  of  persuading  Churchil to 
resign so that  Eden could  have time to establish an administration  before a  General 
Election.25 His  diary entries for  4  August  1953 and  6  April  1954  display an active 
assumption that Eden would be Prime Minister after Churchil.26 On 24 August 1954 
he spoke to Churchil about his repeated, and broken, undertakings to resign and hand 
over to Eden. His memoirs recount the meeting: 
 
Churchil naturaly did not like this, but as always treated what I said calmly and 
courteously. I had once observed to him that I could speak to him more frankly 
than some of his coleagues. He had long treated Eden as an eldest son and even 
if Eden were to break down in health, there were many senior to me. In the case 
of great estates, the eldest son can never speak to his father about the wisdom of 
handing over property; a younger son who has nothing to gain is the person who 
should undertake the task, however disagreeable.27 
 
Whether  or  not  Macmilan  held  out any  hope,  however slim,  of  becoming  Prime 
Minister after Churchil, he was aware that his chances were extremely limited. The 
                        
25 G.  Best, Churchil:  A  Study in  Greatness (London,  2001),  pp.  310-313;  S.  Haffner, Churchil 
(Translated  by John  Brownjohn) (London,  2001),  pp.  140-150;  R. Jenkins, Chucrchil (Basingstoke, 
2001), pp. 870-900. 
26 HMD vol. I (4 Aug., 1953), pp. 249-251; HMD vol. I (6 Apr., 1954), p. 305. 
27 H. Macmilan, Tides (1969), pp. 540-541. 
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Daily  Mirror ran a  popularity  pol in the summer  of  1954 in  which  Macmilan 
received less than  2%  of the  vote compared to  Eden’s  52%.28 As  he said  himself to 
Churchil there  were  other  men than  Eden  more senior to  him, and  he  was  not 
considered among the first rank of the Conservative Party. He had never held one of 
the  great  ofices  of state and apart from  his time as  Minister  of  Housing and  Local 
Government, his most significant role in government had been a short and frustrating 
tenure as Minister of Defence. This was frustrating because of Churchil’s tendency to 
interfere continuously.29 
 
It is here that the first two questions begin to overlap and, rather than abandon 
Macmilan’s leadership chances relative to Eden at Churchil’s retirement and move 
onto  his chances  of succeeding  Eden,  we  wil consider them together.  Thorpe  has 
asserted that  Macmilan in fact  needed  Eden to succeed  Churchil if  he  were to 
seriously entertain any leadership ambitions  of  his  own.30 He also  needed  Eden to 
remain in charge long enough to establish himself as a leadership alternative, but not 
so long that  his age  disqualified  him in the face  of competition from  younger  men 
such as Butler or Lloyd.31 
 
Could  Macmilan  have  become  Prime  Minister  without the  Suez  Crisis?  As 
with any counterfactual this is rather complicated. Macmilan’s chances depended on 
Eden succeeding Churchil then leaving ofice, voluntarily or by compulsion, before 
                        
28 A. Sampson, Macmilan (1967), p. 98. 
29 HMD vol. I (29 Oct., 1954), p. 363; HMD Vol. I (11 Dec., 1954), pp. 369-370; HMD vol. I (26 Feb., 
1955), p. 397; H. Macmilan, Tides (1969), p. 560. 
30 D.R. Thorpe, Eden (2004), p. 498. 
31 E. Pearce, The Lost Leaders: The Best Prime Ministers we Never Had (London, 1997), p. 102. 
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Macmilan’s age and the  position  of  Butler rendering it impossible.  Moreover, 
Macmilan  was  neither liked,  nor trusted  by  Eden, who  was  wel aware  of  his 
ambitions  by the time  he  became  Prime  Minister.  Churchil  was reported to  have 
spoken to Eden about this although,32 according to Peter Hennessy, Eden was already 
wel aware  of this anyway.33 Macmilan always claimed that  he achieved  his life’s 
ambition  when  he  became  Foreign  Secretary in  April  1955  yet,  his actions in 
December  1955 suggested  he considered  Butler to  be a rival and although  he could 
have  meant that in the context  of advising the  Prime  Minister, it is  more likely that 
this rivalry  was for the  Premiership itself.  Eden  had  not  wanted  Macmilan as  his 
Foreign Secretary. He considered foreign afairs to be his arena and had no intention 
of handing over control to someone who was strong enough to chalenge him. Had his 
prefered candidate,  Salisbury,  not sat in the  House  of  Lords,  Eden  would  have 
prefered  him as  Foreign  Secretary.34 Having  won a  General  Election, increased the 
government’s majority and obtained a mandate for himself, Eden was able to act and 
sought to  move  Macmilan to the  Treasury, replacing  him  with  Selwyn  Lloyd, an 
inteligent man but not remotely capable of chalenging Eden on foreign policy. 
 
Macmilan did not want to become Chancelor, particularly if Butler was to be 
Lord Privy Seal and Deputy Prime Minister. The later was a position that was rarely 
dealt with and Macmilan feared that merely by holding the title, Butler’s position as 
heir apparent  would  be solidified.  He spent some time  negotiating  with  Eden and 
although  he  was  unable to  persuade the Prime  Minister to  make  Butler  his de facto 
                        
32 D.R. Thorpe, Supermac (2011), p. 296. 
33 P. Hennessy, Having it so Good: Britain in the Fifties (London, 2006), p. 374. 
34 HMD vol. I (17 Jan., 1953), pp. 208-209. 
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deputy, he did obtain an assurance of rather dubious constitutionality that Butler did 
not formaly outrank him.35 If Macmilan entertained no leadership ambitions himself 
then a  promotion to  what is indisputably the second  most  powerful  position in the 
British  government should  not  have  been a cause for concern.  Nor should  Butler 
holding an empty title.  However,  when  we take into account  what  Macmilan  knew 
about  Eden’s  health, and the  growing  disquiet about aspects  of  Eden’s leadership, 
Macmilan’s concern with Cabinet pre-eminence becomes clearer. 
 
Macmilan, to judge from his diaries, was more than aware that Eden’s health 
was  precarious,36 and that there  were  many in the country, including  Churchil and 
Robert Boothby,37 who did not believe he was up to the job of being Prime Minister.38 
Butler commented that Eden was half mad Baronet and half beautiful woman but the 
best  Prime  Minister they  had.39 Macmilan later remarked that  Eden  was ‘trained to 
win the  Derby in  1938,  but  was  not let  out  of the stals  until  1955’.40 By the time 
Nasser seized the  Suez  Canal in July  1956,  Eden’s  position  was  neither strong  nor 
particularly secure. Macmilan, according to Thorpe, had a strong sense that he could 
                        
35 HMD vol. I (7-13 Dec., 1955), pp. 513-517. 
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be the next leader of the Conservative Party.41 He had secured his position within the 
Cabinet and  by  virtue  of  having  been  Foreign  Secretary and  now  Chancelor  of the 
Exchequer  was  now considered as leadership  material.  This  was in contrast to the 
view in 1954 where it was noted that his good conduct as a member of the party made 
it unlikely that he would ever lead it.42 However, despite atacks in the press and il-
health,  Eden  was the leader  of a  government  with a large  majority in the  House  of 
Commons. He had led the party to a General Election victory that had resulted in this 
majority, and he had proved politicaly strong enough to make changes to his Cabinet 
that strengthened his own position. As events transpired it was Suez that forced him 
out  of  ofice and enabled  Macmilan to succeed  him.  The issue to examine  here is 
how that came about. 
 
The crisis’ first and  most immediate impact  on  Macmilan  was the role it 
played in the downfal of Eden. The strain of the crisis had, by mid November, taken 
its tol  on  his already fragile  health and  he  was compeled to leave  Britain and 
recuperate in Jamaica. He returned on December 14th but despite an initialy bulish 
determination to continue,43 it soon  became clear that  his  position  was  untenable. 
Even while he was away Harold Wilson had caled for him to either return or resign,44 
and, according to Thorpe, the Conservative Party was awash with speculation about 
                        
41 D.R.  Thorpe, Supermac (2011),  p.  299;  Earl  of  Kilmuir, Political Adventure: The Memoirs of the 
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43 ‘Sir A. Eden Returns “Absolutely Fit to Resume Duties”’, The Times (15 Dec., 1956), p. 6; R. Butler, 
The Art of the Possible (London, 1971), p. 195. 
44 ‘Alternatives for Sir Anthony: “Return or Resign” The Manchester Guardian (1 Dec., 1956), p. 1. 
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his  position.45 Edward  Heath,  Chief  Whip  during the crisis, claimed in  his 
autobiography that he was approached by a member of the Suez Group before a vote 
on  November  8th,  ofering support to the  government if  Heath  would  undertake to 
remove  Eden from  ofice.46 Even in the  US there  was a  belief that  Eden’s time as 
Prime Minister was over. Winthrop Aldrich, US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, 
reported  his suspicion that there seemed to  be a concerted efort in the  Cabinet to 
replace  Eden.47 A conversation in the  White  House  between  President  Eisenhower, 
Herbert  Hoover Jr (Undersecretary  of  State) and  Colonel  Goodpaster (one  of 
Eisenhower’s aides) included  Hoover refering to reports  of tensions  within the 
British  Government and  Cabinet.48 The source for these reports  was  presumably 
Aldrich and in fact the  American record  notes that  he caled  President  Eisenhower 
later  on the  19th to report that  his suspicions  were corect,49 as  wel as a further 
telegram reporting that Eden would go on holiday to recuperate and then retire. The 
telegram predicted Butler as Prime Minister but mentioned the possibility of it being 
Macmilan.50 
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Washington (19 Nov., 1956). 
49 FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume. XVI, Doc. 592, ‘Editorial Note’. 
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Eden’s premiership, and his health, had been undone by the strain of the crisis 
itself and by the divisions it caused within his government. Britain had been forced to 
halt an  operation that  had  barely even  got  underway  when it  became clear that the 
British economy could  not  bear the cost in the face  of  US  opposition.51 Anthony 
Nuting and Edward Boyle resigned when they became aware of the details of Sèvres, 
and the Conservative Party was split between those who were opposed to the invasion 
itself, and those who abhored the decision to withdraw. The Chief Whip was able to 
limit the extent  of  backbench rebelion and ensure that the  government  was  not 
defeated on November 8th and December 6th, actions that brought him great credit.52 
Nevertheless, accusations  of colusion that  Eden  unwisely, although  predictably, 
denied in the House, anger in Washington at British behaviour, the stress of months of 
planning, the diplomatic reversal and the possibility of the fal of the government took 
their tol and even though Eden returned on December 14th determined to continue, he 
was compeled to announce his resignation on January 9th 1957.53 
 
Suez brought about the resignation of Eden: but there is stil the issue of how 
the crisis  prevented  Butler from succeeding  him.  Considered the  most likely long-
term successor to  Eden and acting as  Deputy  Prime  Minister in  his absence in 
Jamaica,  Butler  would  have expected to  become  Prime  Minister  when  Eden 
resigned.54 Indeed  he retained that expectation even  when  Heath arived to tel  him 
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52 See Chapter Six. 
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that the Queen was sending for Macmilan instead. There were longstanding concerns 
amongst the  Conservative  Party about  Butler as  Prime  Minister.  He  had  been a 
notable supporter of the appeasement policy in the mid and late 1930s and so stood in 
marked contrast to  Churchil,  Eden and  Macmilan.  There  was also a sense that 
despite his impressive record on domestic issues such as education, he was not viewed 
as someone decisive or capable enough to defend British interests abroad.55 The Suez 
Crisis  brought  both  of these concerns to the forefront and enabled  Macmilan to 
outmanoeuvre Butler, who was in the unfortunate position of having been privy to the 
ful details of the Protocols of Sèvres, had reservations about the entire operation and 
yet had done nothing to prevent it. To make maters worse, the influential Suez Group 
on the right  of the  party  was angered  by the  opposition  of the  US and felt that the 
government’s  decision to  halt  Musketeer and then  withdraw completely  was a 
betrayal.56 Butler in his capacity as acting head of the government was the one who 
had to announce this in the House of Commons.57 
 
Butler  had  been in the  unfortunate  position  of  having angered  both  wings  of 
the Conservative Party: the left for not having prevented the atack on Egypt, and the 
right for the decision to withdraw.58 This alone does not explain how Macmilan was 
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able to take the leadership for,  on the face  of it,  having  been amongst the  most 
aggressive, hawkish members of the Cabinet59, and also the one who then ensured the 
retreat, he should also have been unpopular with both the left and right wings of the 
party. There have been several interpretations of the period and Macmilan’s actions 
during it that  might  help  us examine  why  Macmilan  did  not sufer this fate.  Some 
sources have accused him of working deliberately to remove Eden from power. The 
historian W. Scot Lucas wrote that Eden’s absence gave Macmilan free rein,60 and 
the US Ambassador stated that in addition to his suspicions that there was a Cabinet 
plot to remove  Eden, Macmilan  had  been  desperately anxious to  meet  Eisenhower, 
portraying  himself as  Eden’s  deputy  despite the fact that  he  was  no such thing.61 
Others such as Charles Wiliams and D.R Thorpe have taken the view that he merely 
took advantage of a poor speech given by Butler to the 1922 Commitee and that there 
was nothing underhanded or Machiavelian about his conduct.62 
 
One  key common feature in considerations  of  Macmilan’s conduct and  his 
accession to the  Premiership is the speech  he  gave to the  Conservative  1922 
Commitee. Macmilan was not actualy entitled to speak to the commitee and only 
did so  with  Butler’s  goodwil.  While  Butler  gave a limp and  uninspiring speech, 
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Macmilan  delivered a  passionate  defence  of  Britain and its interests, railing in 
particular against appeasement in a performance described by Enoch Powel as one of 
the  most  horible things  he experienced in  politics.63 Macmilan  did  not explicitly 
atack Butler in any way. He did not question his patriotism, his parliamentary record, 
or his beliefs. What he did do was to link the retreat from Suez to 1930s appeasement, 
an issue that was the source of considerable doubt about Butler on the part of many 
Conservatives. Ian  Or-Ewing,  MP for  Hendon  North, stated that ‘a  great  number, I 
should think  90  percent  of  people as they  went  out  of that room,  would  have 
supported Harold Macmilan’.64 One of many Conservatives who reported back from 
his constituency the views of Conservative voters stated that many were denouncing 
the withdrawal from Suez and saw Butler as a vilainous appeaser.65 
 
Macmilan was one of the few Conservatives to come out of the Suez Crisis 
with  his reputation  more  or less intact.  Despite criticisms from  political  opponents 
including Harold Wilson and Brendan Bracken, and the fact that he had aggressively 
pursued military action before reversing his position and insisting that the operation 
be  halted,  he  was able to  outmanoeuvre  Butler and  on January  7th became the  new 
Prime Minister. He was able to do this because of the type of crisis that Suez was. It 
was a foreign  policy  disaster and as such  made  both  Anthony  Eden and  Rab  Butler 
vulnerable. Eden’s reputation was based on his foreign policy expertise. He had litle 
interest in domestic policies and both the scale of the debacle and the accusations of 
colusion made his position untenable. Butler, for his part already seen as an appeaser 
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by  much  of the  Conservative  Party, aroused the anger  of  both the liberal and 
conservative  wings  by  his refusal to try to  prevent  Operation  Musketeer and  his 
association with the decision to withdraw. Macmilan was able to present himself as 
someone  who  would  defend  British interests and  was thus able to achieve the 
Premiership that was seen as beyond his reach a year before. Even Butler himself later 
commented that there  was a sizeable anti-Butler faction  but  not an anti-Macmilan 
one.66 
Macmilan and British Policy on the EEC 
The World Macmilan Faced 1960-1962 
Macmilan’s motivations have been examined ever since General de Gaule vetoed his 
EEC  bid.  Miriam  Camps and  Wolfram  Kaiser are two  historians  who  have stressed 
geopolitical concerns, specificaly that  prolonged absence from the  EEC  would 
damage  Britain’s relationship  with the  United  States.67 Others  have taken the  view 
that he was primarily concerned with improving the British economy.68 This author is 
of the  opinion that  neither explanation alone is suficient,  nor are the special 
relationship and the  British economy the  only factors that  prompted the  Prime 
Minister to decide to enter Europe. Firstly, trying to distinguish between geopolitical 
and economic considerations is superfluous as they are in fact interdependent.  The 
1957 ‘Defence  Outline  of  Future  Policy stated, ‘Britain’s influence in the  world 
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depends first and foremost on the health of her internal economy and the success of 
her export trade. Without these, military power cannot in the long run be supported.’69 
Macmilan’s decision was based on his belief that Europe represented the only viable 
solution to the many problems that he perceived Britain to be facing in the summer of 
1960.  
 
In  May  1960,  when this author contends  Macmilan  made the  decision that 
Britain should join the  EEC,  Britain  was facing  many  problems  both real and self-
perceived, and his diaries are ful of references to them. The British economy was in a 
strong position, growing steadily and enjoying almost ful employment and increasing 
standards of living. In 1957 Macmilan had made his famous uterance that the British 
people had never had it so good, yet the perception in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
was of an economy (and a nation) in decline.70 Part of this was because the economies 
of the  Six, the  United  States, and Japan  were  growing at a faster rate than the 
British,71 although as  Tomlinson  described, this  was to  be expected  given that the 
economies  of  Western  Europe  had started in  1950 from a lower  position, and  with 
new technologies and greater trade liberalisation were able to achieve higher rates of 
growth.72 Nevertheless,  Macmilan’s  diaries  demonstrate  persistent fears  within the 
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cabinet that the economy  was  becoming a  problem. In  February  1960  he repeatedly 
refered to the  Chancelor (Derick  Heathcoat-Amory) expressing concerns about 
inflation,73 and by June and July 1960 the diary was refering to the same problems.74 
 
The second issue confronting the British government by 1960 was the process 
of  decolonization and the retreat from empire.  This  process  had started long  before, 
most notably in 1947 when India and Pakistan became independent, but British policy 
in the 1950s had been anything but consistent. An agreement with Egypt in 1954 over 
British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone suggested an acceptance that Britain’s 
days  of imperial  glory  were  over.75 However, the  presence  of  British troops in the 
ongoing Malayan and Cyprus conflicts, and the somewhat colonial nature of the Suez 
Crisis, suggest a certain retrenchment. In  February  1960  Macmilan  delivered  his 
famous ‘Wind  of  Change’ speech signaling a  new  wilingness  by the  Conservative 
government to grant independence to Britain’s African colonies.76 It was not however 
a simple  mater  of saying to  African teritories that they  were  now independent. 
Several such teritories had large populations of European setlers and they were no 
more eager for the indigenous  population to assume  power as their counterparts in 
French Algeria. The atempts of Macmilan’s government to create a Central African 
                        
73 HMD (7  Feb.,  1960), Cited in  P.  Cateral, The Macmilan Diaries: Volume II Prime Minister and 
After 1957-1966 (Basingstoke,  2011),  p.  269.  Al future citations  wil read as  HMD  vol. II (Date  of 
Entry); HMD vol. II (16 Feb., 1960), p. 270; HMD vol. II (26 Feb., 1960), p. 375; HMD vol. II (20 
Mar., 1960), p. 280. 
74 HMD vol. II (30 Jul., 1960), pp. 315-317.  
75 C.B.  Selak, Jr, ‘The  Suez  Canal  Base  Agreement  of  1954: Its  Background and Implications,’ The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Oct., 1955), pp. 487-505. 
76 ‘Wind of Change,’ Times (4 Feb., 1960), p. 11. 
 148 
Federation to include  Northern and  Southern  Rhodesia and  Nyasaland  had  been 
ongoing since 1957 and are an excelent example of the dificulties Macmilan faced 
reconciling  demands for independence  with trying to ensure the  position  of  white 
setlers.77 
 
Macmilan’s diary entry for 4 February 1960 aluded to further problems between Roy 
Welensky (Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and Edgar 
Whitehead (Prime  Minister  of  Southern  Rhodesia) including threats  of secession.78 
The entry for 10 July stated: 
 
In addition to other troubles, the Congo (which became independent only a few 
days ago) has fallen into chaos; murder, rape, inter-tribal warfare, mass flight of 
Europeans etc.  The  Belgian  Govt  doesn’t  quite  know  what to  do.  The  Prime 
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Minister (Congolese)…is a  Communist and  probably a  Russian agent; the 
Premier of Katanga (where the mineral wealth is) is a moderate, and wants to be 
independent. Sir Roy Welensky wants Katanga to be independent and would like 
to send in troops,  by leave  of  U.K.  Govt if  we agree and  without leave if  we 
don’t. I feel like Lord North.79 
 
Macmilan’s  problems  went  beyond this and even included the  problems the 
Conservative Party felt were posed by a society becoming more and more liberal. In 
1957 the use of the Death Penalty was limited to cases of murder by the Homicide Act 
and although capital  punishment  was  not abolished until  1969, the issue  was 
occupying  more and  more  public atention.  Macmilan  bemoaned this in  September 
1961  noting that the  press  had ‘exceled itself.  Hardly a  word about  U.N. crisis, 
Congo crisis; Berlin crisis…whole front page of these papers is devoted to a murder 
case.’80 British society and the British government were also preoccupied with cals to 
decriminalise homosexuality. On 30 June 1960 the House of Commons voted against 
decriminalisation, a  vote that  Macmilan thought ‘should end the  Parliamentary 
controversy for a time.’81 The changes to British society, particularly the increasingly 
liberal approach the electorate was beginning to take is a good example of one of the 
biggest problems Macmilan faced in the early 1960s; that of relevance. In 1959 the 
major powers of the West were led by himself, Eisenhower, de Gaule and Adenuaer, 
al relatively old men who were products of an era rapidly disappearing. The election 
of John  F  Kennedy in  November  1960  brought  not  only an interesting comparison 
                        
79 HMD vol. II (10 Jul., 1960), pp. 313-314. 
80 HMD vol. II (23 Sep., 1961), pp. 413-414. 
81 HMD vol. II (30 Jun., 1960), p. 311. 
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between the leaders of Britain and the US but also ilustrated their power relative to 
each other. Kennedy was young, energetic and seemed to represent the future in the 
same that  his country  did.  Macmilan, although respected,  was  much  older and  his 
reputation for being unflappable was beginning to change to ‘out of touch’. 
 
Definitional ‘Europeanism’ 
In the introduction to this thesis  we examined  briefly  one  of the  problems that 
historians  of  British  policy towards the  European  Communities face,  namely the 
extent to  which  British  political leaders  were ‘pro’  or ‘anti’  European. It  was  noted 
that  while in the case  of  Edward  Heath,  R.A.  Butler and  Hugh  Gaitskel it  was 
relatively accurate to portray them as one or the other, Churchil, Eden and especialy 
Macmilan are  much  more complicated.  The  problem itself is that  broad,  general 
labels such as ‘Europeanist’, ‘pro-Europe’ and ‘anti-Europe’ are inadequate for the 
nuanced  positions these  men adopted at  various  points in their  political careers.  A 
‘Europeanist’ is taken to  be someone  who supports the creation and existence  of a 
supranational or federal Europe, an ‘anti-European’ being someone with an aversion 
to the idea and a preference for the retention of national sovereignty.82 The problem is 
that when we consider ‘Europeanism’ in the context of British and French policy re-
evaluations towards EEC membership, we are actualy asking three distinct questions: 
 
1. Does the person believe that an integrated Europe is a good thing? 
2. Should an integrated Europe be ‘federal’ in nature? 
3. Should Britain/France be an active member? 
                        
82 htp:/www.oed.com.oxfordbrookes.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/65100?redirectedFrom=Europeanism& 
Accessed 14 December 2015. 
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When  we examine the  views and  policies  of five  Conservatives (Churchil,  Eden, 
Macmilan,  Butler and  Heath),  based  on their statements, autobiographies and the 
views atributed to them by historians, and arange the likely answers in a table we get 
the folowing: 






















Britain	  be	  an	  
active	  
member?	  
No	   No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
 
If, therefore, a ‘Europeanist’ is someone who believed that Britain should be an active 
member of an integrated and federal Europe than only Heath would qualify. It would 
also suggest that there was no diference between Eden and Macmilan, a suggestion 
that does the later a great disservice. In order to fuly demonstrate this and to explore 
this author’s contention that  Macmilan’s  more  positive  view  of  Europe than either 
Eden  or  Butler,  was essential in the redevelopment  of  British  policy after  1957, the 
views on Europe of al three wil be examined below. 
Anthony Eden 
Anthony  Eden  has long  been considered  by  historians to  have  been sceptical,  or 
unenthusiastic according to one author,83 of and about the idea of Britain as part of an 
                        
83 G. Smith, Britain in the New Europe, Foreign Afairs, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Fal, 1992), p. 162. 
 152 
integrated  Europe.84 He saw litle  merit in the creation  of the  United  Europe 
Movement in  1947, and in the  words  of  biographer  David  Carlton, ‘ostentatiously 
remained aloof’.85 During the tenure of Atlee’s Labour government between 1945 and 
1951,  Eden found  himself in  broad agreement  with  policies  of  Labour’s  Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin, and did not see any benefit in opposing policies with which 
he agreed  purely  on the  grounds of  partisan  politics.  To  Eden,  Britain’s  pursuit  of 
what  he thought  of as the “right” foreign  policy  was  more important than scoring 
political  points, and even commanded  more  of  his loyalty than the  Conservative 
Party.86 In fact, although he ultimately submited to pressure from Churchil and led 
the  Conservative  opposition in its cal  on the  Labour  Government to enter the 
discussions  on the  Schuman  Plan,87 he found the  whole  process  distasteful and 
something that smacked  of  hypocrisy.88 Immediately after leading the  Opposition in 
the Schuman debate, Eden made a speech in which he stressed the importance of the 
Commonwealth, and its pre-eminence when it came to British foreign policy.89 
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When the  Conservatives returned to  ofice in  1951,  Eden, as  Foreign 
Secretary, ruled out any direct British involvement in supranational organisations. A 
year later, in  1952,  he  proposed  moving al  European  organisations, including the 
ECSC and the proposed European Defence Community (EDC) under the authority of 
the  Council  of  Europe.90 He felt that this intergovernmental approach  would enable 
Britain to enjoy the benefits of the integration process without having to assume the 
obligations inherent in supranational organisations.91 Harold Macmilan was reported, 
and claimed, to  have submited to  Eden a  paper  urging a  more  positive stance  on 
Anglo-European relations.92 Eden apparently read the  paper  but  did  not  deign to 
                        
90 Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom at the Tenth Meeting 
of the  Commitee  of  Ministers (Paris,  19  March  1952), 
htp:/www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/10/31/5b2bfb47-d200-49e5-bdf7-
25a4e16ad831/publishable_en.pdf ; Speech to be delivered by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P., 
Secretary  of  State for  Foreign  Affairs, at the  Consultative  Assembly  of the  Council  of  Europe, 
Strasbourg:  Monday,  15th Sept.  1952,  htp:/www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/10/31/ecffd313-
88ed-463b-a931-da44ca6a8f31/publishable_en.pdf ;The  Eden  Plan  by Julian  Amery,  Conservative 
Member  of the  House  of  Commons.  British  Representative in the  Council  of  Europe  Consultative 
Assembly in 1951 and 1952, htp:/www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/3/31/7b96ba60-178b-4c19-
b064-278443bcdf5d/publishable_en.pdf . 
91 A. Hovey Jr, Britain and the Unification of Europe, International Organization, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 
1955),  p.  326;  A.  Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in 
the  British  Conservative  and  Labour  Parties since  1945 (London,  2002),  p.  12;  R.J.  Lieber, British 
Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups (Berkley, 1970), p. 24. 
92 J.W. Young, ‘Churchil’s ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ of European Union by Churchil’s Post-
War  Government,  1951-1952’, The  Historical Journal,  Vol.  28,  No.  4 (Dec.,  1985),  p.  932;  H. 
Macmilan, Tides of Fortune 1954-1955 (London, 1969), pp. 468-470. 
 154 
respond to it, and his 1952 Foreign Policy Review made no mention of Europe, save 
for it being a geographical area of interest as regarded British defence policy.93 
 
It was the European Defence Community,94 and then the Messina Conference 
and  Spaak  Commitee, that  have  provided the  most evidence for the accusation that 
Eden was hostile to European integration. Eden was not favourably inclined towards 
supranational  organisations,  but  he reluctantly accepted the  EDC  because  he, like 
many  others, feared a re-armed  Germany;  because the  US  was supportive  of it, and 
because  he  knew that its supranational characteristics  would  make  British 
participation impossible anyway.95 It is  worth  noting the folowing  points.  Eden  did 
not wreck the EDC: that task fel to the French Assembly, which rejected it in August 
1954, and in fact  Eden  worked  hard to come  up  with an alternative, the  Western 
European  Union, that  was  palatable to al concerned.96 The  Messina  Conference in 
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1955 however does not contain much that can be used to question the interpretation of 
Eden as at least sceptical, if not hostile, where European integration was concerned. 
While Eden was by no means the only member of the government who was sceptical 
about the  proposed  Common  Market,97 he  was the  Prime  Minister, and  ultimately, 
where such questions of ‘high’ policy were concerned, ultimate decisions rested with 
him. 
 
The traditional  view  of  Eden as a  man sceptical  or  hostile to  European 
integration is  not an  unchalenged  one.  Eden  was  not in fact  hostile to  European 
integration per se,  merely to supranationalism.98 He felt that  European co-operation 
was a  good thing and in the best interests  of the  European  powers.  He  did  however 
believe, as did many others, that Britain was not in the same position as its continental 
neighbours. It  had a  world role and the responsibilities that came  with it and these 
made  participation in supranational  or federalist institutions impractical if  not 
impossible.99 After  he left  ofice,  when  Britain sought to enter the  EEC,  Eden 
accepted that membership was now in Britain’s best interests and publicly supported 
it.  He  never  became a fanatic  on the isue,  but then  he  never  had  been.  Eden 
supported the  haltingly  pro-European  moves  of successive  governments, and  was 
unrepentant when it came to his record on the issue when in ofice.100 
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In addition there is the memorandum he wrote and circulated in January 1957 
just  before  he resigned from  ofice.  This  has already  been  quoted in  Chapter  Three 
and  while it is  not included  here to suggest that  Suez  made  Eden reverse  his 
scepticism  when it came to federalism, it  was remarkably  prescient  when  one 
considers the fate  of the first and second entry  bids,  when  Britain’s sincerity  was 
caled into question. This author would cite it as evidence that Eden was above al a 
statesman and expert in foreign  policy.  He  was  by  no  means a  pro-European in the 
way that Ted Heath was, but neither would he belong in such anti-European company 
as Lord Beaverbrook or Enoch Powel. It is impossible to state categoricaly whether 
or  not  he  would  have tried to take  Britain into the  EEC  had  he remained as  Prime 
Minister after the  Suez  Crisis.  The  memorandum, and  his  public support in  1962, 
1967 and 1972, might suggest that he would have been pragmatic enough to reverse 
his  previous  policy.  On the  other  hand,  he  had a long  history  of  opposing further 
integration in  Europe, and  one  must take into account,  where the  memorandum is 
concerned, that it  was  writen at a time  of stress and  when  he felt  betrayed  by the 
United  States,  perhaps  prompting  or at least influencing the tone and content  of  his 
note. 
R.A Butler 
Whereas  Eden’s  views  on  Europe were suficiently  nuanced to transcend  general 
terms such as ‘pro’ or ‘anti European’, Butler’s were rather more straightforward. One 
of his biographers, Patrick Cosgrave, does not mention Europe in his 1981 work on 
Butler,101 and  he is similarly absent from  many  works  on the  history  of  European 
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integration.102 Butler’s memoirs do not mention the EEC, Schuman, Spaak or in any 
way  deal  with the  Messina  Conference.  His second  volume, The Art  of  Memory, 
contains  only three references to the  EEC.103 In  one respect this is  not  particularly 
surprising. Although Butler held al of the Great Ofices of State (Foreign Secretary, 
Chancelor and  Home  Secretary),  he  was  never  Prime  Minister, and,  with the 
exception  of the end  of  his time as  Chancelor  during the  Messina  discussions,  his 
ministerial responsibilities had litle to do with European integration. Indeed, he only 
became  Secretary  of  State for  Foreign  Afairs in  October  1963, some  nine  months 
after de Gaule vetoed the first EEC entry application. Between 1957 and July 1962, 
the period which saw the changes in British policy in Europe, he was Home Secretary 
and Europe was therefore not in his purview.  
 
This is not to say that he had no opinion on Europe, nor that he played no role 
in British policy on European integration, general Cabinet roles notwithstanding. His 
reputation in this area is  one  of  broad  Euroscepticism that  has  been  variously 
described as  hostile,104 or, in the case  of  Alan  Milward, ‘disinvolved  distaste’.105 
Anthony Howard, author of the best-known biography of Butler, described his policy 
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on European integration as predominately sceptical.106 In addition to being the leader 
of the agricultural lobby  within the  Conservative  Party,107 he represented an 
agricultural constituency, Safron Walden, in rural Essex, and was concerned that he 
risked losing  his seat if  he supported  British  participation in  Europe.108 Most  of  his 
constituents, and the National Farmers Union, opposed the agricultural provisions of 
the  EEC,  particularly the abolition  of  national subsidies in favour  of a centralised 
system, fearing that  with a smaler agricultural sector than  most  of the  Six,  British 
farmers  would lose  out if  Britain joined.109 Beyond the  narow confines  of  his 
constituency concerns, Butler also belonged to the Imperial-Commonwealth wing of 
the  Conservative  Party.110 There are two  periods in the  history  of  Anglo-European 
relations that are significant for this chapter’s consideration of Butler’s role. The first 
was during the later part of his tenure as Chancelor of the Exchequer in 1955, and 
the second  was in  1962  when  Macmilan’s  government launched its il-fated  bid to 
enter the Common Market. 
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Butler  was  by  no  means the  only  member  of the  British  government  who 
expressed  distinctly  negative  opinions  when  Britain  was invited to join the 
discussions at the Messina Conference. In the two years prior to Messina, 1953 and 
1954, Butler was very hostile to the idea of closer links with the ECSC, and admited 
that he, like Eden, was bored by European issues.111 As Chancelor, he felt that Britain 
could not viably join a Common Market, as it would threaten the Sterling Area, and 
although  he  may  have  been  more  dismissive  of the  proposed initiatives in terms  of 
tone,  his atitude in fact  difered litle from  many  of  his contemporaries, including 
Eden and  Macmilan.  Macmilan felt that  France  would  never join a  Common 
Market,112 and Eden did not want to encourage European integration if it could not be 
steered in a direction more acceptable to British interests.113 
 
The second  period  of significance for  Butler’s  European sentiments is the 
summer of 1962, when Britain was negotiating entry to the EEC. By this time, British 
policy towards  Europe  had changed.  Having failed to  prevent the emergence  of the 
EEC, Britain had tried in a number of initiatives, unsuccessfuly, to participate in the 
integration process while remaining outside the Common Market. France had vetoed 
the free trade area that  was  designed to subsume the  Six,  EFTA  was  not a  viable 
alternative, and the Six had also refused to alow the kind of association arangements 
that  Macmilan  had  pressed for  between  1959 and  1961.  Broadly speaking a  pro-
European,  Macmilan  had accepted that  EEC  membership  was the  only remaining 
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course  of action and  had endeavoured to  persuade  his  Cabinet, the House  of 
Commons, and the  Conservative  Party  of the  necessity  of the  move.  Butler,  by 
contrast, had not altered his view on the subject in the intervening years. Macmilan 
appointed  him to  head the  ministerial commitee charged  with the  oversight  of the 
EEC  negotiations.  Anthony  Howard speculated that this  was  due to  Butler’s 
scepticism, and that the  Prime  Minister  was trying to ensure that  he could  not raise 
significant  or efective  opposition to an  undertaking the  oversight  of  which  he  was 
charged.114 
 
His appointment did litle, initialy, to change Butler’s sceptical atitude to the 
EEC  negotiations.  He  had  never  been an easy convert to the cause, and  his 
aforementioned agricultural ties in his constituency made it a dificult issue for him. 
Nevertheless, when  Macmilan  met  with  him in the summer  of  1962,  he  ofered 
qualified support for the entry bid.115 He felt that the National Farmers’ Union should 
be  brought into the  discussions,  but that even if the  Treaty  of  Rome  had to  be 
accepted in its entirety, it could  be lived  with.116 Ultimately,  Butler  made  what  he 
caled a ‘staunch’ decision to back the negotiations, although as Howard points out, 
‘staunch’ did not equate to ‘enthusiastic’.117 
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Harold Macmilan 
Earlier  we  discussed the  dificulty in  using traditional  definitions  of ‘pro’  or ‘anti-
European’  when examining  men such as  Harold  Macmilan.  His  biographers  have 
been  unable to agree  whether  or  not  he  deserves to  be considered a ‘pro-European’ 
Prime Minister. Wiliams noted his membership of the United Europe movement,118 
while  Thorpe  noted  his  urging  of the  Labour  government in  1950 to adopt the 
Schuman  Plan,119 and  Fisher,  Sampson,  Turner and  Young  described  his frustration 
with that  government’s  policies towards  Europe and those  of the  Churchil 
government  of  which  he  was a  member.120 However, these authors  do  not consider 
him to  have  been an avowed  pro-European and so  have sought to  qualify  his 
Europeanism.  Alistair  Horne,  his  oficial  biographer, stated  of  Macmilan in the 
context of 1950-1951: 
 
Although there is  no  doubting  Macmilan’s total commitment to  Europe at this 
juncture, at the same time  he  was asking  himself  how  much  would the  British 
electorate accept?..The  determination…to  get  back into  power, and stay there, 
was an  overiding consideration and inevitably tempered  Macmilan’s stance 
towards Europe at this point.121 
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Horne suggested, as  did  Sampson and  Turner, that  political expediency  was at the 
heart of his advocacy of the Schuman Plan.122 Horne’s view appears to be based on a 
memorandum  Macmilan sent to  Churchil in  1950 about  Schuman.  His  memoirs 
include a copy of it which says: 
 
The situation created  by  M.  Schuman  may  wel  be a  major turning-point in 
European history. It is certainly a turning point in the fortunes of the Tory Party. 
This issue afords the last, and perhaps only, chance of regaining the initiative… 
11. But whatever the Government may or may not do, we shal have to define our 
policy soon. The modern Conservative Party is tough and imaginative… 12. The 
Socialists  have  got, and look like  keeping, the immense advantages  of ful 
employment and  high  pay-packets.  So far,  we  have  only cost of living and the 
housing muddle against these.123 
 
Other  historians  have  placed  Macmilan in the category  of  British  politicians  who 
were  pro-European in  opposition  but  who altered their  views  once in  ofice.  David 
Carlton, Eden’s biographer, claimed Macmilan was no federalist visionary,124 Nigel 
Ashton opined that he was at best a reluctant European,125 while Richard Davenport-
Hines went so far as to suggest that had Macmilan succeeding in taking Britain into 
the EEC in 1962 he would have been at best ambivalent, and at worst detrimental to 
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European developments.126 Even the historians who have considered him broadly pro-
European  have refered to  his  distaste for federalism,127 a  preference for  Britain’s 
imperial and  Commonwealth links,128 and  his  desire that the  EDC and  Messina 
discussions end in failure.129 Indeed, it is the Messina period that provides a great deal 
of evidence for the claim that  Macmilan’s  Europeanism should  be treated  with a 
degree  of scepticism.  Richard  Lamb asserted that  by the time  of the  Messina 
discussions  European integration  had ceased to interest  Macmilan,130 while  Hugo 
Young accused him of not seeing the danger of the Six reaching agreement without 
Britain that would leave it unable to influence future developments.131 Peter Cateral 
dismissed  both  Lamb and  Young’s claims  but  noted the absence  of  Messina from 
Macmilan’s  diaries and claims that  he  did  not  provide an alternative  policy for the 
British government to folow.132 
 
This author takes the view that, despite the views of many of his biographers, 
Macmilan should be considered one of the British leaders most favourably disposed 
towards  European integration and  British  participation in it. We  wil  deal  with the 
specific alegations  made against  Macmilan regarding  Messina  before considering 
the  broader issue  of  Macmilan’s  Europeanism in the context  of  British  policy re-
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evaluations  of  membership  of the  European communities. In the first instance 
Macmilan’s diaries do not mention Messina much despite his having responsibility as 
Foreign Secretary for diplomatic afairs for several reasons. The first is that, as James 
Elison and  others  have  noted, it  was the  Treasury that assumed responsibility for 
British  policy towards  Europe  on the  grounds that the issue  was  deemed to  be a 
financial one rather than a political or diplomatic one.133 Secondly, an examination of 
Macmilan’s diaries reveals that he was not short of issues and crises to deal with in 
his short tenure as  Foreign  Secretary.  A railway strike,134 the formation  of  West 
Germany as a sovereign state and its admission to  NATO,135 the creation  of the 
Warsaw  Pact,136 and a  major summit in  Geneva  on  nuclear  disarmament  were al 
ongoing at the same time as Messina,137 to say nothing of the proximity of the General 
Election,  ongoing  problems in  Cyprus,138 a  pogrom in Istanbul against the  Greek 
minority population139 and the scandal that arose over the defections of Burgess and 
Maclean and the accusations against Kim Philby.140 
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When  Macmilan replaced  Butler as  Chancelor  of the  Exchequer and  hence 
became the  head  of the  department  with responsibility for  European  policy,  he 
immediately  began to formulate an alternative to the  proposals  of the  Six for the 
creation  of a  Customs  Union.141 In the summer  of  1956  he and  Peter  Thorneycroft, 
President of the Board of Trade, presented to the Cabinet a plan for the creation of a 
partial free trade area.142 It should also be noted that there were hardly any observers 
in Europe who felt in 1955 that the Six would be able to agree on further European 
integration.  The  European  Defence  Community (EDC)  had  been  defeated in the 
French Assembly the previous August, and even Paul Henri Spaak, long and rightly 
considered  one  of the founding fathers  of the  European  Communities and a  noted 
federalist, remarked to  Macmilan in  February  1956  his  despair  of the  Six reaching 
agreement.143 
 
To deal with the broader issue of Macmilan’s sentiments towards Europe and 
how they fit into this thesis, this author  would  make three  points to support  his 
assertion that Macmilan was deeply commited to European integration and to taking 
Britain closer to the  Six:  Firstly  we  have to  make a  distinction  between  how 
Macmilan  has  been interpreted  by  historians since  he left  ofice and  how  he  was 
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viewed  by  his contemporaries; secondly the  dificulties  we  have already  mentioned 
when  we try to fit specific  definitions to  political leaders; and thirdly the  way 
Macmilan approached  Europe,  how  often  he thought about it and  how  much  of a 
priority it was for him. It is agreed that he was not a federalist, but then again he never 
claimed to be one and in a diary entry for November 1950 he described federalists as 
‘absurd, conceited, and quote impossible to work with’.144 
 
Macmilan’s  biographers  may  have taken a rather sceptical  view  of  his 
Europeanism but his contemporaries considered him to among the most pro-European 
members  of the  Conservative  Party.  The  minutes  of a  meeting  of the  Conservative 
Party on 19 July 1955 record that his re-appearance in the Assembly of the European 
Council  was  greeted  with  warmth and taken as a sign  of  British support for the 
Council  of  Europe.145 In a  meeting in  Washington  DC in January  1957 the  French 
Foreign  Minister  Christian  Pineau and  his  American counterpart John  Foster  Dules 
agreed that  Macmilan  was the  most  pro-European  Conservative and that the 
prospects for the  Common  Market  would  be enhanced if, as  was expected at that 
point, he became Foreign Secretary again.146 His rival for the Conservative leadership, 
R.A.  Butler, remarked in  his  memoirs that  he felt in January  1957 that  Macmilan 
succeeding  Eden instead  of  him  would result in an atempt to  bring  Britain into 
Europe,147 and even his opponent Harold Wilson stated in the debate on Plan G ‘the 
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Chancelor  of the  Exchequer – I  do  not think anyone  wil  doubt the sincerity  of  his 
desire to stimulate the progress of European unity- has strange ways of showing his 
devotion to the  European idea.’148 Lastly, the first issue  of The  Economist to be 
published after  Macmilan  became  Prime  Minister, listed  him, along  with  Peter 
Thorneycroft and  Sir  David  Eccles as ‘good  Europeans’, and stated that  Macmilan 
himself was commited to the reversal of the policy of standing aloof from Europe.149 
 
The  dificulty in accurately  describing  Macmilan as either ‘pro’  or ‘anti-
Europe’  based  on existing  definitions  has already  been  dealt  with earlier in this 
chapter and so it is not this author’s intention to cover it again in detail. What should 
be said  here though is to refer  back to the fact that any such consideration in fact 
means asking  whether  Macmilan thought  European integration  was a  good thing, 
whether he supported a federal Europe, and whether he thought Britain should be an 
active participant in an integrated Europe. Macmilan definitely believed in the notion 
of a united Europe. He prefered a confederal approach to federalism but unlike either 
Eden  or  Churchil  he  believed that  Britain could  not adopt a ‘with  but  not  of’ 
approach. If his views on federalism are the be al and end al of Europeanism then he 
would not qualify as a European politician. Then again, on that basis, neither would 
almost any British leader with the exception of Edward Heath. To consider Macmilan 
to  not  be a  pro-European is to put  him in the same category as  Eden and  Churchil 
both of whom felt that Britain could not participate in the integration process. 
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The third reason for this author’s  views  on  Macmilan and  Europeanism is the 
diferent  way  he approached the issue compared to  his contemporaries.  For  Eden, 
Europe  was an issue that  had to  be  dealt  with from time to time.  However,  when it 
was  not a  pressing concern,  he  was  not inclined to  devote  much thought to it. It 
simply did not interest him when it did not directly impact upon his duties as Foreign 
Secretary.  Macmilan  passionately  believed in a  united  Europe.  Horne  used the 
references to  party-politics in  Macmilan’s  memorandum to  Churchil in  1950 to 
question the extent  of  his support for  Europe.  Yet,  when  we look at the entire 
document we can see much more than this: 
 
It is  now  widely reported that the  British  Government  wil  make an 
immense…efort to reopen negotiations….In that event it is absolutely vital that 
this should come about as the result  of  pressure from the Tory  Party and from 
you.  For this reason  you  must  give the lead for  which Britain, the  Empire, 
Europe and the  world have  been  waiting.  Everyone looks to  you.  They feel 
entitled to look to you. They have, up to now, been disappointed and are geting a 
litle restive at your inaction. They wil soon get suspicious. It is said that…you 
are  preparing a retreat from the  whole concept  of  United  Europe,  now that 
practical decisions have to be made. ‘Winston is seling out Europe’ is the phrase 
being spread everywhere.  This  propaganda is causing  much anxiety and 
darkening  of counsel.  You started  United  Europe.  Without  you, there  would  be 
no Council of Europe, no Commitee of Ministers, no Consultative Assembly, no 
Strasbourg. This is the first and supreme test. You cannot let down al Europe.150 
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Yes,  party  politics features again  but  what comes  out  of this text is the sense that 
Macmilan feared  Churchil  wil  draw  back from  his late  1940s enthusiasm for a 
united  Europe, a fear that  proved to  be  wel-founded.  He is trying to appeal to 
Churchil to act  diferently and  his references to the  political  benefit to the 
Conservative  Party should  be interpreted as something that  Macmilan felt  might 
resonate  with  Churchil even if an appeal to the ideals  of the  whole  project did  not. 
Macmilan tried again in  1952 sending a  paper to  Anthony  Eden,151 and in  his 
memoirs  he remarked that  his  ministerial responsibilities  meant that  he could  only 
give  occasional time to ‘other  questions –defence, foreign afairs, and above al, 
European  unity, to  which I  had  devoted so  much labour’.152 In  many  of  his  diary 
entries for March 1952 Macmilan’s sense of frustration at the policies being pursued 
by Churchil’s government are more than apparent. On the 12th he stated his view that 
Eden and the Foreign  Ofice ‘clearly  mean to  destroy  Strasbourg’,153 while the  15th 
March entry reads as folows: 
 
I  have  put the  whole  of the ‘Council  of  Europe’  papers in  order. I am stil  not 
sure  what  best to  do.  Resignation is  no  good and  wd  delight those  who are 
against us – at least so I feel. But Churchil must be pressed, and warned. I don’t 
believe he realises the sense of disappointment or even anger of those whom he 
led in 5 years work in the European Movement.154 
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What were Macmilan’s Views on Europe? 
Macmilan approached  Europe from the  perspective  of a  man to  whom  great issues 
and  problems appealed.  He  was a  product  of the  Edwardian  period and  his love  of 
literature and  history  had inculcated in  him a  belief that  great issues required  bold 
solutions, and that summit  diplomacy  by  great  men  was the  best  way to achieve 
this.155 In the context of Europe after the Second World War Macmilan held a fervent 
belief that the unification of the continent was the only way to avoid a repeat of the 
two  world  wars,  prevent a resurgent  Germany from seeking to  dominate  Europe 
again,156 and ensure that the  West could successfuly  prosecute the  Cold  War.157 In 
this last respect  he recognised that the active  presence and support  of the  United 
States was essential, and that the US was more likely to commit itself to the defence 
of a continent that  was actively trying to  move  beyond and resolve the  problems  of 
the recent past. 
 
Macmilan was by no means alone in this conviction. Across Europe men such 
as  Churchil, Jean  Monnet,  Robert  Schuman,  Paul-Henri  Spaak and  others  had 
become convinced that Europe’s future lay in a process of unification, the creation of 
a ‘United States of Europe’. Where Macmilan difered from these men was the type 
or form that this united Europe should take, and in the case of Churchil the role that 
Britain should play. Churchil believed that Britain’s interests outside of Europe made 
it impractical for it to be an active member of a unified Europe and so Britain’s role 
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should be that of a facilitator, a sponsor and close aly, with but not of.158 By contrast, 
Macmilan felt that Britain must play an active role as a member otherwise it risked 
the leadership of Europe passing to another country, most likely Germany in the long 
run.159 Where he difered from Federalists such as Spaak was that he did not believe 
Britain could join institutions that  would limit its ability to conduct trade relations 
with the  Commonwealth.  Macmilan  prefered a confederal approach  whereby the 
nations  of  Europe  would cooperate in  maters of  mutual interest such as tarif 
reduction, through the Council of Europe or the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC).160 
 
Macmilan’s Impact on British Policy Towards the 
European Communities 
Macmilan’s sentiments on Europe are, of course, only one part of the issue that this 
work is atempting to deal with. The most significant part is the impact that the Suez 
Crisis had on British policy by bringing him to power instead of Butler. What we wil 
do  now is examine  how  British  policy  under  Macmilan’s leadership changed and 
evolved  between  1957 and  1961. In  keeping  with the  historiographical focus  on the 
decision-making role of elected political leaders, the emphasis wil be on Macmilan 
and the decisions he made, rather than on the advice he and his coleagues received 
from  Whitehal.  Furthermore, this section  wil also seek to  determine the extent to 
                        
158 M.  Francis, ‘Tears,  Tantrums, and  Bared  Teeth:  The  Emotional  Economy  of  Three  Conservative 
Prime Ministers, 1951-1963’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), p. 380. 
159 H. Macmilan, Tides (1969), pp. 192-193. 
160 HMD vol. I (24 Aug., 1950), p. 13; HMD vol. I (26 Nov., 1953), pp. 275-276. 
 172 
which  his  policies  were shaped  by  his  personal  views  on  European integration. It 
should be made clear at this juncture that while in the long-term, British policy under 
Macmilan ended with the decision to seem membership of the EEC, this was not a 
long-term strategy of his. Macmilan did not enter ofice in January 1957 determined 
that Britain would join the Six in a customs union. On the contrary, his initial policies 
were aimed at shaping  Europe in  ways acceptable to  British interests in the  wider 
world. The EEC bid was the culmination or the end point of his policies, but it was 
not until the summer of 1960 that EEC membership itself became a policy aim. 
 
EFTA 
Macmilan’s initial policy was a continuation of the pre-Suez ideas of Plan G, namely 
to prevent the creation of a customs union. When the Six signed the Treaties of Rome 
in  March  1957 the focus shifted away from trying to  prevent a customs  union from 
being created, and towards trying to limit the damage it could do to Britain. Reginald 
Maudling, the Paymaster General, was tasked with conducting negotiations aimed at 
subsuming the new Common Market into a wider European free trade area,161 ‘EFTA 
of the seventeen’ in the words of Richard Lamb.162 This free trade area would include 
the  EEC  within it and  would commit al seventeen  members to liberalise trade  with 
each  other,  while remaining free to conduct trade  with regions  outside  of  Europe in 
whatever way the nation concerned felt best. It is also an example of a policy pursued 
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by Macmilan that was very close to his own personal views on the form that Europe 
should take. It did not envisage supranational institutions that could overule national 
parliaments, and it took into account Britain’s trading links with the Commonwealth. 
 
Despite some  hopes that a free trade area  would  be created, there  was litle 
appetite for it within the Six. The German Finance Minister, Erhard, favoured it, but 
Adenauer  did  not,  nor  did the  French  government.  Both felt that trying to create a 
wider free trade area would be unnecessarily complicated at a time when the EEC had 
only just been agreed, and in November 1958 de Gaule ended the negotiations.163 In 
response, the British government adopted a Swedish proposal and in the summer of 
1959 joined six  other  European  nations in signing the  Stockholm  Convention that 
created the  European  Free  Trade  Association.164 This is  where  we see  Macmilan’s 
policies  diverging away to an extent from  his  views  on  Europe.  At the  heart  of  his 
Europeanism  was the fervent  belief that  Europe  must  be  united,  yet  by  helping to 
create  EFTA  Macmilan  was acting in a  manner completely at  odds  with  his  own 
views. His actions can be explained in reference to two aspects of his character that 
played a large role in the development of policies in Europe: a pragmatic wilingness 
to adapt  when  necessary; and a  more ruthless tendency to  use confrontation as a 
negotiating tactic.  EFTA  was an excelent example  of the later.  Macmilan  had 
claimed in  his  diary  on  12 June that in a  meeting  with the  Danish  Prime  Minister, 
Hans Christian Hansen, that he regarded EFTA as a bridge between the Six and the 
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rest of the OEEC.165 However his diary entry for 7 July 1959 described the formation 
of EFTA and included the folowing: 
 
The Chief item was the Anglo-Danish agreement. This is an essential preliminary 
to the  Stockholm conference and the  organisation  of the  7 – a  European  Free 
Trade group in opposition to the 6 – Stockholm v Rome. The stakes in this afair 
are very high – no less than the industrial life and strength of Britain. For if we 
cannot successfuly organise the opposition group…then we shal undoubtedly be 
eaten up, one by one by the 6…Already the Germans are beginning to talk in a 
very diferent way and even the French seem alarmed. I have every hope that if 
the Seven can make an agreement and get it ratified by the end of the year, the 
Six wil be ready for a reasonable negotiation between the two groups.166 
 
EFTA was not designed, as far as Macmilan was concerned to be a bridge between 
the  Six and the  Seven.  Undoubtedly  he  hoped that it  might serve as  one,  but  his 
intention was to force the Six to adopt policies that would not exclude Britain and the 
rest of Europe from the economic benefits that the Common Market would bring. He 
also  hoped to  use the threat  of a  divided  Europe and  US fears  of  protectionist 
measures by the Six to harness American influence. Unfortunately for Macmilan, the 
political elements of the EEC, which Britain disliked, were the chief atraction of it to 
the United States.167 Both in Europe and in the US, opinion was critical of EFTA. The 
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US was not opposed to a wider free trade area per se,168 and was actualy concerned at 
the  prospect  of a protectionist  Common  Market  discriminating against  US trade. 
However, despite this the US saw EFTA as jeopardising the further integration of the 
EEC,169 and a further and unnecessary division of Europe at a time when US policy 
was to  promote a  more  unified continent.  Christian  Herter (US  Secretary  of  State 
1959-1961)  warned  President  Eisenhower in  November  1959 that emerging trade 
rivalries between the EEC and EFTA risked serious harm, and that the EEC was being 
chalenged  by the  Seven, seen as  being  under UK leadership.170 The  European 
Commission and  other  European  nations took a similar  view to the  US.  Robert 
Marjolin, the  Vice  President  of the  Commission, stated  his concern in a  meeting in 
Washington that British fears about the Common Market could not be resolved unless 
the EEC denied its own purpose, and that the proliferation of regional schemes would 
lead to a fragmentation  of  world  markets, concerns that the  US shared.171 Both the 
French and the  Dutch in separate  discussions  with  US  oficials in  1959 raised 
concerns that Europe would drift apart as a result of any divergence between EFTA 
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and the EEC, and that greater world issues could not be resolved cooperatively while 
Britain remained hostile to the Six.172 
 
The First EEC Bid 
Macmilan’s atempt to use EFTA to change the economic policies of the Six was a 
complete failure that had served only to divide Europe even more than the Cold War 
already  had.  This stood in  marked contrast to  his  belief that  peace and stability in 
Europe required the continent  being united. It also represented the last time 
Macmilan’s government atempted to deal with the EEC by trying to change it from 
the  outside.  EFTA  had  not and could  not succeed in forcing the  EEC to alow  non-
members such as Britain the benefits of membership without adherence to the Treaties 
of Rome. Within a year of EFTA’s formation Macmilan had reached this conclusion 
and so  his focus switched and in  what can  best  be interpreted as an act  of supreme 
pragmatism, he decided that Britain’s interests could now only be served by joining 
the EEC and then changing the organisation from the inside. In one sense Macmilan 
had good reason to believe that this was possible. He had a longstanding association 
and  working relationship  with  General  de  Gaule and  was aware that the  French 
President shared much in common with Macmilan when it came to the form that an 
integrated  Europe should take.  His  Grand  Design,  distributed to the  Cabinet in 
January 1961 had this say on the subject: 
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As  dificult as de  Gaule is,  his  view of the  proper political structure 
(Confederation not Federation) is realy nearer to ours. If he wished us to join the 
political institutions it would be easier for us to do so if they took the form which 
he favours.173 
 
Macmilan  was also aware that  de  Gaulle  desired  France  have  more say in the 
organisation of the western aliance and that it should develop a nuclear deterent, two 
things that  Macmilan  believed  he could  use as  bargaining chips to  persuade the 
French to support British aims in Europe.174 
 
It is necessary to take a brief step back at this point and consider when and for 
what reasons Macmilan decided to see on what terms Britain could join the Common 
Market.  Historians  have  debated this for some time and  while it is  not this author’s 
intention to go over an existing historiographical debate, it is necessary to examine it 
if  only  because it  provides a context for several  of the  moves  Macmilan  made 
between  May  1960 and July  1961.  Much  of the  debate  has centred  on  whether 
Macmilan  was  motivated  primarily  by  high  political  or low  political concerns. 
Wolfram  Kaiser and  Miriam  Camps stressed the  need to  maintain the  Special 
Relationship  with the  US,175 while  Milward emphasised the economic 
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considerations.176 It is this author’s opinion that any such disagreement is academic. 
The perceived high political threat to Britain’s relationship with the United States was 
itself a reflection  of the  growing economic  power  of the  EEC.  Trying to separate 
economics and foreign policy serves no purpose as they are indelibly linked to each 
other. 
 
What is  of  more interest and certainly  more significance to this  work is the 
debate  over  whether  or  not it  was  Macmilan  himself  who  decided  on  EEC 
membership and  precisely  when  he  did so.  The  majority  of authors contend that  he 
was responsible for the  decision and for  persuading  his  government accordingly.177 
However, there is also a view that far from being decisive in May and June 1960, or 
even January  1961,  Macmilan  vacilated  between a  membership  bid and further 
atempts at EEC/EFTA association.178 This author is takes the view that not only was 
Macmilan the driving force behind the bid, but that it was in the summer of 1960 that 
he  made that  particular  decision.  There are three reasons for this: the comments 
Macmilan made in his diaries and in his ‘Grand Design’; the publication of Sir Frank 
Lee’s report  on association  with the  EEC; and the reshufle  of  his  Cabinet in July 
1960. 
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By the end of 1960 and the beginning of 1961 Macmilan was aware that any 
sort of EEC-EFTA association was almost impossible to achieve. His ‘Grand Design’ 
dated January 1961, includes the folowing: 
 
(d) E.E.C. and E.F.T.A. (Sixes and Sevens) 
It is now prety clear that an accommodation could be reached – which would at 
any rate reduce, and perhaps altogether eliminate, the economic split in Western 
Europe. It is equaly prety clear that it wil not be reached, as things are going 
now. There wil be talk –pleasant phrases- but no action.179 
 
It was not until April 1961, though, that he was finaly able to convince his coleagues 
in the  Cabinet that  Britain should  undertake  negotiations  with a  view to joining the 
Common  Market.  His  diary entry for  26th April read: ‘An excelent  discussion  on 
Europe. I revealed to al the Cabinet ‘The Grand Design’. On the whole, approval – 
tho’  of course  with reservation’.180 Having convinced the  Cabinet, including the 
deeply sceptical  Rab  Butler,181 the  next task  was to similarly convince the 
Conservative  Parliamentary  Party and then the country as a  whole.182 This  was 
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accomplished  by the  5th August and from the autumn  of  1961  Britain’s  negotiating 
team, led by Heath, atempted to take the country into the Common Market.183 
 
There is evidence to suggest that Macmilan’s mind was not only made up before he 
came to write his ‘Grand Design’, but had probably been made up by July 1960. On 
27 May 1960 he made the folowing remarks in a Cabinet meeting: 
 
How far would anything short of ful membership of the Common Market meet 
our indirect economic dificulties?..To “go into Europe fuly” would at least be a 
positive and imaginative approach…”Near identification”  had less atractions, 
and not appreciably less dangers.184 
 
 Slightly more than a month later, on the 9th July 1960 he wrote the folowing in his 
diary: 
 
Walked a bit – pondered a lot….Shal we be caught between a hostile (or at least 
less and less friendly)  America and a  boastful,  powerful ‘Empire  of 
Charlemagne’- now under French but later bound to come under German control. 
Is this the real reason for ‘joining the  Common  Market’ (if  we are acceptable) 
and for abandoning a) the Seven b) British agriculture c) the Commonwealth. It’s 
a grim choice.185 
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At this  point  Macmilan  had seen the report  prepared  by the  Economic  Steering 
Commitee  under the  Chairmanship  of  Sir  Frank  Lee.  The report advocated ‘near 
identification’ between the Six and the Seven but it is clear from Macmilan’s diary 
that  he  knew ‘near identification’  would inevitably come to  mean ful  membership. 
Lee’s report has been given much credit by historians and biographers of Macmilan 
who saw it as perhaps the biggest single factor that decided the issue of membership 
for the  Prime  Minister.  Thorpe,  who seemed to  be  of the  view that  Macmilan’s 
ultimate  decision came later,  nevertheless remarked that ‘There  were  many staging 
points of Macmilan’s Damascene journey towards conversion to the European idea, 
but the  Lee  memorandum  was  one  of the  most  vital.’186 Another, Jacqueline  Trat, 
described the report as ‘the  definitive  document that  was to set  Britain  on a  new 
course,  not  only in terms  of trade  but also in terms  of  Britain’s  political role and 
outlook,’187 Philipp  de  Zulueta,  one  of  Macmilan’s foreign  policy advisors saw the 
failure of the Paris summit as prompting Macmilan to seize upon EEC membership. 
He is quoted in Peter Hennessy’s work Having it So Good: Britain in the Fifties: 
 
I think this led him to think very much again about what the British position was 
in the  world.  The colonial empire  was, if  not  gone, rapidly  going, the 
Commonwealth obviously not being realy strong enough, coherent enough as an 
economic force. So what does Britain do? How does she play a part in the world? 
… I  don’t think there  was a  day  on  which  he suddenly  decided,  you  know, 
Europe is the thing. But certainly he moved, from then onwards, realy rather fast 
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in the direction of feeling that this was the right road for Britain to folow, and 
that  Europe  was  going to  be  united, and that  without  being a  part  of it  Britain 
would neither be important on its own nor play a part in a wider grouping.188 
 
De  Zulueta  knew  Macmilan  very  wel and  worked  with  him, as  he  had  Anthony 
Eden.  As such  he  was in a  good  position to  know  when  Macmilan  had reached a 
particular  decision.  His reference to  Macmilan’s  desire that  Europe  be  united is 
interesting and links  us  back to  whether  or  not  Macmilan  was  driven  by  his  own 
views,  or  by  more  pragmatic considerations.  Given that  he  had long  opposed 
federalism in  Europe and  had spent the  previous three  years trying to ensure that 
Europe took a form amenable to Britain’s global interests, it is more realistic to state 
that a  pragmatic recognition that there  were  no  viable alternatives to  membership 
rather than  personal conviction  were  behind the  bid.  However,  part  of  Macmilan’s 
support for ‘Europe’  was  his  belief that  European  unity  was essential. In this case 
although the EEC represented a form of Europe he disliked, there was stil enough of 
the broad view to make membership palatable to him. 
 
The final evidence to support Macmilan having decided on EEC entry in the 
summer  of  1960 comes from  his  Cabinet reshufle.  The July  1960 reshufle  has, as 
with most things Macmilan, generated some controversy and debate. Miriam Camps 
for instance cited it as evidence that  Macmilan intended to enter.189 George 
Hutchinson  described the reshufle as ‘to fit the  Europeans in  his  Cabinet – mere 
handful though they were – into spheres of delicate importance to the development of 
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the strategy  which  he  was already contemplating’.190 Nora  Belof  has  however 
disagreed, particularly when it came to appointment of Heath as Lord Privy Seal with 
special responsibility for  Europe.  She claimed that if  Macmilan intended a turn to 
Europe  he  would  have appointed  one  of the  known  Cabinet  heavyweights such as 
Thorneycroft  or  Duncan  Sandys.191 Macmilan’s diaries  do  not  give any firm 
indication as to how far, if at al, Europeanism was a factor in his reshufle. However, 
the changes  Macmilan  made are evidence enough that  Europe  was a factor.  Heath, 
appointed as  number two in the  Foreign  Ofice  was a  noted Europeanist192 and 
Macmilan  was aware  of  his sentiments as far  back as  1950.  Beyond  Heath, 
Macmilan moved pro-Europeans into strategic departments. Christopher Soames was 
appointed  Minister  of  Agriculture,  Duncan  Sandys as  Secretary  of  State for 
Commonwealth  Relations,193 and  Lord  Home  became  Foreign  Secretary.194 
Agriculture and the reactions of the Commonwealth were two of the biggest obstacles 
to  be  overcome if  Britain  were to even atempt to enter the  EEC, an issue  noted  by 
Macmilan in his diary entry for 14th May 1961.195 
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Although the first atempt at  British  membership  of the  Common  Market 
ended in complete failure and, along  with the  Christine  Keeler afair,196 probably 
ended Macmilan’s premiership in practical terms, it was stil an important moment in 
the  development  of  Anglo-European relations. In the first instance,  de  Gaule and 
France  were roundly condemned for their  obstructive atitude.  The Italian  Prime 
Minister described de Gaule’s speech vetoing British entry as exceeding Italy’s worst 
expectations,197 and a later State Department telegram refered to the solidarity of the 
other five members of the EEC in atempting to stand up to de Gaule over his veto of 
the  British application, suggesting that the  breakdown  of the  negotiations  was  not 
being blamed on Macmilan or Britain.198 In the second instance, Macmilan, despite 
the failure,  had fundamentaly changed  British  policy  on  European integration and 
had established British membership of the EEC as a viable prospect. It would need to 
wait for the  departure  of  General  de  Gaule from  power in  France, something that 
would take another six years, but British membership was now a mater of when, not 
if. Ironicaly,  de  Gaule  himself  best  demonstrated this  when  he  described  Heath in 
1965 as the man who would take Britain into Europe.199 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has examined one of the most immediate and long-lasting efects of the 
Suez  Crisis  on  British  politics and  on  British  policy re-evaluations towards 
membership of the European Communities. By removing Anthony Eden from power 
and providing Harold Macmilan with the means to overhaul R.A. Butler in the race to 
succeed the  Prime  Minister,  Suez altered the  nature  of  Britain’s relationship  with 
Europe.  Anthony  Eden should  not  be considered  hostile to  European integration. 
However, it was not a subject that interested him a great deal and so if it was not a 
pressing concern for his work as Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister, he was 
not inclined to devote much time to it.200 Butler, by contrast, not only had no interest 
in  Europe,  he  was actively  hostile to  British  participation, seeing in  European 
integration a threat to  British agriculture, important to  him from  his constituency in 
rural  Safron  Walden, and to  Britain’s longstanding  but  diminishing imperial trade 
links.201 
 
Without the  Suez  Crisis it is  highly improbable that  Macmilan  would  have 
become Prime Minister. Anthony Eden had been in ofice for barely a year when the 
crisis began and although the subject of press speculation and il-health, had led the 
Conservatives to an increased majority at the General Election. Eden had waited for 
many years for Churchil to retire and hand the leadership of the party to him and he 
had  no intention  of resigning  himself.  Absent a colapse  of  health  or a  political 
catastrophe, it was assumed that Eden would lead the Conservatives at least up until 
the next General Election in 1959 or 1960, and perhaps beyond that. Even if he did 
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not,  R.A  Butler  was seen as the likely successor  not  Macmilan.  The  Suez  Crisis 
however gave Macmilan an opportunity that he seized with both hands and held onto. 
His biographers have generaly defended his conduct up until the speech he gave to 
the 1922 Commitee, but stressed that he saw an opportunity to seize the leadership 
from  Butler and took it,  presenting  himself as a  defender  of  British interests and 
taring Butler, once again, with the brush of appeasement.202 However, the record of 
his discussions with the Eisenhower administration presents a compeling case for his 
having atempted to depose Eden and then out-manoeuvre Butler for the vacancy in 
Number Ten. He misrepresented his own position within the government to Winthrop 
Aldrich and the  general tone  of  his  meetings is  of someone trying to appear as the 
logical successor to a discredited Prime Minister.203 
 
Harold Macmilan was what this author considers a ‘European’ politician. He 
did  not  believe that  Europe should  be federal and  prefered a cooperative approach 
through existing institutions such as the OEEC,204 but the sceptical note that many of 
his  biographers  have  used  when  discussing  his ‘Europeanism’ is  based  on  modern 
understanding  of terms such as ‘pro-European’ and as such  does  him a  historical 
disservice.205 In fact,  Macmilan  was a fervent  believer in the concept  of a  unified 
Europe. The idea appealed to the Edwardian aspects of his character. It was a grand 
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scheme of high politics, suited to the nineteenth century practice of solving great and 
pressing issues through summit diplomacy involving the major powers. In the context 
of the world in the aftermath of the Second World War, Macmilan saw in Europe the 
only way to ensure that the events of the preceding thirty years were not repeated, that 
Germany could never again seek to dominate Europe, and to ensure that the west was 
strong enough and stable enough to fight  Communism.206 Macmilan also  believed, 
unlike  Churchil for  whom  he  worked in the  United  Europe  Movement, that  Britain 
had a role to  play in a  unified  Europe.  Churchil saw  Britain’s role as that  of a 
sponsor, a facilitator. Macmilan thought that Britain must play an active role from the 
inside, either to  maintain a  position  of leadership, and later to  make sure that 
developments in the integration  process  were  not  detrimental to  Britain’s extra-
European interests. These views were to play a role in the decisions Macmilan made 
before and after he came to power in January 1957 and were the basis for the views of 
his contemporaries  who,  unlike  many  of  his  biographers, considered  him to  be a 
‘European’.207 
 
Macmilan  himself as  Prime  Minister  had a significant, although  not always 
positive, impact  on the evolution  of  British  policy towards the  European 
Communities. He initialy persevered with pre-Suez atempts to prevent the formation 
of a customs union by the Six by presenting an alternative plan for the creation of a 
partial (industrial  but  not agricultural) free trade area.208 After the  Six signed the 
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Treaties of Rome this was repackaged and Macmilan’s government negotiated with 
the  Six to try and create the free trade area to include the  new  Common  Market.209 
When further  negotiations  were ruled  out  by the  French  government in  November 
1958 Macmilan appeared to take a more combative line in Europe, helping create the 
European  Free  Trade  Association, in an atempt to force the  EEC to adopt  more 
liberal  policies  with regard to the rest  of  western  Europe.210 This shift  marked a 
change in tactics and seemingly motivation for Macmilan. Plan G and the proposed 
free trade area were in line with his personal views on Europe; the need for a united 
Europe  but  one  based  on cooperation rather than federal institutions.  EFTA  went 
against both of these elements and while an argument could be made that the policy 
was borne out of frustration and a certain degree of pragmatism, it is noticeable that 
the policy bore litle relation to the Prime Minister’s views on Europe. 
 
Ultimately, in the summer  of  1960  Macmilan realised that  Britain  had  no 
choice  but to try and join the  Common  Market.  His  Cabinet  did  not  yet agree  but 
Macmilan  began a  year-long conversion  process.  He reshufled the  Cabinet in July 
1960,  promoting  known ‘Europeans’ to strategic  positions,  one  of  whom  was 
Heath.211 Macmilan’s bid was a failure but it did accomplish two things that were to 
be  of lasting importance.  The first was that  he  had established  Britain as a future 
member of the European Communities; the second was that by promoting and giving 
responsibility for  Europe to a  man  known then and  now as a supporter  of  British 
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participation in  Europe,  Macmilan  made it  possible for  Heath to succeed  where  he 
himself had failed. 
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Chapter V: Suez, Algeria, de Gaule and French 
Policy Towards the European Communities 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has thus far focussed exclusively on the impact of the Suez Crisis from the 
British perspective. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the crisis impacted 
upon  French  policy towards  membership  of the  European  Communities, and the 
subsequent efect  on Britain’s relations  with them.  This  wil,  of course, also 
encompass  British  policy to a certain extent.  An integral  part  of the  developing 
relationship between Britain and Europe was the change in British policy on European 
integration, and this  was in  part caused  by the  French response to the  Suez  Crisis. 
Moreover,  while a strict interpretation  of the  phrase ‘Anglo-European relations’ 
would suggest some focus  on  other  European countries,  particularly  Germany, Italy 
and the  Benelux  nations, the  nature  of  European  diplomacy and  politics in the late 
1950s and early 1960s was such that in practical terms it is France that maters here. 
The  papers  of the  British  government in this  period  make clear that the  most 
significant issue for Britain when it came to Europe was France, particularly after the 
return  of  General de  Gaule.1 Accordingly this chapter  wil focus  on three  ways in 
which Suez influenced French policy, and in turn on the Anglo-European relationship.  
 
The first area is  how  Suez changed  French  policy  on  European integration, 
particularly the discussions in 1956 on EURATOM and the Common Market. Despite 
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being engaged fuly in the discussions at Messina and the Spaak Commitee in 1955 
and 1956, France was not positively inclined towards further supranationalism, having 
rejected the  European  Defence  Community in  August  1954.2 The chapter  wil 
demonstrate how the humiliation France sufered at Suez, combined with a sense of 
betrayal by Britain and the United States, convinced French leaders that for France to 
remain a  great  power, it must take the lead in  developing a  united  Europe, the 
leadership  of  which  would enable it to  play the role that the shame  of  Suez  had 
suggested it could play no longer.3 
 
It  was this sense  of  humiliation and  betrayal that  Guy  Molet, the  French 
Premier between 1 February 1956 and 13 June 1957, was able to use to overcome the 
hostility  of  much  of  his  government, the  French civil service, and  French  public 
opinion, towards the Common Market, and in March 1957 France signed the Treaties 
of Rome.4 This had the efect of rendering obsolete the view on the part of the British 
government that  French  hostility to supranationalism  would  prevent the  Common 
Market from  being created.5 Britain  was  now faced  with a  European  grouping from 
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which it had chosen to exclude itself.  Moreover, this  was a  European bloc with a 
common external tarif that meant Britain’s exports could not enter the markets of the 
Six on the same terms that those of the Six could.6 This also confronted Britain with 
the  prospect  of losing  what it considered to  be the leadership  of  Europe to the  new 
group, and more woryingly, the prospect of the EEC replacing Britain as America’s 
European partner of choice.7 
 
The second and third areas  of focus in this chapter  both concern  General 
Charles de Gaule. The first of these is the impact that Suez had on the ongoing crisis 
facing  France in  Algeria.  France  had seen the  Suez  Crisis as an intrinsic  part  of its 
struggle in  Algeria, seeing the  hand  of  Egyptian  President  Nasser in the 
encouragement and arming of the FLN rebels, and the crisis made France even more 
determined to retain control of its colony.8 The crisis in Algeria was the catalyst for 
the return to power of General de Gaule in June 1958, as it created a state of political 
instability so serious that  only  his return to  ofice  prevented a coup  d’etat by the 
French  Armed  Forces.9 De  Gaule’s return added a  new element to the  Anglo-
European relationship.  Although  not an  Anglophobe, de  Gaule  had long  held a 
degree of mistrust for Britain and the USA (‘les Anglo-Saxons’), and despite having a 
similar view to Macmilan of federalism and the type of integrated Europe he wanted, 
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his vision was of a Europe that was not dominated by the United States.10 The General 
saw  Britain as  having fundamentaly  diferent  objectives, and felt that its links  with 
the  Commonwealth  made it economicaly incompatible  with  EEC  membership, as 
wel as  believing that its close ties  with the  US  meant that its accession could  only 
lead to undue US influence in Europe.11 Above al, de Gaule saw Europe as a vehicle 
for  French leadership, and rightly felt that  having  Britain as a  member  of the  EEC 
would threaten the position he felt should belong to France.12 
 
The third and final area of focus here is the development of the French nuclear 
arsenal,  La  Force de Dissuasion (beter  known as the  Force  de  Frappe).  This  was 
another manifestation of the sense of humiliation and betrayal that Suez provoked in 
France. In the same  way that  French  policymakers responded to  Suez  by reversing 
their  opposition to the  Common  Market, the crisis  had a similar impact  on  French 
atomic policy. France had been, like Britain and Israel, the recipient of veiled threats 
of  nuclear atack  by the  Soviet  Union at the  height  of the crisis,13 and saw  Suez as 
proof that, lacking  nuclear  weapons  of its own, it would  be  vulnerable to  nuclear 
blackmail.14 This  was  heightened  by the  belief that it could  not rely  on  America to 
defend France and its interests, or to retaliate on its behalf if it were atacked by the 
                        
10 J. Newhouse, De Gaule and the Anglo-Saxons (London, 1970), p. 36. 
11 H.S. Chopra, De Gaule and European Unity (New Delhi, 1974), p. 176. 
12 A. Werth, De Gaule: A Political Biography (New York, 1966), p. 312. 
13 A. Gorst & L. Johnman, The Suez Crisis (Oxford, 1997), pp. 122-123. 
14 L.  Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton,  1965),  pp. 
105-106. 
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Soviet Union.15 After the crisis France accelerated its atomic energy research and in 
1958 took the  decision to  develop  nuclear  weapons.  This  had significant 
consequences for  Anglo-European relations.16 Initialy it added a  new  dimension to 
the discussions between Britain and France on the free trade area proposals, and then 
the  British  bid to enter the  EEC.  Macmilan contemplated  using assistance for the 
French  nuclear  programme as an exchange for  French support  of  British  desires in 
Europe.17 In the event this  proved  not to  be feasible in the face  of  US  opposition,18 
and it was Britain’s decision to purchase Polaris from the US under the terms of the 
Nassau  Agreement that  provided de  Gaule  with the  pretext to terminate the  EEC 
negotiations, and in practical terms veto Britain’s entry.19 
 
Suez, France and the EEC 
One of the ways in which the Suez Crisis had an impact on European integration was 
its role in altering French views on a Common Market and moving the country away 
                        
15 Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1956 Vol. III, 24 Oct-31 Dec, ‘Conversation Between Adenauer 
and Molet’ (6 Nov., 1956), Translated by Dan Whyman. 
16 H.  Parr, ‘Transformation and  Tradition:  Anglo-French  Nuclear  Cooperation and  Britain’s  Policy 
Towards the European Community, 1960-1974’, in M. Grant (Ed.), The British Way in Cold Warfare: 
Inteligence,  Diplomacy  and the  Bomb  1945-1975 (London,  2011),  p.  89;  H.  Parr, ‘”The  Nuclear 
Myth”: Edward Heath, Europe, and the International Politics of Anglo-French Nuclear Co-Operation 
1970-3’, The International History Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2013), pp. 534-555. 
17 P. Mangold, The Almost Impossible Aly: Harold Macmilan and Charles De Gaulle (London, 2006), 
pp. 170-171. 
18 TNA PREM 11/3311, ‘Kennedy to Macmilan’ (8 May., 1961). 
19 J. Fenby, The General: Charles De Gaule and the France He Saved (London, 2010), p. 503. 
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from the  opposition to supranationalism  demonstrated  by the rejection  of the  EDC, 
and towards the position where it signed the Treaties of Rome in March 1957. As with 
many, if  not most aspects  of the  Suez  Crisis, the idea that  Suez  made  France  more 
amenable to the Common Market has not gone unchalenged, and there appear to be 
two conflicting interpretations. German  historian  Hans Jurgen Küsters described the 
successful outcome of the EEC negotiations as an historical accident initiated by the 
Suez  Crisis, as it  was the failure  of the  Anglo-French expedition that tipped the 
balance and pushed French doubts about the Common Market into the background.20 
 
However, Clemens Wurm, another German historian who edited the work in 
which Küster’s account appeared, cited  French  historian  Piere  Guilen’s assertion 
that Suez was the major catalyst for the French government’s acceptance of the Rome 
treaties.21 Guilen  himself  made this case in  Ennio  Di  Nolfo’s  1992  volume  on the 
origins  of the  EEC,22 and in a  1988 article in the  French journal Revue D’Histoire 
Diplomatique.23 Guilen is  not the  only  French  historian to  make such a claim. 
                        
20 H.J. Küsters, ‘West Germany’s Foreign Policy in Western Europe 1949-58: The Art of the Possible’ 
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Maurice Vaïsse,  writing in  Roger  Louis and  Robert  Owen’s edited  volume  on the 
crisis, made several assertions including one that Suez, via the international tension it 
caused, the disruption of oil supplies and the evident European weakness compared to 
the superpowers served as an accelerating factor in the further  development  of 
European  Unity.24 He cited the supposed statement  of  Adenauer to  Molet after the 
later had been informed of the British decision to withdraw, that Europe would be his 
revenge, a statement also cited by Robert and Isobel Tombs in their work That Sweet 
Enemy:  Britain  and  France,  The  History  of  a  Love-Hate  Relationship.25 Vaïsse and 
Guilen  were two  of the  French  historians  who colaborated  on Histoire  De  La 
Diplomatie Francaise (a 2005 volume that accompanies much of the released French 
diplomatic archive material), which includes the folowing editorial statement; 
 
The crisis had major consequences: it was clear that France and Britain no longer 
had the means for an imperial policy, the Franco-British retreat and the political 
victory  of  Nasser  definitely jeopardized the situation in  Algeria, a considerable 
resentment against the  United  States…the  pending  European  option  was 
relaunched.26 
 
                        
24 M. Vaïsse, ‘Post-Suez France’ in WM. Roger Louis & R. Owen (eds), Suez 1956: The Crisis and its 
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Anglo-American revisionist authors,  most  notably  political scientist  Andrew 
Moravcsik, and the late British historian Alan Milward, have chalenged this orthodox 
opinion.  Their revisionist case  dismisses  Suez as  playing a significant role in the 
French decision to sign the Treaties of Rome, claiming that the crisis was coincidental 
and that the  decision  had already  been  made in  Paris  prior to the  Adenauer-Molet 
meeting in early  November  1956.  Moravcsik, in The  Choice for  Europe:  Social 
Purpose  and  State  Power from  Messina to  Maastricht references Küster’s assertion 
that the EEC was a Suez inspired historical accident27 but then proceeds to dispute it. 
His  position is that the  orthodox  views expressed earlier  were  based  on  dubious 
accounts from associates  of  Adenauer, and that the  deciding factor  was in fact 
Molet’s pro-European views.28 Moravcsik concedes that Suez did supply the French 
government with an extra argument to use to shift opposition views in Parliament, but 
this is a somewhat  grudging concession and is  outweighed  by the claim that every 
(unreferenced)  oral  history rejects a  decisive link  between  Suez and  Europe.29 
Adenaeur and Molet appeared to have reached an agreement before Eden’s cal came 
through, in a meeting that had been scheduled some months before for precisely this 
purpose.30 
 
Alan Milward, in the first volume of his account of the history of Britain and 
the European Communities, took a similar line to Moravcsik. Milward throughout this 
                        
27 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(London, 1999), p. 87. 
28 Ibid, pp. 120-121. 
29 Ibid, p. 120. 
30 Ibid, p. 119. 
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work takes an economic  based revisionist position  where  European integration is 
concerned, and tends to reject geopolitical considerations in favour of economic ones. 
Where  Suez,  Britain and  Europe are concerned  he states that  historians  have two 
particular tendencies: dismissing  Suez as a causal factor  where  British  policy is 
concerned, and asserting that it  prompted  France to sign the  Treaty  of  Rome.  His 
opinion is that neither view is corect.31 Where Britain is concerned he links Suez to 
the adoption of Plan G and the atempts to create a European Free Trade Area, but in 
the case  of  France he rejects any impact  of the crisis  on  French  policy.  Milward’s 
position, as with Moravcsik, is that France had already decided to sign the Treaty of 
Rome at least as early as September 1956, and he cites Russel Bretherton’s account 
of a  French  delegate informing  him  on  26  September that  France  would sign the 
Common Market treaty.32 
 
It is this author’s contention that the revisionist arguments of Moravcsik and 
Milward are not borne out by the available evidence. It can be conceded that orthodox 
accounts that cite the  Adenauer-Molet conversation can  be  questioned  on the  basis 
that the French transcript of the meeting ends before Eden’s telephone cal to Molet, 
and that the sole source for the statement ‘Europe wil be your revenge’ appears to be 
Pineau, the  French  Foreign  Minister,  whose account (according to  Moravcsik and 
Keith  Kyle) is not to  be entirely trusted.33 The series Documents  Diplomatique 
                        
31 A.  Milward, The United Kingdom and the European Community Volume I: The Rise and Fal of a 
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32 Ibid, p. 261. 
33 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe (1999), p. 119; K. Kyle, Suez (1991), p. 467. 
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Francais34 provides nothing to coroborate Pineau’s recolection, but then it does not 
dispute it either.  There are,  nevertheless, several  problems  with the revisionist 
interpretation. The first is that the case seems to be based on France having reached 
certain conclusions in the summer or autumn of 1956, thereby rendering any Suez link 
nul. Assuming that the assertion as to timing is corect, that would seem to suggest 
that the end of the crisis  had  no impact,  but this is  not the same thing as the crisis 
itself being unimportant. Suez began in July 1956 and was ongoing at the point that 
Bretherton  was told that France  would sign the  Common  Market  Treaty.  Moreover, 
the statement  made to  Bretherton  was  not  necessarily an accurate representation  of 
France’s position, nor could be taken as suficient evidence even it if were accurate. 
In the first instance,  by  September  1956 the  Spaak  Commitee  discussions were 
ongoing and Bretherton was present as a British observer. At this point the Six were 
keen for British involvement, as was France, whose President ofered a Franco-British 
union and was known to favour Britain as a member. It cannot be ruled out that the 
assertion  was simply a  negotiating tactic  designed to  play  on  British fears  of a 
Common  Market  being created in their absence.  Secondly,  Molet’s  government 
intending to sign the Common Market Treaty in September 1956 is not the same thing 
as the French state doing so. The French government in 1954 led by Piere Mendès 
France agreed to the  proposed  European  Defence  Community,  yet said  EDC  never 
came to fruition as it  was rejected  by the  French  Parliament.  A  French Premier 
intending to sign a treaty under the Fourth Republic was one thing; the treaty being 
accepted  by the  French  parliament  was another.  Molet’s  pro-European  views  were 
                        
34 Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1956 Vol. III, 24 Oct-31 Dec, ‘Conversation Between Adenauer 
and Molet’ (6 Nov., 1956), Translated by Dan Whyman. 
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known, and as even  Moravcsik  pointed  out,  Suez  gave  him additional arguments to 
use on parliamentary opponents.35 
 
The second issue that disputes Milward and Moravcsik’s view is the nature of 
the Common Market negotiations, and the Adenauer-Molet meeting and is based on 
contemporary,  documentary evidence.  Their argument rests  on the  meeting  being 
scheduled to solve any remaining diferences, and that France had already made the 
decision to sign the Treaty of Rome some months before. The contemporary evidence 
disputes this. In January  1957, an edition  of The Economist ran an article  on the 
Common Market negotiations, ‘The Treaties of the Six: The Common Market Takes 
Shape’, in which the corespondent wrote, ‘only three months ago the basic concept 
of the Common Market –that the six countries (France, Germany, Italy and Benelux) 
should commit themselves in advance to remove internal tarifs…-seemed threatened 
by unacceptable French demands’.36 
 
Beyond a contemporary  media account there are the US  diplomatic cables 
which cast considerable  doubt  on the claims  of  Milward and  Moravcsik, and at a 
meeting  of the  Conservative  Parliamentary  Foreign  Afairs  Commitee in  March 
1956,  The  President  of the  Board  of  Trade (Peter  Thorneycroft)  opined that ‘the 
chances  of the  Six  geting  Euratom (must  be seen in the context  of the  Common 
Market)  were  negligible.  France  would sign anything  but  would  balk at lower 
                        
35 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe (1999), p. 120. 
36 ‘The Treaties of the Six: The Common Market Takes Shape’, The Economist (19 Jan., 1957), p. 171. 
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tarifs’.37 The US took a keen interest in and promoted European integration and was, 
as a consequence, very wel informed. On October 25th the US representative to the 
European  Coal and  Steel  Community cabled  Washington to the efect that ‘the 
outcome of the Paris meeting leaves EURATOM and Common Market hanging in the 
air…al  held the  view that it  was  make  or  break  within the  near future and another 
ministerial meeting terminating in failure would be the end’.38 On October 30th the US 
Ambassador to Germany telegrammed Washington the account of a conversation he 
held  with  Adenauer in  which the  Chancelor  made clear  his  wilingness to  make 
concessions  on  EURATOM,  but that  Germany could  not  meet certain  French 
demands on the Common Market (France desired a greater level of protectionism in 
order to secure its agricultural sector,  whereas  Germany’s  high level  of industrial 
exports saw it favour a more liberal, free trade approach).39 
 
What is clear from these accounts is that as late as the end of October 1956 the 
EURATOM and  Common  Market  negotiations were stil at a stage  where a  French 
decision to sign  having already  been  made in  September seems  highly improbable. 
The October 25th telegram portrays the negotiations as being one bad meeting away 
from  disaster, and the  October  30th highlights the  divergence  between  French and 
German policies on both major issues. The meeting scheduled for a week later may 
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have been designed to bridge these gaps, but even if that were the case, al this casts 
considerable doubt on the claim that France had already decided to sign the Common 
Market treaty as late as a month before. France was in the autumn of 1956 keen on 
EURATOM, a  viewpoint that according to  one  US  diplomatic  observer  had  been 
heightened by the Suez Crisis and the accompanying threat to European oil supplies.40 
But France  was  not similarly enamoured  of the  Common  Market towards  which its 
atitude veered between hesitancy and hostility.41 Monnet urged Adenauer to agree to 
separate the two sets  of  discussions so as to ensure the signing  of the  EURATOM 
treaty,  but the  German  Foreign  Ofice rejected these  urgings on the  grounds that 
unless EURATOM and the Common Market were intrinsicaly linked, France would 
achieve the former, but Germany would not achieve the later.42 
 
We have, therefore, two reasons to dispute the argument that Suez had litle or 
nothing to  do  with the  French  decision to sign the  Treaties  of  Rome.  The 
contemporary record is clear that as late as the end  of  October  1956 an agreement 
between  Germany and  France was stil some  way  of, certainly further than the 
Milward and Moravcsik accounts would suggest. The specific issue of the Common 
Market and the evidence that would support the orthodox position is similarly clear. 
Contemporary diplomatic cables from US oficials in Europe, and most significantly 
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the account  of  Robert  Marjolin, the lead  French  negotiator for the  Common  Market 
discussions, demonstrate unequivocaly the role that Suez played. On December 19th 
1956 the  US  Ambassador to  Belgium sent a telegram to the  State  Department that 
references the  Belgian  Chef  du  Cabinet (Robert  Rothschild) and  Paul  Henry  Spaak. 
The folowing passages from the telegram are unambiguous where Suez is concerned: 
 
Spaak told me yesterday he is very optimistic on prospects of early signature and 
ratification  of  EURATOM and  Common  Market treaties after  his conversation 
with  other  Foreign  Ministers in  Paris last  week…He said  he found  French 
enthusiasm so  keen that it amounted  virtualy to about-face and added this 
atributable to their  Suez experience…Rothschild  pointed  up  Spaak’s remark 
about the efect of the Suez experience on the French atitude towards integration 
by remarking to the Embassy ofice that the French appear finaly to see that they 
must work together with the rest of Europe if they are to have a significant role in 
world afairs…He said while French nationalistic feelings have not diminished, 
the outcome of the Egyptian venture had brought home to the French the extent 
to which their ability to act independently has dwindled.43 
 
Further evidence is to  be found in the  memoirs  of  Robert  Marjolin, the lead  French 
negotiator in the Common Market discussions in 1956. He had this to say: 
 
The negotiation of what was to become the Treaty of Rome can be divided into 
two  broad  phases.  The first  of these  was a  period in  which the  partners  were 
feeling their way and France’s hesitations were preventing any decisive progress 
                        
43 FRUS 1955-1957 Volume. IV, Doc. 206, ‘Alger to Department of State,’ (19 Dec., 1956). 
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from  being  made; it lasted roughly  until  August-September  1956.  The 
nationalization  of the  Sue  Canal  on July  26th 1956, folowed  by the il-fated 
Anglo-French expedition in November of the same year, marked the end of that 
phase.  From that  moment  on, things  moved forward rapidly.  Guy  Molet,  who 
had long been wedded to the idea of European integration, but who hesitated to 
defy the hostility of most of his ministers, virtualy the whole of the central civil 
service and large segments of public opinion, felt that the only way to erase, or at 
least lessen, the  humiliation that  France  had just sufered from the  Suez afair 
was to conclude a European treaty quickly. He brought al his influence to bear 
and was able to tip the scales in the right direction.44 
 
It is this author’s contention therefore that far from there  being  no 
contemporary evidence to support the assertion that  Suez influenced the  French 
decision to sign the Treaties of Rome, many of the available accounts in fact confirm 
such a link.  The  orthodox accounts  of  Tombs, Vaïsse and  others  do  not provide 
contemporary evidence for the claim beyond the recolection of Christian Pineau, and 
so  have  been atacked  by revisionist authors,  yet, the  balance  of the  documentary 
record,  particularly the  observations  of  Spaak (one  of the founding fathers  of the 
integration  movement) and  Marjolin, provide a compeling case for linking  Suez 
intrinsicaly to the signing  of the  Treaties  of  Rome.  What is  necessary, now, is to 
explore how this impacted upon the nature and development of British policy towards 
the EEC. 
 
                        
44 R. Marjolin, Architect of European Unity (1989), p. 297. 
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Impact of the EEC on British Policy Towards Membership of the 
European Communities 
British policy on European integration in 1955 and 1956 was partly predicated on the 
belief that French opposition to supranationalism, as demonstrated by the rejection of 
the EDC, would prevent the creation of a European customs union.45 British leaders 
such as  Eden,  Butler and  Macmilan  have al  been the subject  of criticism for their 
inability to  predict the success  of the  Messina and Spaak talks, although  Macmilan 
has also  been credited  with seeing the  dangers  before  many  of  his coleagues  of 
Britain  doing  nothing,  or  being seen to  be the cause  of the talks’ colapse.46 By the 
spring of 1957 the discussions had turned to how Britain should deal with the signing 
of the Treaties  of  Rome.47 On  March  30th a  note  by the  Chairman  of the  Economic 
Policy stated that  Britain  must  proceed in the expectation that the customs  union 
would become an accomplished fact, and listed the problems this would cause Britain 
(increased export tarifs to the Six, and Britain and Commonwealth countries facing 
competition from  other  members  of the  Six in  French  overseas teritories  who  were 
inside the common tarif).48 The  Cabinet  meeting five  days later (3rd April) raised 
similar  points regarding the economic  damage to  Britain,49 and  Macmilan’s  diary 
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entry for 27th March spoke of the desire to atack the French for their handling of the 
last stages  of the  Common  Market treaty, that they  had  had their  way and that the 
inclusion of the French colonial empire made things very dificult for Britain.50 
 
Britain’s chosen policy for dealing with the EEC was broadly similar to that 
pursued in the summer and autumn  of  1956, to set  up an industrial  European  Free 
Trade Area. The creation of the EEC meant that instead of an industrial free trade area 
designed to  prevent the  development  of a customs  union, this now represented an 
atempt to subsume the Six within a wider grouping. Reginald Maudling (Paymaster 
General and leader of the FTA negotiations) wrote in January 1958 of the dangers to 
Britain if the free trade area could not be created: 
 
I  have  become  more than ever impressed  by the  dangers  of failing to reach an 
agreement. The European Economic Community has now been launched…If no 
Free  Trade  Area agreement is achieved, this  new industrial  giant  wil 
increasingly overshadow our trading future throughout the world. The centre of 
gravity in  European economic afairs  wil shift inexorably to  Bonn (or  Paris). 
The smaler continental countries wil have wily-nilly to come to terms with the 
Six.  The atractions  of the  Continental  market  wil  grow in the eyes  of the 
Commonwealth, and the power of the Six to compete with us in Commonwealth 
markets wil steadily increase.51  
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By  1959, after the termination  of the  FTA  discussions in  November  1958, there 
appeared to be an evolution of the atitudes prevailing in the British government. The 
fear  of the  EEC and its  potential impact  on  Britain economicaly and vis-a-vis the 
United  States remained throughout,  but the  way in  which the British  government 
intended to deal with this changed. In the earlier part of the year the intention was to 
create an alternative European grouping,52 and Macmilan was candid in his intentions 
for  EFTA to  be a  mechanism to force the  Six into  what  he caled a reasonable 
negotiation, having also refered to the Seven in opposition to the Six as ‘Stockholm v 
Rome’.53 By October though, high-ranking figures within the government had reached 
the conclusion that ‘for beter or worse, the Common Market looks like being here to 
stay at least for the foreseeable future…the question is how to live with the Common 
Market economicaly and turn its political efects into channels harmless to us.’54 In 
December the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, was talking of the need to come to 
terms with the EEC, fearing that British opposition to the political integration of the 
Six  would  not  prevent their  moving closer together,  but  may in fact  hasten such a 
process.55 Sir Frederick Bishop (Macmilan’s Principal Private Secretary) opined that 
using  EFTA to  make the  EEC  more liberal  was a  pious  hope rather than a realistic 
aim,56 and the notes sent by Macmilan to several of his Cabinet coleagues indicate a 
reluctant  wilingness to consider associating  Britain  with the  Six, in line  with the 
sentiments  De  Zulueta,  Macmilan’s  Private  Secretary, had expressed to  him two 
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months  before.57 By  April  1960  Bishop  was  writing  of the  need for ‘a fundamental 
rethinking  of  our atitude towards  Europe’,58 and the  Economic  Steering  Commitee 
chaired by Sir Frank Lee argued in its report that, among other things, that what had 
changed since  1956  when the  government first rejected the  EEC,  was that the 
‘Common  Market is an established fact and is rapidly increasing in cohesion and 
economic strength’.59 
 
In July 1961 the government took the decision to begin negotiations with the 
Six to see on what terms Britain could join the EEC. It is not this author’s intention to 
go  over the arguments that  have  been  presented as to  whether economic  or 
geopolitical considerations  prompted  Macmilan and  his  Cabinet to reach this 
decision.  Kristian  Steinnes’ article  provides an excelent summary  of that  particular 
historiographical  debate,60 and  whether  or  not  geopolitics  or economics  was the 
deciding factor, it was the existence and seeming success of the EEC that provided the 
overal impetus for the  decision.  This  was certainly the  view expressed  by a sadly 
unknown author in a memorandum to the Quai D’Orsai in May 1961 which includes 
the folowing: 
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The paterns that caused Britain to modify its atitude are probably the folowing: 
 
First, the success  of the  Common  Market. It is  undeniable that it  has  been 
successful so far, at least in regard to industrial  products.  Tarif reduction  was 
faster than  planned; the  Common  Market countries are experiencing financial 
stability and a  more satisfactory rate  of expansion than  other  European 
countries…  Secondly, the  Six  preserved their cohesion,  despite serious 
dificulties.61 
 
The  memorandum continues  by listing the  views  of the  United  States as the 
third factor that prompted the modification of Britain’s atitude. This refers to the new 
Kennedy administration’s indication to  Britain that it  would  not support any 
association solution,  was  hostile to any  purely commercial solution, and that  only 
British  membership  of the  Common  Market could  be considered.62 This  French 
interpretation  of  US  policy is supported  by a  12th April telegram from the  State 
Department to  various  diplomatic  missions in  Europe.  The  US  document stated that 
the  development  of the  EEC  had created  problems for  Britain and the  other  EFTA 
states, and that not only was a purely commercial form of association problematic for 
the  US, but the  only solution that  would command  American support  was  Britain 
joining the  EC and  wholeheartedly accepting the accompanying  political and 
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institutional  obligations.63 It is  worth recaling  briefly here that the  US  had  been 
sceptical or hostile to EFTA on the grounds that it further split Europe, and that US 
policy  had  been supportive  of the  EEC  based  on its  political  nature.64 A significant 
factor regarding  American  views  of the  EEC  was the fact that it  was seen to  be 
successful, and so the  US  had  not  only a  geo-political reason to support it  on the 
grounds that a  united  Europe  would  make a stronger  Cold  War ally,  but also a 
reflection of its own success. 
 
In  both economic and  diplomatic terms, the creation and successful 
development  of the  EEC forced  Britain to adapt its policies, and  while this initialy 
took the form  of atempting to subsume the  EEC into a  wider  European  grouping, 
then atempting to counter the threat by the formation of another European economic 
group, ultimately, the relative success of the EEC was the most important factor in the 
British decision to apply for membership in 1961. The Suez crisis played a significant 
role in the  development  of the  EEC, fostering a sense in  French government circles 
that faced with the prospect of not being able to rely on the US, Europe ofered the 
best  way for  France to  maintain a great  power role. It  gave  Molet the evidence  he 
needed to  overcome the  hostility to the  Common  Market that  Britain  had  used to 
justify its own sceptical atitude towards European integration in the mid 1950s. 
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Algeria and De Gaule 
The second  way in  which  Suez  played a role in the course  of  Anglo-French 
negotiations over the EEC was in the return to power of General Charles de Gaule in 
June  1958.  Although there  was an eighteen-month  gap  between the crisis and the 
return of the General, it is submited that Suez was a significant factor. The reason for 
this is that while it was the ongoing Algerian crisis that prompted de Gaule’s return, 
that crisis  was  heavily influenced  by  Suez.  Bernard  Ledwidge asserted that the 
humiliation  of  Suez and its consequences in  Algeria  produced the conditions in 
France that were necessary for and favourable to de Gaule’s return.65 Maurice Vaïsse 
made a similar point that the seeds of de Gaule’s return were sown in the failure of 
the  Suez  operation,66 and  Peter  Mangold even credits  Macmilan  with the statement 
that ‘some of the seeds of the General’s return were sown by the failure of Suez’.67 
 
Algeria  had  been ruled  by  France since  1848 and  was considered to  be a 
French département, and thus part of the country itself, rather than merely a colony.68 
By  1958 there  were  more than  one  milion  European setlers,  known as pieds noirs, 
living in Algeria and they held considerable power and influence, both localy and in 
mainland France.69 Although Algerians had fought for France during the Great War, 
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there  had  been a  growing sense  of  nationalism since the  1920s and in  November 
1954, the atacks by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in what became known 
as Toussaint Rouge (Red Al-Saints Day) began the Algerian uprising.70 The response 
of the  French  government was to state its  determination to  hold  onto  Algeria. 
Miterand  declared that the  only  negotiation is  war, and that  Algeria  was  France. 
Jacques Soustele, who served as Governor General in Algeria, remarked that Algeria 
and al its inhabitants were an integral part of France, ‘one and indivisible’.71 Perhaps 
Piere Mendès-France made the most striking comments, as the then Prime Minister 
said: 
 
One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the 
nation, the unity and the integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are 
part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are 
irevocably  French…Between them and  Metropolitan  France there can  be  no 
conceivable secession…Never  wil France –any  French  government  or 
parliament,  whatever  may  be their  particularistic tendencies- yield  on this 
fundamental principle.72 
 
The influence of the Suez Crisis in this conflict comes in two ways: the first is that 
French leaders saw the crisis as part of the ongoing Algerian uprising, and the second 
is how Suez influenced the later conduct of operations in Algeria. Dealing first of al 
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with  Suez as  part  of the  Algerian crisis,73 French leaders  were  of the  view that the 
Egyptian President, Colonel Nasser, was supporting and supplying the FLN rebels.74 
This view was not without some justification as Nasser himself claimed to Pineau that 
if France wished to negotiate a setlement with the FLN, then it could be aranged.75 
This may have been Nasser trying to discomfit his adversary and taking credit where 
it was not waranted, yet there were other reasons for the French view. The FLN was 
known to broadcast from Cairo,76 and on 16th October 1956 an Egyptian cargo ship, 
the Athos,  was  discovered carying  weapons for the  FLN.77 French leaders already 
considered Suez to be simply another theatre of the Algerian war,78 so the capture of 
the Athos simply  gave a final and conclusive logic to  Operation  Musketeer, linking 
Nasser and  Algeria in stark,  unambiguous terms.  Miterand,  normaly a fierce 
opponent of Guy Molet, supported the Prime Minister’s position and even spoke of 
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the  need to liquidate  Nasser.79 Robert  Lacoste  made the famous  quote that ‘one 
division in Egypt is worth four in Algeria’.80 
 
Thus far, the Suez and Algerian crises were linked by the French view that in 
order to  defeat the  FLN and retain control  of  Algeria, it  was  necessary to  defeat 
Nasser in Egypt. Doing so would, in French eyes, remove the rebels’ principal source 
of support. In this  way  Algeria was an influence  on the  Suez crisis rather than the 
other  way around.  However, it is in the  way the  Egyptian crisis concluded that  we 
find its impact in  Algeria, and  ultimately the return  of  de  Gaule. In some  ways the 
French response to  Suez in an  Algerian context  mirored  Britain’s response to 
Abadan. A significant portion of the Conservative Party saw the failure of the Labour 
Government to respond efectively to Mossadeq and the nationalisation of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company as evidence that a weak position on the Middle East would have 
disastrous consequences for  Britain.81 Anthony  Eden  was  one  of a  number  of 
Conservatives  who  went from  being initialy cautious to caling for a  more robust 
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response, and at Suez five years later a diplomatic solution was not seen as credible in 
the face of what appeared to be a repeat of Abadan.82 
 
A large  part  of the  French contribution to the  Anglo-French taskforce for 
Operation Musketeer had seen recent service in Algeria. The troops from the French 
Parachute  division shocked their  British counterparts  with their toughness and 
professionalism, a legacy  of the fighting in  North  Africa and also in Indochina.83 
Their experiences in Asia, particularly the circumstances of their defeat, had ingrained 
in them a hatred of and determination to fight against Communism with which they 
associated  neutralism, a  by-product  of colonial independence.  Many in the  French 
Army felt that Communist and Socialist politicians in France had betrayed them and 
there was litle afection for the Fourth Republic among the military, particularly the 
elite  units such as the  paras.84 Having successfuly landed at  Port  Said and in the 
process  of  brushing aside  Egyptian resistance, the  French forces  were  dismayed  by 
the ceasefire order. General Beaufre later claimed to have contemplated disobedience 
and continuing the advance, and the soldiers felt cheated by their government.85 Suez 
had two particular impacts: it added to an already long list of grievances felt by the 
army against the Fourth Republic and its leaders, and it made it even more determined 
to win in Algeria.86 
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By the spring  of  1958 the economic and  political situation in  France and 
Algeria  was  deteriorating.87 Although  French  military tactics  had improved since 
1955/1956 and  were  now specifically  designed to combat a lightly armed  opponent 
engaging in guerila tactics, there were more than 500,000 French soldiers in Algeria 
and the costs were prohibitive.88 Molet’s government, the longest-lived of any in the 
Fourth  Republic fel in  May  1957  when the  more conservative  parties refused a tax 
increase to fund continued  operations.89 Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury between June 
and November 1957, Félix Gailard (November 1957-May 1958) and Piere Pflimlin 
(14  May-1 June  1958) led administrations that  were incapable  of  dealing  with 
Algeria.90 The  government  had initialy refused to recognise (publicly) that  Algeria 
was anything other than a pacification issue, and as May 1958 arived, elements in the 
army  were  becoming convinced that the  government in  Paris  was contemplating a 
withdrawal.91 Lacoste  had  been  vainly atempting to enact a  policy  of Loi  Cadre, 
increasing Algerian autonomy and Muslim representation. Neither the European pieds 
noirs,  nor the army in  Algeria, supported these ideas and  Lacoste’s  position, as 
Governor  General,  was almost  untenable.92 At the same time, the  United  States  had 
been taking an increased interest in the  Algerian  question,  mainly  out  of concern at 
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the  political instability  of the  French  State. Irwin  Wal claimed that  Washington 
played a critical role in the fal of Félix Gailard in May 1958,93 and there were those 
in Algeria who feared that American influence would manifest in the surender they 
were expecting from Paris.94 
 
On 13 May Piere Pflimlin was sworn in as Prime Minister. The response in 
Algeria amounted to a coup.  There  were riots in  Algiers and  Generals  Massu and 
Salan seized  power from the civil authorities, refusing to recognise  Pflimlin’s 
government.  The army  gave tacit and in some cases active support to the 
demonstrations  without  which they could  not  have  occured.95 A  group  of  Gaulist 
oficers  were actively  planning to seize  power in  Paris,  which  had lost complete 
control of Algeria, by way of Operation Resurection, a combined parachute and tank 
assault on the capital designed to force the recal of de Gaule.96 In the event it was 
unnecessary and de Gaule was caled upon by the President René Coty to form a new 
government  on  1 June.97 The  Algerian crisis  was the catalyst for the  General’s 
resumption of power in France, but by hardening the atitude of the Army in Algeria, 
Suez had played an important role.  
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De Gaule and French Policy Towards Britain and the European 
Communities 
The Suez Crisis took place while de Gaule had putatively retired from public life. As 
such, it either does not feature at al in many biographies of the general,98 or is given 
only the  briefest  passing  mention in the context  of  Algeria, and thus de  Gaule’s 
return to power.99 Two notable exceptions are Jonathan Fenby’s 2010 biography, and 
the 1970 work by John Newhouse, both of whom discuss, albeit briefly, de Gaule’s 
reaction to the crisis. Fenby wrote that de Gaule saw Suez as further evidence of the 
weakness of the Fourth Republic, and the futility of relying on Britain as an aly.100 
Newhouse made much the same points but included the view that de Gaule was wel 
informed  despite  being in retirement and that the crisis aroused  his  passion for 
action.101 This is at the same time a plausible omission given the fact that de Gaule 
was in retirement from public life, and yet a curious omission as wel, as Suez was an 
integral  part  of the  Algerian conflict  which  was itself responsible for the  general’s 
return to  power in  May  1958.102 By contrast, de  Gaule’s  views  on  European 
integration, and  his relationships  with  Britain and the  United  States  have received 
much more extensive scholarly atention. De Gaule claimed that had he been in ofice 
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in 1956 and 1957 he would not have signed the Treaties of Rome.103 Yet, once back in 
power he made no atempt to remove France from the European organisations created 
by the treaties, recognising their  potential economic and  geo-political  benefits.104 
According to  Chopra, de  Gaule’s thinking rejected the  view  of  Monnet and  Spaak 
that institutions could  be an efective  means for converting a sceptical  European 
electorate to the  benefits  of supranationalism.  De  Gaule saw supranationalism as 
unreal, fictitious and bound to fail, and stressed the role of the state as the expression 
of the political wil.105 
 
The issue  of de  Gaule’s  vision  of a  united  Europe has, in  keeping  perhaps 
with the  general’s reputation,  generated a  degree  of academic  dispute and 
controversy.  The traditional  or  orthodox interpretation is that de  Gaule  viewed 
Europe through the lens  of  French  national greatness and renewal.  Geopolitics and 
diplomacy were at the heart of his policies in the late 1950s and 1960s, seeing Europe 
as the means by which France could maintain great power status, but also, develop an 
alternative  power  bloc, alied to,  but  not  dominated  by the  United  States.106 In the 
same way that historiography of Macmilan’s decision to apply for EEC membership 
has  been the subject  of intense  debate,107 de  Gaule and  Europe  has seen the 
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presentation  of a revisionist interpretation.  Andrew  Moravcsik decried the  geo-
political argument and stressed the primacy of economic considerations in de Gaule’s 
thinking: ‘the  price  of  wheat,  not the  political  grandeur and  military security  of 
France, was the national interest that drove De Gaule’s European policy’.108 Jefrey 
Vanke  provided a rebutal to  Moravcsik’s revisionist interpretation,  questioning the 
basis for separating economic considerations from  what  Moravcsik caled  high 
politics, on the grounds that they were and are indivisible.109 This particular point of 
Vanke’s is significant as irespective  of  whether  or  not an academic sees economic 
strength as an integral  part  of  geopolitics, it  was a link that  was  made  by 
contemporaries  of de  Gaule.  Harold  Macmilan in  his ‘Grand  Design’,110 and 
Anthony  Eden in his  1952 foreign  policy review,111 explicitly linked economic 
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strength to their country’s diplomatic  position, and stressed the importance  of the 
former to the later, as did the 1960 ‘Study for Future Policy’.112 
 
General de Gaule’s return to power in May 1958 added a new and somewhat 
paradoxical element to the Anglo-European relationship. While it is true that Anglo-
French relations  were  not as close after  Suez as they  were  before and  during the 
crisis,113 and that  Anglo-French  diferences  over  Europe  were too great to  be easily 
bridged, the FTA negotiations were foundering before de Gaule returned,114 none of 
the  Fourth  Republic  governments  between January  1957 and  April  1958  were as 
actively  hostile to  Britain in  Europe as  was de  Gaule. Thereafter  he  dominated 
French foreign policy while he was in ofice, far more so than his predecessors had 
done.115 
 
The  paradox  of de  Gaule and  his  views  on  Europe and  Britain alike is that, 
despite  being  hostile to  British  membership  of the  EEC,  his  particular  vision  of a 
unified  Europe  had  much in common  with that  of  Britain.  De  Gaule refered to 
‘Europe des Patries’ (Europe of nation-states), and stressed cooperation and decision-
making by the national governments, disdaining institutions such as the Commission, 
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or the ideas  of  Halstein116 to the  point  of  withdrawing  French representatives from 
the Community during the Empty Chair Crisis.117 Macmilan, somewhat acidly, stated 
in  November  1961 that ‘he talks  of  Europe and  means  France’,118 an accurate 
description if the Empty Chair Crisis was any indicator. Macmilan’s remark leads us 
to the  paradoxical element  of de  Gaule and  Britain’s  EEC  bid. In  his  1961 ‘Grand 
Design’ Macmilan noted that: 
 
As  dificult as de  Gaule is,  his  view  of the  proper political structure 
(Confederation not Federation) is realy nearer to ours. If he wished us to join the 
political institutions it would be easier for us to do so if they took the form which 
he favours.119 
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In  his  diaries  Macmilan refered to the similarities  between de  Gaule and  Britain 
when it came to a confederal  or a federal approach in  Europe.  His entry for  29 
November 1961 talks in almost desperate tones, the problem that Macmilan and the 
British bid are facing: 
 
The tragedy of it al is that we agree with de G about almost everything. We like 
the political Europe (Union des patries or union d’Etats) that de G likes. We are 
anti-federalists; so is  he…We agree;  but  his  pride,  his inherited  hatred  of 
England…his biter memories of the last war; above al, his intense ‘vanity’ for 
France…make  him  half  welcome,  half repel  us,  with a strange ‘love-hate’ 
complex.120 
 
Contained within that diary entry is the crux of the mater. Macmilan was wrong, or 
at least exaggerating, when  he claimed de  Gaule possessed an inherited  hatred  of 
England.  De  Gaule  had a longstanding suspicion  of  Britain  dating  back to  his 
childhood  during the  Fashoda incident,121 and exacerbated  by some  of  his  wartime 
experiences,  particularly  Churchil teling  him ‘each time  we  must choose  between 
Europe and the  open sea,  we shal always choose the  open sea.  Each time I  must 
choose  between  you and  Roosevelt, I shal always choose  Roosevelt’.122 This 
sentiment  made a  deep impression  on the  general  who refered to it  during  his 
December 1962 meeting with Macmilan at Rambouilet, the meeting where he made 
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clear his opposition to British membership of the Common Market.123 Yet de Gaule 
admired Britain and described it to Sir Pierson Dixon (UK Ambassador to France) as 
‘a  good  neighbour  he  would always  help  me to  put  out a fire in  my house’.124 De 
Gaule simply  had an  overwhelming  desire to  do  what  he thought  was  best for 
France.125 His hostility to the British EEC bid was based on his belief that Britain was 
not sincere in its desire to  play a ful role in  Europe,  was applying as an  American 
Trojan horse, and that due to its trading links with the Commonwealth Britain’s prior 
commitments were incompatible anyway  with the agricultural  provisions  of the 
Common Market.126 
 
Where Macmilan was corect was his portrayal of the similarities between de 
Gaule and Britain on European issues and his frustration at de Gaule’s hesitancy and 
hostility. The timing of this entry is significant, as is the note of hope that de Gaule 
might yield to pressure. A year later in December 1962 Macmilan reacted angrily to 
De  Gaule’s explanation regarding  his  opposition to the  British  bid, stating that  he 
made  what amounted to ‘a fundamental  objection in  principle to the  British 
application. If this was realy the French Government’s view, it should have been put 
forward at the  very start’.127 Macmilan’s anger can  be explained  by a sense  of 
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surprise and outrage, although the general’s decision cannot have come as a complete 
surprise as Macmilan was wel aware as 1962 progressed that the negotiations were 
in trouble.128 However,  beyond the  progress reports from  Brussels, de  Gaule’s 
decision should not have been so seemingly unexpected. Macmilan demonstrated in 
1960,  1961 and  1962 that  he  was aware  of the contradictory  nature  of de  Gaule’s 
views, and crucialy the reason for them. 
 
 What Macmilan failed to  understand (until after the  veto129)  was that  de 
Gaule’s  personal sentiments  on federalism and the constitutional  nature  of  Europe 
were  of less importance to  him than  his awareness that  Europe  ofered  France a 
leadership role and great power status, and his feeling that Britain was a threat to that 
position.  Britain’s entry was incompatible  with the principles  of the EEC in de 
Gaule’s eyes and even if it was not, France was the weaker of the two countries in 
1963.  France  had an  opportunity (limited  by time) to shape  Europe in the  way it 
wanted.  Germany,  despite its industrial and economic  potential being  greater than 
France, was stil the weaker partner in the Franco-German partnership. With Britain in 
the Common Market France would not automaticaly occupy the leading position. De 
Gaule  had always  had a  principled  objection to  Britain coming into the  EEC.  The 
Nassau  Agreement  provided  him  with a convenient  pretext  but  he  had always 
intended to end the negotiations at one point or another. That he waited until 1962/63 
to pul the plug is the same as his decision to terminate the FTA talks in November 
1958.  He  was  not in a strong enough  position in either case to act  much, if any, 
earlier. In 1958 he was preoccupied with Algeria and formulating a new constitution 
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for  France and  his atempts to  develop a tripartite relationship  with  Britain and the 
US. In 1961-62 he was engaged in trying to end the Algerian crisis, and proposing the 
Fouchet Plan.  
 
The French Nuclear Deterrent 
The historiography of the French deterent is extensive and encompasses several areas 
of  particular focus.  The first  works emerged in the  1960s and  1970s and  were 
dedicated to atomic energy policy under the Fourth and early Fifth Republics. French 
author  Betrand  Goldschmidt,  who  had  been intimately involved in the  French 
contribution to the Manhatan Project, and American academic Lawrence Scheinman, 
published  more  general  histories,  while  Scheinman’s compatriot  Wilfried  Kohl 
considered the deterent in the context of the NATO aliance, specificaly its impact 
on Anglo-French-American discussions and military policy.130 By the later 1980s and 
into the 1990s and 2000s more works appeared. Some such as that by Georges-Henri 
Soutou considered a  wider time-period to include the  French  presidencies  of 
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Pompidou, Giscard D’Estaing and Miterand, while others, notably Colete Barbier, 
revisited the Fourth Republic.131 
 
Beyond  more  general  histories, there  have  been  works that are  more 
specialised.  Gabriele  Hecht took a  more technical approach in  her examination  of 
French nuclear policy under the Fourth Republic, looking more deeply at the power 
(scientific rather than geo-political) issues and reactor design than their impact on the 
wider world.132 Binyamin Pinkus looked at the role of France in the development of 
Israeli  nuclear  weapons,  while authors including  Mathew  Kroenig  have examined 
nuclear  non-proliferation  more  generaly.133 Samaan and  Gompert revisited the 
deterent and NATO in the aftermath of the then President Sarkozy’s 2007 decision to 
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reintegrate the French military, reversing de Gaule’s famous 1966 withdrawal from 
that structure.134 
 
The third area, which admitedly encompasses many more sub-divisions than 
can realisticaly be considered here, includes works that have focussed on France and 
French history that include substantial sections on the nuclear deterent, biographies 
of  General  de  Gaule,  particularly that  by  H.S.  Chopra,135 and considerations  of the 
General’s foreign policy that have nuclear elements to them.136 
 
Although the French nuclear arsenal is perhaps best known historicaly for its 
development  under  General  De  Gaule,  France  having exploded an atomic  bomb in 
1960,137 formed  operational  Mirage squadrons in  1964, left  NATO’s integrated 
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command structure in  1966,138 and  detonated a thermonuclear  device (hydrogen 
bomb) in 1968,139 al under the General’s leadership, the Force De Dissuasion has its 
roots in the Fourth Republic, although again de Gaule was the initial driving force. 
The directive of de Gaule created the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in 
October  1945140 and it  was the  general’s intention to  modernize the  French  Armed 
Forces including the production of atomic weapons, an intention that was not shared 
by the politicians of the Republic and resulted in de Gaule’s resignation in January 
1946.141 Despite the intentions of de Gaule, the French atomic energy program in the 
late  1940s and early  1950s,  under the initial leadership  of the  Communist  Frederic 
Joliot-Curie,  was concerned solely  with  peaceful applications and  did  not seriously 
envisage the development of atomic weapons.142 This was in part a political issue and 
was a reflection of the political divisions in the French government at that time,143 but 
was also subject to a clear-eyed cost-benefit analysis.  France,  despite its role in the 
wartime  Manhatan  Project  was, like  Britain,  prevented from sharing  US advances 
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under Section Ten of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act,144 and French planners operated 
on the basis that France was under the protection of the US nuclear umbrela and so a 
French atomic bomb was both costly and superfluous.145 
 
The  body  of literature that  has  dealt  with the  French  nuclear  deterent  has 
identified the  period  1954-1957 as the  most significant,146 specificaly the  period in 
which the  French  government altered its  nuclear  weapons  policy and authorised a 
military dimension to the workings of the CEA.147 It is here that we find the influence 
of the  Suez  Crisis as  while the  CEA and  French  government  began to explore the 
development  of atomic  weapons  before  Suez, the crisis  played a similar role in the 
field of nuclear deterence that it did when it came to the Common Market, namely 
building on sentiments in France that the US was not a reliable aly where France’s 
interests  were concerned and so in  order to  maintain its ability to  pursue those 
interests,  France  had to alter its policies.  Colete  Barbier emphasised  1954 as the 
critical  year for  French atomic energy  policy and the role  played  by the  war in 
Indochina. French distrust and anxiety about the US dates back to the Second World 
War,  with the  Levant (Middle  East)  being an area  of  particular tension.  De  Gaule 
interpreted many Anglo-American actions in the region during and immediately after 
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the  war as evidence that the  Anglo-Saxons  were atempting to reduce  or eliminate 
French control and influence.148 
 
It  was Indochina though that  brought  home to  French  policymakers the 
dangers of relying on American support. Unlike in Lebanon where the view was that 
America sought to get France out of the region, or at least supplant it as the dominant 
western  power, in Indochina the  US  was  keen to  keep  France fighting against the 
Vietminh and opposed any sort of setlement that would leave a Communist regime in 
power.  This  view is  not  unchallenged. Kathryn  Statler in ‘Replacing  France:  The 
Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam’ presents a case for America seeking to 
supplant  France and  help to set  up a  pro-western regime in  South  Vietnam.149 
Irespective of which thesis is corect or more accurate, it was the batle of Dien Bien 
Phu that caused the greatest dificulty. France wanted, and in fact badly needed, active 
military support from the US for its garison at Dien Bien Phu, assistance that created 
problems for  Eisenhower’s administration,  which  ultimately refused to  use atomic 
weapons to support French troops.150 
 
                        
148 J. Fenby, The General (2010), p. 288; T. Smith, ‘The French Colonial Consensus and People’s War, 
1946-1958’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), p. 223. 
149 K. Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam (Lexington, 2007), 
pp. 1-6. 
150 G.C. Herring & R.H. Immerman, ‘Eisenhower, Dules and Dienbienphu: “The Day We Didn’t Go to 
War” Revisited’, The Journal of American History,  Vo.  71,  No.  2 (Sep.,  1984),  pp.  343-363; For the 
Franco-American and internal US discussions see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 
Vols. XII & XIII, Indochina. 
 232 
France saw the US refusal to actively support the garison at Dien Bien Phu as 
evidence that when French and American interests did not coincide, the US could not 
be relied upon. Throughout 1955 the government of Piere Mendès France steps were 
taken to  being the  development  of atomic  weapons. In  March  1955 a  National 
Defence  Commitee  memorandum concluded that the  decision should  be taken to 
launch  programmes for the construction  of  nuclear  weapons and  nuclear  powered 
submarines,151 and a substantial transfer of funds from the Armed Forces Ministry to 
the CEA was authorised.152 However, despite Mendès France and his oficials leaning 
towards atomic  weapons,  no formal  decision  was actualy  made,153 and  when  he 
became  Prime  Minister in  February  1956  Molet seemed to end any  prospect  of a 
French atomic  weapons  program. In  April  he told a coleague, ‘I  waged a  political 
campaign on three issues: peace in Algeria, tax reductions and nuclear disarmament. 
Today I am engaged in a war in Algeria, raising taxes to finance it, and now you want 
me to add an atom  bomb.’154 Molet’s  Socialist  Party  was  opposed to  nuclear 
weapons, and  he agreed  with Jean  Monnet in January  1956 that the  proposed 
European Atomic  Energy  Agency (EURATOM) should take  over al  European 
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nuclear  programs, and that  European states  must  discontinue  production  of atomic 
weapons.155 
 
Binyamin Pinkus stated that if 1955 was pivotal for laying the basis of French atomic 
weapons research, then 1956 was decisive for its continuation.156 This author takes a 
similar view as regards 1956 though he would accord more significance to Suez than 
to Indochina two years before. While the defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the refusal of 
the US to provide active military assistance to France engendered feelings of mistrust 
and resentment on the part of France, the fact that there was no definitive decision to 
develop nuclear weapons in 1954 or 1955 would suggest that such sentiments had not 
reached a critical mass.  French  historian  Georges-Henri  Soutou  wrote that in  1954 
and  1955  French considerations and interest in acquiring  nuclear  weapons  did  not 
actualy envisage a completely independent role for  France.  Rather, the  mid-‘fifties 
desire for atomic weapons was seen in the context of Europe, and the wider Atlantic 
Aliance, with French policymakers desiring a position of influence within them, not a 
position separate from them.157 It  was  Suez that changed this, even though  French 
oficials  began the  process  of  developing atomic arms,  without a formal  directive, 
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after the defeat in Indochina, Suez added to these impressions and amplified them to 
the point where a deterent was seen as a national necessity.158 
 
The reason that  Suez is accorded  more significance than Indochina  by this 
author lies in one crucial diference between the two events. At Suez, as at Dien Bien 
Phu,  France  had  been  humiliated and  developed feelings  of  mistrust towards and 
resentment of the United States for its lack of support. What made Suez so diferent 
was that instead  of the  US  merely  not seeming to support  France  on an issue  of 
national importance, the crisis created the impression in France that it could not even 
rely on the US to defend France if it were atacked. At the height of the Suez Crisis, 
Khrushchev and Bulganin threatened rocket atacks on London, Paris and Tel Aviv if 
the atack on Egypt did not cease.159 The threat was not credible, but while Eden was 
not alarmed  by it,160 Molet  was.  During  his  6  November  meeting  with  Adenauer, 
Molet discussed the Soviet leter and his belief that the US would not start a war if 
France and  Britain  were atacked.161 Adenauer agreed and  went as far as to say that 
America was responsible for the Suez Crisis. What comes out of this discussion is the 
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shared  Franco-German  belief that the  US  was  not a reliable aly, and seemed to  be 
wiling to  marginalise  or ignore  European concerns, even to the  point  of  directly 
negotiating with the Soviet Union, a point made by Wolf Mendl in 1970.162 
 
The majority163 of the works that have covered the French deterent accord to 
Suez an influence in the  development  of  oficial  French  policy  on atomic  weapons, 
although with a few notable exceptions this is very brief.164 Scheinman, Chopra and 
Mendl  go into  more  detail  where the crisis is concerned. It is  not this author’s 
intention to repeat the  points these authors  made,  but  particular  mention should  be 
given to the evidence provided by Scheinman and Mendl in support of their claims as 
to the importance  of  Suez.  Scheinman  quotes articles in the  French  media such as 
Carrefour and Juvenal in late November 1956 with the former quoted thus: 
 
The first lesson  of  Suez is that  only  possession  of the atomic  bomb confers 
power. If  France again  wishes to intervene in international competition in an 
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efective  manner,  her essential task is to establish  her strategic and tactical 
nuclear potential so as to weigh in the balance of the destiny of the world.165 
 
Scheinman and  Mendl  quote senior  French  political and  military figures such as 
Mouvement Républicain  Populaire (MRP) Senator  General Béthouart,  Marshal Juin 
(former commander  of  Headquarters  Alied  Forces  Central  Europe), and  Chief  of 
Staf General Ely. Juin asked ‘what should we think of French security?’ and claimed 
that France must not remain subject to one NATO member for the manufacture and 
deployment of nuclear weapons.166 On 30th November 1956 a protocol establishing an 
atomic military program was signed between the French Ministry of National Defence 
and the CEA.167 Suez was not the only factor, but the crisis had played a significant 
role in convincing  previously sceptical  French leaders such as  Molet that  nuclear 
weapons were now a national necessity.168 
 
Impact of the Deterrent on British Membership of the European 
Communities 
It was not until de Gaule returned to power in May 1958 that Anglo-French relations 
entered a period best characterised by the term ‘The Almost Impossible Aly’, the title 
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of  Peter  Mangold’s  work  on the relationship  between  Macmilan and de  Gaule.169 
The role of de Gaule has been examined already in this chapter from the perspective 
of the diferent views on British membership of the EEC. Nuclear weapons, particular 
the French desire to achieve parity with Britain, is the focus here. At the heart of de 
Gaule’s vision for France was its position at the centre of the western aliance, equal 
to Britain and given a voice alongside the Anglo-American aliance in the context of 
the Cold War.170 A credible French nuclear deterent was an integral part of this and 
while de Gaule was wiling and prepared for France to build a nuclear arsenal alone, 
he recognised that it would be easier and less expensive if France were to enjoy the 
technical and research cooperation of Britain and the US.171 
 
Although de Gaule and France’s nuclear aspirations constituted a problem for 
NATO and for Britain, Macmilan saw them as an opportunity. Macmilan, despite his 
initial  preoccupation  with restoring the  Special  Relationship, saw  British foreign 
policy as having a global dimension. He considered Britain’s position within the same 
framework as the Three Circles Policy in so far as Britain was an essential component 
of the  Anglo-American aliance,  Europe, and the  Commonwealth,  but rather than 
consider them as separate, linked solely  by  Britain,  he saw them as  one al 
                        
169 P.  Mangold, The  Almost Impossible  Aly:  Harold  Macmilan  and  Charles  De  Gaule (London, 
2006). 
170 C.A. Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem 1960-1963: A Troubled 
Partnership (London, 2000), pp. 3-4. 
171 HMD vol. II (13 Mar., 1960), pp. 277-280; J. Fenby, The General (2010), p. 455. 
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encompassing  western  or  Atlantic  Aliance.172 He recognised that  France and de 
Gaule would provide the biggest obstacle to Britain’s policies in Europe, initialy the 
Free  Trade  Area  negotiations  until  1958,  but  more significantly, the British  bid to 
associate with or join the EEC.173 Macmilan also saw de Gaule’s nuclear aspirations 
as something he could potentialy use in this endeavour, contemplating the exchange 
of  British assistance to the  French  nuclear  weapons  program for de  Gaule’s 
assistance, or at least non-opposition, to Britain in Europe.174 His ‘Grand Design’ of 
December 1960-January 1961 argued thus on de Gaule, Europe and nuclear weapons: 
 
His (De Gaule’s) determination – whatever the cost – that France should become 
a  nuclear  power.  For it is  France’s exclusion from the  nuclear club that is the 
measure  of  France’s inferior status…Can  what  we  want and  what  de  Gaule 
wants be brought into harmony? Is there a basis for a deal? Britain wants to join 
the  European concern;  France wants to join the  Anglo-American concern.  Can 
terms be aranged? Would de Gaule be ready to withdraw the French veto which 
alone  prevents the setlement  of  Europe’s economic  problem  {EEC/EFTA 
division} in return for politico-military arangements which he would accept as a 
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recognition  of  France as a first-class  world  power?  What  he  would  want is 
something on tripartitism and something on the nuclear. Are there ofers which 
we could aford to make? And could we persuade the Americans to agree?175 
 
Several of Macmilan’s diary entries in 1961 and 1962 raise similar points. His entry 
for 29th January 1961 briefly asks the question of whether America can be persuaded 
to accept France’s nuclear aspirations,176 and on 11th June 1961 Macmilan expounded 
at length about his discussion with President Kennedy about the later’s talks with De 
Gaule, noting both the American refusal to provide technical assistance or weapons 
to France, and the stark reality that ofering such in exchange for French support in 
Europe, was a non-starter as de Gaule would take but give nothing in return.177 On 8th 
May  President  Kennedy  had already writen to the  Prime  Minister to the efect that 
the  US could  not assist the  development  of the  French  deterent, fearing the impact 
this might have on Germany.178 The files in the UK National Archives confirm that de 
Gaule’s nuclear ambitions and Europe was a subject of discussion on two occasions 
between the  General and  Macmilan in  1961179 and  1962.180 Moreover, the 
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preparatory  documents,  notes and  memoranda  demonstrate the importance  of the 
issue, and, given the dificulties presented by the terms of the 1958 Mutual Defence 
Agreement regarding Anglo-American nuclear colaboration, the need for Macmilan 
to tread a very careful line.181 
 
In the event, American opposition to the idea of sharing nuclear secrets with 
France  meant that  Macmilan could  not  ofer de  Gaule the sort  of cooperation  he 
wanted, and that Macmilan hoped would result in the French at least not preventing, 
if  not actively supporting,  British  membership  of the  EEC.182 The fact that  Britain’s 
relationship  with the  US  prevented it from coming to a satisfactory accord  with 
France  was  not lost  on de  Gaule.  He already felt that  Britain  was  more concerned 
with the Americans than  with  France and Europe and this  was to  have serious 
consequences for the EEC bid. In December 1962 Macmilan successfuly persuaded 
President  Kennedy to agree to sel the  Polaris  nuclear  missile system to  Britain.183 
While this  was a  victory for the  Prime  Minister, the agreement served  only to 
reinforce de  Gaule’s fears that  Britain sought entry to the  Common  Market as an 
American  Trojan  Horse, and  provided the  pretext for  his  veto  of the  bid in January 
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1963.184 De Gaule cited Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth as providing 
too many dificulties for entry into the EEC, but historical and contemporary opinion 
has seen Nassau as a deciding factor, while recognising that de Gaule was probably 
going to  veto the  bid anyway.185 Moreover,  on several  occasions  between  1963 and 
1966 the  General  made repeated references to  Nassau and  Polaris.  An article 
published in the Times on November 27th 1967, coincidentaly the same day de Gaule 
ended the  Wilson  bid, colated  many  of the  General’s comments about  Britain 
including: 
 
Macmilan had crossed the Atlantic to throw himself into the arms of Kennedy to 
whom  he sold  his  birthright in exchange for a  dish  of  Polaris…Let  us always 
recal this  obvious truth.  The  Common  Market cannot remain the  Common 
Market and at the same time absorb Great  Britain and  her clients.  The  British 
would only enter in order to break up the machine.186 
 
The  Suez  Crisis  heightened  French feelings  of resentment and  mistrust towards the 
United States, and provided the event that took the Fourth Republic from an intention 
to produce nuclear weapons but lacking the oficial decision to do so, to one that saw 
the  possession  of a  nuclear  weapon as the  only  way that  France could  maintain an 
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independent role in the  world.  Lacking atomic  weapons  France  would always  be 
vulnerable to  nuclear  blackmail and so they  became a  national  necessity.  This  had 
consequences for France and its relationships with Britain and the United States, and 
on Britain’s relationship with Europe. Macmilan felt that a deal involving British and 
or American aid to the  French  nuclear  programme could  be  ofered to de  Gaule in 
exchange for French assistance on European maters such as the EEC bid. Ultimately, 
however, such a deal was not possible and the most significant impact of the French 
nuclear program was that Britain’s decision to purchase an American missile system, 
rather than colaborate with France, gave de Gaule the excuse he needed to end the 
negotiations and prevent Britain from joining the Common Market. 
 
Conclusion 
The  Suez  Crisis  had as  profound an impact  on  France as it  did  on the  United 
Kingdom, and the  way in  which  France responded to the events  of  November  1956 
afected, in turn, the  development  of  Anglo-European relations.  This chapter  has 
focused on three areas where Suez had a significant impact on France and on French 
policy: the  Common  Market,  Algeria and the return  of de  Gaule, and the 
development of the French nuclear deterent. A common thread between the first and 
third areas considered here is the dual feelings of humiliation and betrayal on the part 
of France as a result of the crisis. Humiliated by having to withdraw and cede control 
of the  Suez  Canal, and feeling betrayed at the  hands  of the  United  States, and to a 
lesser extent  Britain, it was these feelings that  prompted  French leaders to rethink 
their policy on the Common Market, going from a position of scepticism or outright 
hostility, to concluding that  Europe  ofered  France the  best  option for  playing a 
leadership role. By leading Europe, France would maintain its status as a great power. 
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The  French  nuclear  deterent  was similarly  motivated.  Although  France  had  been 
developing atomic energy from the late 1940s, and had been strongly contemplating 
atomic  weapons after the  defeat at  Dien  Bien  Phu, the  Suez  Crisis,  particularly the 
threat of atack by Russia and the perception that America would not defend France, 
caused several  French  political and  military figures to conclude that  only  by 
possessing a  nuclear  weapon could  France ensure that it could  defend its vital 
interests. It provided the final impetus needed to take a formal decision to develop an 
atomic bomb. 
 
The  French  decision to sign the  Treaties  of  Rome, and thus create  what 
became the  EEC, removed a  basic  British  premise that  had  dominated its sceptical 
atitude towards the  Messina  Conference and  Spaak  Commitee in  1955 and  1956, 
namely that the creation of a Common Market was unlikely due to French opposition 
to supranational integration. France had rejected the European Defence Community in 
August  1954 and British  political leaders such as  Harold  Macmilan,  Anthony  Eden 
and Rab Butler assumed that the same French opposition to military supranationalism 
would extend to  politics and economics and so  destroy any  prospect  of the  Six 
creating a customs union. By developing the Common Market, France forced Britain 
to confront the possibility of a European grouping coming into existence that Britain 
felt it could not join, but would threaten its economic and trading interests within and 
outside  of  Europe, and,  perhaps more significantly, threaten its privileged  position 
with the United States. British policy was initialy hostile to the Common Market and 
moves were made to, if not destroy it, then subsume it within a wider industrial free 
trade area. By 1959/1960 this had evolved into a reluctant acceptance that Common 
Market would continue and so British policy was reoriented towards finding ways that 
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Britain could deal with the Six, leading ultimately to the first membership application 
in 1961/1962. 
 
The  Suez  Crisis  played a significant role in the  Algerian  uprising.  France 
considered  Suez to  be  part  of this conflict  with the  FLN rebels and, as  Nasser  was 
seen to  be encouraging the rebels, to say  nothing  of arming them, removing  Nasser 
from power was an integral part of maintaining control of Algeria. The Franco-British 
operation in Egypt failed and in so doing made Nasser even more of a pan-Arab hero 
than  he  had  been  before, and increased resentment  of  France  within its colony. In 
addition, the French army, which had been compeled to withdraw from a conflict it 
considered  winnable, felt a  keen sense  of  humiliation and resentment against the 
politicians and the structure of the Fourth Republic. As the Algerian crisis worsened 
and  had an increasingly  negative efect on the  political stability  of the  Fourth 
Republic, the army in Algeria began the process of launching a coup d’etat that was 
only forestaled  by the return to  power  of  General de  Gaule.  De  Gaule  had a 
particular vision of and for France and Europe, and despite having a broadly similar 
view to Britain regarding federalism, and prefering a confederal approach to a federal 
one, he was opposed to Britain being a member of the Common Market. De Gaule 
was not an Anglophobe but he harboured longstanding mistrust of Britain, viewing its 
intentions in Europe as motivated by a desire to create the wider Atlantic Community 
that he wished to avoid, on the grounds that it would lead to American domination of 
Europe. He felt that Britain, as the leader of the Commonwealth, was not compatible 
with the economic aspects  of the  Common  Market (not  without some justification) 
and saw its EEC entry bid as it acting as an American Trojan horse. 
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Linked to the wider impact of the return of de Gaule is the development of the 
French deterent. France’s desire to acquire atomic, and later thermonuclear weapons 
brought in a new element to Anglo-French discussions on Europe. Macmilan saw a 
possibility for a quid  pro  quo deal  with de  Gaule,  ofering  British, and  possibly 
American assistance to France’s atomic weapons program in exchange for de Gaule’s 
help with first of al the free trade area negotiations, and later the EEC bid. American 
opposition made this impossible, and to make maters worse, Macmilan’s agreement 
with  President  Kennedy at  Nassau provided further evidence for de  Gaule’s 
suspicions  of  British  motives in applying for  EEC  membership.  Nassau  gave de 
Gaule the  pretext he  needed to  veto the  British  bid, and  while  he cited  Britain’s 
Commonwealth links as the reason for this, nuclear weapons have long been seen as 
the reason for the timing of the veto, even if not for the decision to veto in the first 
place. Ultimately this is perhaps the tragedy of the Suez Crisis for Britain, in that it 
had done so much to change British policy on European integration to the point that it 
applied for EEC membership only five years after rejecting that option, and yet at the 




Chapter VI: Edward Heath, The Suez Crisis and 




We in Britain are not going to turn our backs on the mainland of Europe or on 
the countries  of the  Community.  We are  part  of  Europe;  by  geography, 
tradition,  history, culture and civilisation.  We shal continue to  work  with al 




Edward  Heath, the author  of the above quotation, is  not among the  more celebrated 
figures to have been Prime Minister since the Second World War. David Starkey has 
labeled  him the  worst  Prime  Minister in  British  history, along  with  Lord  North.2 A 
search of the Bodleian catalogue reveals only twenty-two books about him compared 
to more than 150 each for Tony Blair and Margaret Thatcher, and more than 1000 for 
Churchil.3 Heath has enjoyed  neither the longevity, nor indeed the controversy, of 
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Thatcher and Blair; Macmilan’s reputation as a statesman; or an accession to power 
accompanied by a wave of popular enthusiasm, as enjoyed by Wilson. It this author’s 
contention  however that  Heath  had an impact that  was arguably as significant to 
Britain as Thatcher’s monetarist policies, Macmilan’s ‘Winds of Change’ or Atlee’s 
nationalisation.  An impact that is the  basis  of  one  of the enduring  debates and 
controversies  of  modern  British  politics:  Heath as  Prime  Minister took the  United 
Kingdom into what is now the European Union forty years ago at the time of writing.4 
 
While Heath remains a former Prime Minister with a deserved reputation for 
having strong  pro-European sentiments,  what is  not so  wel  known  outside the 
academic community is that in 1963 he was the Lord Privy Seal and head of the team 
that made the first bid to enter the European Communities.5 Stil less wel known is 
that six years before de Gaule vetoed the first bid, Heath was the Government Chief 
Whip at a time  when, although he  was wel  known  within  Westminster, he was a 
virtual unknown outside. It was during this time, at the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956 
and early 1957, that Heath made his name and catapulted himself from obscurity to 
nationwide recognition as the man who held together a government split both by the 
decision to go to war with Egypt over the Suez Canal and the subsequent decision to 
withdraw from that conflict under heavy American pressure. On 3 February 1957 The 
                        
4 htp:/europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1970-1979/index_en.htm  Accessed  22  March  2013;  L.  Heren, 
‘The Times: Meeting Chalenge of New Frontier’, The Times (01 Jan., 1973). 
5 Although it is more common to refer to the European Economic Community (EEC) in this context, 
Britain was technicaly negotiating accession to the Treaties of Rome, which created two bodies, the 
EEC and the European Atomic Energy Commitee (EURATOM) to add to the pre-existing European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
 248 
Sunday Times featured him in a smal article in which he was described as ‘one of the 
finest Chief Whips of the century’.6 The article went on to state that he ‘is one of his 
party’s  men  of the future…he has the  qualities  of  personality and  oratory  of  which 
great  parliamentarians are  made’.7 More controversialy,  Heath, in  his capacity as 
Chief  Whip,  was intimately involved in the leadership contest that folowed  Eden’s 
resignation.  His conduct  has  been the subject  of some  debate and controversy 
amongst  his  biographers,  with some claiming  he  was  not as  detached as  he  himself 
suggested. Macmilan’s post-election celebrations with Heath have been interpreted as 
him repaying Heath for his help.8 
 
This author contends that through the elevation of Heath, the Suez Crisis had 
perhaps its greatest single impact on the nature of Anglo-European Relations, and it 
this chapter’s express purpose to examine this contention, as wel as establishing its 
authenticity. In order to accomplish this, it wil examine the role Heath played in the 
Suez  Crisis, how it contributed to  his entry into the  upper echelons  of  government, 
and, ultimately, the impact this had on British policy towards membership of the EEC. 
The  most immediate impact of  Suez in this context  was that on  Heath himself.  The 
crisis aforded  him an  opportunity that  he  grasped  with  both  hands. At its  onset  he 
was wel respected within Westminster, but virtualy unknown outside of it.9 By the 
time  Macmilan succeeded Eden in January  1957 the  media  was  beginning to take 
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note  of  Heath, and  his influence  within the  Government.10 Alone among  post-war 
Chief Whips he rose to become Prime Minister, a remarkable achievement if set in its 
proper context: there have been only three other Conservatives, and one Labour Chief 
Whip, who have atained one of the Great Ofices of State.11 This chapter wil explore 
the position of Chief Whip, the reasons why its holders have not risen to the highest 
points of government, and what made Heath unique in having been the one to do so. 
 
In the longer term, Heath’s handling  of the  unsuccessful  1961-1963 
negotiations was widely praised, and he developed the reputation outside of Britain, 
especialy within  European capitals, as a  pro-European, and someone  who  was 
determined to  bring  Britain into the  EEC as soon as  possible.  He  was awarded the 
Charlemagne  Prize in  1963, the European  Prize for  Statesmanship in  1972 and, in 
Opposition, despite  personal and  political  misgivings, supported  Harold  Wilson’s 
abortive atempt to enter the EEC. Upon winning the 1970 General Election, he was 
able to successfuly dispel French fears of British membership and after discussions 
with  Pompidou, signed the  Treaty  of  Rome  on  Britain’s  behalf.12 This last  was 
perhaps the most significant event in the history of Anglo-European relations after the 
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Second  World  War, and  one that  owed its  beginnings to the  Suez  Crisis, for Suez 
made Ted Heath.13 
 
Unfortunately, at the time  of  writing, the  Heath  papers  deposited in the 
Bodleian  Library in  2011  have  not  yet  been catalogued and are, therefore, 
unavailable. In addition the  oficial  papers from  his time as  Chief  Whip  have  been 
added to the colection and are similarly unavailable. This chapter wil stil, however, 
make extensive use of primary source material. This wil be in manuscript form from 
the  National  Archives, include  Heath’s  own autobiography, and also  draw  on 
contemporary  magazine and  newspaper articles. In addition, secondary source 
material,  predominately (but  not exclusively) existing  biographies  of  Heath,  wil  be 
utilised along  with  other scholarly contributions that  deal  with a specific area  of 
interest. These wil include research evidence from fields including Anglo-European 
relations,  Anglo-American relations,  works  dedicated to the  Chief  Whip, and the 
structure of Westminster politics itself, the pinnacle of which, Heath, unusualy for a 
Chief Whip, reached in 1970. 
 
Heath During the Suez Crisis 
Ted  Heath  was first elected to  Parliament in  1950 as  M.P. for  Bexley with a  very 
narow majority of 133 over the Labour incumbent. Bexley was a relatively new seat, 
created in  1945, and  had  been captured that  year  by the  Labour  Party.14 The  new 
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Member was, along with Iain Macleod, Robert Car and Enoch Powel, among others, 
one of the founders of the ‘One Nation Group’.15 Men who had been newly elected in 
the  1950  General  Election founded ‘One  Nation’ to represent themselves and their 
contemporaries. This intake, according to one historian, was ‘considered symbolic of 
a widening of the Parliamentary Party’s demography, with the arival of a new wave 
of modern, professional, business-minded, and often lower-middle-class MPs’16 Class 
notwithstanding, these  men  were  modernisers  by inclination  who felt that  Disraeli’s 
One  Nation  Conservatism,  was the right  path for the  party to  go  down.  There is a 
certain degree of mythology at work where One Nation is concerned. It is based on 
what  David  Seawright  describes as ‘mythical  origins’, specificaly that  Disraeli  was 
the first of a succesion of leaders who sought to bridge the divide between rich and 
poor, and create one unified nation. In policy terms this meant pursuing a programme 
designed to ameliorate the economic situation of those social groups not traditionaly 
associated  with the Conservatives.  This could include  pursuing ful employment, 
afordable housing, the new (in 1950) National Health Service and free education.17 
Stil, as  Seawright  has  pointed  out,  while  Disraeli  did, in  his speeches, refer to the 
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need to improve the condition of the multitude, he added the qualification that doing 
so  must  not  violate ‘those economic  principles  of economic truth  upon  which 
prosperity of states depends.18 
 
Foundation  myths aside,  One  Nation  quickly came to the atention  of the 
Conservative Party leadership.19 Heath was not to remain a member for long however 
as, soon after he gave his maiden speech in Parliament he was ofered a position in 
the  Whips’  Ofice as an  unpaid Junior  Whip.20 His  maiden speech  has atracted 
scholarly atention, and rightly so, for it is one of the indicators that his pro-European 
sentiments  were  wel  developed  by the time  he entered  Parliament. It  has also  been 
cited as a factor in his promotion.21 Initialy as an unpaid Junior Whip, Heath moved 
up through the ranks to Deputy Chief Whip in 1952, until in 1955 Eden appointed him 
as  Chief  Whip, a  position  he  held  when  Nasser  nationalised the  Suez  Canal.  Eden, 
who regarded  him as  being  patient, adroit and  dependable, later commented that  he 
had never known a beter equipped Chief Whip.22 
 
Heath was, along with Selwyn Lloyd, R.A. Butler and Harold Macmilan, one 
of the  only  men  made aware  of the ful content and  nature  of the  Protocols  of 
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Sèvres.23 Heath later claimed that  he counseled  Eden against  military action in 
colusion with Israel on the grounds that he risked spliting the country, and that few 
people  would  believe  his account.24 Eden  did  not  dispute this assessment,  but 
maintained  his  opposition to alowing  Nasser’s action against  British and  French 
interests to  go  unopposed.25 Heath’s  biographers  have suggested  he  was  personaly 
opposed to the action taken over Suez but that, in line with his job as a Whip, he never 
expressed his view publicly.26 Norman Brook, then Cabinet Secretary, included Heath 
in a list  of  Cabinet members  who  would likely express a  preference for al  means 
short of military action to be exhausted before the government resorted to violence.27 
Heath  himself claimed to  have  been, along  with  20-30  other  Conservative  MPs, 
opposed to military action over Suez but cited his duties as a Whip as the reason both 
for his lack of public statements, and, more importantly for not resigning: 
 
The Chief Whip’s relationship with the Prime Minister is a special and personal 
one. He owes complete loyalty to the Prime Minister who is entitled to count on 
                        
23 T. Renton, Chief Whip: People, Power and Patronage in Westminster (London, 2004), p. 283. 
24 For the press see: G. Parmentier, ‘The British Press in the Suez Crisis’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 
23, No.  2 (June  1980),  pp.  435-448;  R.  Negrine, ‘The  Press and the  Suez  Crisis:  A  Myth  Re-
Examined’, The Historical Journal,  Vol.  25, No.  4 (December  1982),  pp.  975-983: H.  Thomas, The 
Suez Afair (London, 1966). 
25 E. Heath, My Life (1998), pp. 169-170. 
26 J. Campbel, Heath (1993), p. 93. 
27 TNA PREM 11/1152, ‘Brook to Eden’, 25 Aug. 1956; H.J. Dooley, ‘Great Britain’s ‘Last Batle’ in 
the Middle East: Notes on Cabinet Planing During the Suez Crisis of 1956’, The International History 
Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1989), p. 500; K. Kyle, ‘Brook: Cabinet Secretary’, in S. Kely & A. 
Gorst (Editors), Whitehal and the Suez Crisis (Oxford, 2000), pp. 69-70. 
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it. Any doubts or reservations should be expressed completely privately, one to 
one – which I  did…For a  Chief  Whip to resign,  particularly  during a  national 
crisis such as  Suez,  would  be an act  not  only  of  uter  disloyalty,  but  of  wilful 
destruction.28  
 
It is Heath’s actions in his capacity as Chief Whip that are the most important here. 
As  he  predicted the country, the  House  of  Commons and  more significantly the 
government itself  was split  over  Suez.29 A significant  group  of  Suez rebels,  mostly 
members of the right-wing Suez Group,30 were opposed to the government’s decision 
to  withdraw  under  American  pressure and their  numbers  were a concern to the 
government prior to a vote on November 8th. Heath managed to limit that rebelion to 
six abstentions and a subsequent one on December 6th to fifteen from the initial 86.31 
Heath’s reputation soared as a result of his handling of the Suez Crisis. Lord Kilmuir 
said of him: 
                        
28 E. Heath, My Life (1998), p. 171. 
29 For a ful account of the split over Suez see: R. Braddon, Suez: The Spliting of a Nation (Michigan, 
1973); E. Heath, My Life (1998), p. 173. 
30 For an account  of the  history  of the  Suez  Group see:  S.  Onslow, Backbench  Debate  within the 
Conservative  Party  and its Influence  on  British  Foreign  Policy  1948-1957 (Basingstoke,  1997);  S. 
Onslow, ‘Batlelines for  Suez:  The  Abadan  Crisis  of  1951 and the  Formation  of the  Suez  Group’, 
Contemporary British History, Vol. 17 No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 1-28; L. Epstein, British Politics in 
the Suez Crisis (London, 1964); L. Epstein, ‘Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties’, The American 
Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  50, No.  2 (June  1956),  p.  338; J.  Amery, ‘The  Suez  Group:  A 
Retrospective on Suez’, in S. Iian & M. Shemesh (eds), The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and 
Reappraisal (London, 1990), pp. 84-95. 
31 J. Campbel, Heath (1993), pp. 95-96. 
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Had it not been for the quiet skil with which Edward Heath and his coleagues 
in the Whips’ Ofice handled the Parliamentary Party throughout the crisis, the 
situation might wel have become desperate. It was the sort of situation where 
only the most tender handling was possible…while never showing weakness or 
forgeting  his responsibilities to the  Government,  Heath calmly and  gently 
shepherded the party throughout a crisis which might have broken it.32 
 
It was not just his Cabinet coleagues who were fulsome in their praise of Heath over 
his handling of the Whips’ Ofice during the crisis. The Sunday Times wrote that the 
generalship  of  Heath  was superb and that  he  never lost command  of the situation.33 
The Economist took a  more sarcastic line in refering to a triumvirate consisting  of 
Macmilan,  Butler and  Heath running the  government in  Eden’s absence,  but 
nevertheless noted the contribution he made.34 
 
That Heath made an enormous contribution to the survival of the Conservative 
Government at the end of the Suez Crisis is not disputed. There is, on the other hand, 
something  of a controversy surounding  his role in the leadership election that 
folowed the subsequent resignation of Anthony Eden. There is no suggestion that he 
in any way precipitated Eden’s departure. Eden may wel have consulted him as to his 
position but there is no record to support this and Heath’s own memoirs ofer nothing 
                        
32 Earl of Kilmuir, Political Adventure: The Memoirs of the Earl of Kilmuir (London, 1967), p. 168. 
33 A Student of Politics, ‘The Ranks Unbroken’, Sunday Times (11 Nov., 1956), p. 9. 
34 ‘Keeping the Tories Tame’, The Economist (01 December 1956), p. 763. 
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beyond claiming that  he  had  hoped  Eden  would  not  have to resign.35 Heath, in  his 
autobiography, claimed that Julian  Amery (a  prominent  member  of the  Suez  Group 
and son of felow Conservative MP Leo Amery) ofered the party the support of the 
Suez Group if Heath would bring about Eden’s removal from ofice. This exchange 
reportedly ended, according to Heath, with the later teling Amory to go to hel and 
then returning to dinner.36 
 
Heath claimed in  1998 that  his sole contribution to the leadership contest 
between Macmilan and Butler was to speak to backbenchers before presenting their 
opinions to the party hierarchy and the Palace, trying to maintain a balance between 
the two candidates.37 Margaret  Laing’s  view  was that  he  was sure already that 
Macmilan would win and that while he was loyal and obedient to Eden, he never felt 
the ease  of relationship that  he later enjoyed  with  Macmilan.38 Andrew  Roth,  by 
contrast, does not outright accuse Heath of campaigning actively for Macmilan, but 
the  way in  which  he  phrases  his account  of  Heath’s report  on  backbench  opinion, 
stating that having kiled Butler’s chances, Heath then went to tel him the outcome, 
does suggest that  he is less convinced  of  his impartiality.39 Heath is subsequently 
labeled ‘Macmilan’s  man’ (by  Roth), a state  of afairs  dating  back to the  1930s at 
Baliol Colege and an Oxford by-election against Quentin Hogg. 
 
                        
35 E. Heath, My Life (1998), p. 178. 
36 T. Renton, Chief Whip (2004), pp. 284-285. 
37 E. Heath, Course of My Life (1998) pp. 176-178. 
38 M. Laing, Heath (1972), p. 117. 
39 A. Roth, Heath (1972), p. 113. 
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Tim  Renton,  notable for  having served as  Margaret  Thatcher’s  Chief  Whip, 
again stops short of accusing Heath of helping Macmilan in an ‘undue’ manner, but 
as with Roth, his account of Heath ensuring that Macmilan spoke after Butler at the 
pre-Christmas  meeting  of the  1922  Commitee (despite  Butler as acting leader 
theoreticaly having that prerogative) does  have  undertones  of scepticism  where 
Heath’s impartiality is concerned.40 It should be pointed out though that as Butler and 
Macmilan were candidates for the leadership of the Conservative Party, and hence at 
the time,  Prime  Minister,  Heath  would  have laid  himself  open to charges  of 
favouritism whether he had alowed Macmilan to speak or not. Only alowing Butler 
to speak in  his capacity as acting leader  may  have  been the  proper form,  but  had 
Butler chosen to  do so,  he could  have  used the  occasion to  promote  his  own 
candidature. In this situation,  not alowing  Macmilan to speak could  have  been 
interpreted as  giving  Butler an  unfair advantage, a factor that  Heath insists  he took 
into account.41 
 
Aside from the contest itself, there is also the enduring  problem  of 
Macmilan’s victory celebration. Macmilan, instead of partaking in the high thinking 
and quiet, which he stated would have been the mark of a Butler victory,42 went for 
champagne and oysters at the Turf Club, took Heath with him, and was photographed 
celebrating by the press. This was a source of annoyance to Macmilan, as it appeared 
that  he  was repaying  Heath for ensuring  his  victory  over  his rival. Campbel 
interpreted the  dinner as a  perfectly  natural  move  by a  new  Prime  Minister, 
                        
40 T. Renton, Chief Whip (2004), p. 286. 
41 D.R. Thorpe, Supermac (2011), p. 371; E. Heath, Course of My Life (1998), p. 176. 
42 A. Horne, Macmilan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Oficial Biography (Basingstoke, 1988), p. 5. 
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recognising  where  power lay  within the  Parliamentary  Party, and  beginning the 
business  of  government  by  discussing  maters  with  his  Chief  Whip.43 Horne as 
Macmilan’s  oficial  biographer  merely refered to the celebration, but  made  no 
mention  of  Heath’s role in the leadership contest.  Turner and  Sampson limited 
themselves to  describing  Heath  poling the  backbenchers and  being informed that a 
significant majority were against Butler – with no such feeling against Macmilan – 
and that  on the  basis  of this information  Heath advised  Macmilan as the  beter 
choice.44 
 
Irespective  of  whether  Heath  went  beyond  his remit in the  1957 leadership 
contest, it is certainly fair to say that  he  was  one  of the few  members  of the 
Conservative  government to come  out  of the  Suez  Crisis  with  his reputation 
enhanced. He was credited with holding the party together, an undertaking that seems 
almost impossible even today when one considers the extreme polarisation of opinion 
in the Parliamentary Conservative Party. What is also a reasonable assessment is that 
his position as Chief Whip and his reputation within the government was such that it 
would have been foolish of the new Prime Minister to ignore him once he had taken 
ofice. 
                        
43 J. Campbel, Heath (1993), pp. 97-98. 
44 A.  Sampson, Macmilan:  A  Study in  Ambiguity (Middlesex,  1967),  p.  127;  A.  Horne, Macmilan 
(1989), p. 5; J. Turner, Macmilan (1994). 
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Suez Made Ted Heath 
It has long been a mark of British politics that Chief Whips rarely rise to significant 
Cabinet roles.45 Berlinski,  Dewan and  Dowding’s  2007 study  on  Ministerial tenure 
between 1945 and 1997 said of Whips that, while a successful period of time as Whip 
can enhance future career prospects, being successful as a Whip was not thought to be 
an important indicator of someone’s suitability for ministerial ofice.46 Since the end 
of the  Second  World  War in  May  1945  only four  of the fifteen  Conservative  Chief 
Whips, including Heath, have gone on to hold one of the Great Ofices of State, and a 
further six  held lower ranking  Cabinet  posts.47 Wiliam  Whitelaw  was  Home 
                        
45 ‘Do  Government  Chief Whips  Have an  Afterlife?’  htp:/notspolitics.org/2012/10/22/do-
government-chief-whips-have-an-afterlife-2/ Accessed 1 March 2013. 
46 S. Berlinski, T. Dewan & K. Dowding, ‘The Length of Ministerial Tenure in the United Kingdom, 
1945-97’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April 2007), p. 259. 
47 Although there is no formal ranking of seniority in the Cabinet, the Great Offices of State are seen as 
ranking only below the Prime Minister, and, by convention the choice of the Prime Minister indicates 
an informal hierarchy whereby a post can be considered high in rank in one administration, but rather 
low in another.  See:  Cabinet  Seniority  February  2013.  htp:/www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-
offices/government-and-opposition1/her-majestys-government/ Accessed 24 February 2013; M. Burch, 
‘The British Cabinet: A Residual Executive’, Parliamentary Afairs, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1988), p. 38; G. 
Owen, ‘Ministry of Defence is the biggest winner in Cameron’s Cabinet power shake-up’, Daily Mail 
(30 May., 2010); G. Owen, ‘21st out of 23: Defence Secretary’s Cabinet rank is the lowest in history 
prompting Armed Forces anger’, Daily Mail (4 Jul., 2009). 
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Secretary for four years under Margaret Thatcher,48 while Francis Pym, his successor 
as  Chief  Whip,  had a two-year stint as  Secretary  of  State for  Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs. An unfortunate comment on Question Time and his record as 
an economic and social “wet” saw him dismissed by Thatcher after the 1983 General 
Election.49 David  Waddington later  became  Home  Secretary,  Thatcher’s last  before 
she resigned in November 1990, before moving to the House of Lords.50 
 
For the  Labour  Party the situation is  broadly similar.  While  Geof  Hoon and  Nick 
Brown  both served as  Chief  Whip and  held  positions  of  varying seniority in the 
Cabinet, both did so before becoming Chief Whip. Only Jacqui Smith served a stint in 
the later ofice before spending two years as Home Secretary, resigning as a result of 
the expenses scandal in 2009.51 Ted Heath is the only Chief Whip of either party to 
have subsequently  been  Prime  Minister. John  Major spent two  years in the  Whips’ 
Ofice  before serving in the  Cabinet,  notably as  Chancelor, and then succeeding 
                        
48 M. Garnet, ‘Whitelaw, Wiliam Stephen Ian, Viscount Whitelaw (1918-1999), Oxford Dictionary of 
National  Biography (Oxford  University  Press,  2004),  htp:/www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/72564 
Accessed  21  February  2013;  P.  Cosgrave, ‘Obituary:  Viscount  Whitelaw’, The Independent (2 July 
1999). 
49 D.  Hurd, ‘Pym,  Francis  Leslie,  Baron  Pym (1922-2008), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford University Press, January 2012), htp:/www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/100102 Accessed 21 
February 2013; A. Roth, ‘Obituary: Francis Pym’, The Guardian (8 March 2008). 
50  Waddington.  D, Who’s  Who  2013 (Oxford,  2013),  Online  Edition, 
htp:/www.ukwhoswho.com/view/article/oupww/whoswho/U38414/WADDINGTON?index=1&result
s=QuicksearchResults&query=0 Accessed 1 March 2013; D. Waddington, Memoirs: Dispatches from 
Thatcher’s Last Home Secretary (London, 2012). 
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Margaret  Thatcher as  Prime  Minister,  but  he  was  never the  Chief  Whip, and, 
compared to Heath’s eight years as a Whip, his two year tenure was markedly brief.52 
 
Why then  do so few  Chief  Whips  progress  on to the  upper echelons  of the 
British government, and what made Ted Heath so diferent? A popular idea is that the 
Chief  Whip’s role inevitably results in  making enemies  on the  backbenches and 
occasionaly amongst the more prominent MPs in ministerial positions.53 Indeed, the 
Chief Whip is supposed to be concerned solely with the stability of the government 
and the loyalty of its members, and is thus theoreticaly immune from more personal 
considerations.54 Heath  himself is  known to  have  made enemies  during  his  years in 
the  Whips  Ofice,  most  notably  Airey  Neave, the escapee from  Colditz  Castle  who 
later managed Margaret Thatcher’s campaign against Heath for the leadership of the 
Conservative  Party in  1975.55 In addition to this, convention forbids a  Whip from 
speaking in the House and thus, they rarely come to the atention of the media and the 
wider  public.56 Moreover, the role also  prevents them from  gaining experience in 
                        
52 A. Seldon, John Major: A Political Life (London, 1997); J. Major, John Major: The Autobiography 
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53 P. Ziegler, Heath (2010), pp. 92-93. 
54 D.  Searing  &  C.  Game, ‘Horses for  Courses:  The  Recruitment  of  Whips in the  British  House  of 
Commons’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July, 1977), p. 361. 
55 P. Ziegler, Edward Heath (London, 2010), pp. 92-93. 
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particular  policy areas so they consequently lack  both the exposure and the  policy 
specialisation of other members.57 
 
This is certainly a factor where Heath was concerned. He accepted the ofer to 
become a  Whip in  1951 despite  being concerned that the rules  governing the 
discharge  of the  ofice  would  prevent  him speaking in the  House,  gaining  policy 
experience and honing his debating skils.58 He was also aware that few Whips held 
high Cabinet ofice and none had, up to that point, gone to become Prime Minister.59 
It is clear that his misgivings were wel founded: by late 1956 and the end of the Suez 
Crisis he was respected in Westminster but unknown outside it.60 Suez changed this 
for Heath and its biggest impact upon him was that it brought to the atention of the 
press and the  wider  public.  Politicians and journalists commented  not  only  on  his 
handling of the crisis in parliament, but also the extent to which he was becoming a 
more familiar figure.61 He  was seen  by some as not  only  having  held the  party 
together at a time  of  great  dificulty, and  with two antagonistic  groups  of  MPs to 
control,  but  of  having contributed to the  overal leadership  of the  government in 
Eden’s absence. The former can be contrasted with the 2013 EU Budget vote where, 
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59 E. Heath, Course of My Life (1998), p. 163. 
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despite a  majority, the  Government  was  defeated,62 and the July  1993  debate  on the 
Social  Chapter  of the  Treaty  of  Maastricht, the  day after  which John  Major’s 
government narowly won a motion of confidence.63 
 
The second characteristic of  being a  Chief  Whip, and  one that  perhaps 
explains why so few have risen to the top of government, is that it is seen as requiring 
skils  more  pertinent to a  middle  manager than a leader. In the early  1950s, the 
Conservative Party drew its Whips from among Members with middle-class and staf 
oficer based military backgrounds. Heath was typical of this. The job was seen as a 
sergeant’s route to advancement, that  of a functionary.64 Macmilan,  despite  his 
afection and respect for Heath, commented that he had been an excelent Chief Whip, 
a first class staf oficer, but, crucialy, no army commander.65 The relevance of this 
statement can  be  questioned, although  Heath’s  generaly  negative reputation in 
Downing Street would suggest that Macmilan might have had a point.66 
 
Before turning the focus of this chapter to Heath’s impact on Anglo-European 
relations  we should conclude  by  making clear  once  more the fact that  Suez  gave 
Heath an opportunity that he grasped with both hands. The crisis was so damaging to 
the party that Macmilan warned the Queen that he could not guarantee the survival of 
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64 J. Campbel, Heath (1993), p. 103. 
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his government beyond six weeks.67 Heath gained a public reputation for competence 
and loyalty and  was seen as  one  of the  most  powerful and influential  men in the 
government. His biographer John Campbel stated in 1993 that Suez made Ted Heath. 
A contemporary view comes from the 8 December edition of The Economist, which 
ran thus: 
 
Mr Heath wil surely have earned a niche in the Tory pantheon as the man who 
gave the party a second chance; at a time when the spoting of Tories who may 
some day move to much higher ofice has become the most popular Westminster 
occupation, here is another name to enter on the list.68 
 
Ted Heath and Europeanism 
Edward  Heath  has  had a  deserved reputation as the  most  pro-European leader in 
British  history, standing in  direct comparison to  more  notably  Euro-sceptic  Prime 
Ministers such as David  Cameron.   His  maiden speech in the  House  of  Commons 
urged the then Labour government to adopt the Schuman Plan, he led the negotiating 
team for the first entry application between 1961 and 1963 as Lord Privy Seal, and he 
was  ultimately the  man  who took  Britain into  Europe as  Prime  Minister in  1973. 
Despite the failure of the EEC entry negotiations he led between 1961 and 1963, de 
                        
67 D.R. Thorpe, Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmilan (London, 2011), p. 363. 
68 ‘Notes of the Week: Revolt Dampened’, The Economist (8 Dec., 1956), p. 857. 
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Gaule, the cause of that failure, reportedly told him in 1965 that he would be the man 
to take Britain in.69 
 
As a pro-European Heath was not by any means unique: his predecessor but 
one as leader  of the  Conservative  Party,  Harold  Macmillan,  had  been an early 
supporter  of  European integration.  Similarly,  when  he entered the  Cabinet in  1959 
there were already more senior members of the government with noted pro-European 
sympathies. Peter Thorneycroft, Duncan Sandys and Christopher Soames were three 
notable examples.  There  were  diferences, though.  Whereas  Macmilan’s  pro-
Europeanism  manifested itself as, and  was an extension  of, an  overarching sense  of 
the importance of the Atlantic Aliance, and the Anglo-American relationship, seeking 
closer links with Europe as a way to ensure the maintenance of a special US/UK link 
in accordance with known American policy, Heath was the opposite. Contrary to the 
perception of him in the context of Anglo-American relations more narowly,70 he did 
not  disdain close relations  with  Washington and in fact  when  he  was in agreement 
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with  US  policy, as  he  was  over the  1972  bombing campaign in  Vietnam,  he  was 
supportive.71 In an article on realism and British foreign policy in 1969 Heath had this 
to say: 
 
Equaly there is litle argument in  Britain about  British  membership in the 
aliances to which she now belongs, and in particular of the importance of the 
connection with the United States. Here again much of the rhetoric of the past 
has vanished, leaving behind a realization that a special relationship does not 
mean special privileges. It means a recognition that the two countries stil hold 
interests in common across the world to an extent which goes wel beyond the 
normal dealings between friendly states and peoples.72 
 
He did however see Britain’s future, and more importantly its outlet for leadership, as 
being  part  of an integrated  European  Community.  He told  President  Pompidou that 
even if  Britain  desired a special relationship  with the  US (implying that  Britain  did 
not), the relative size of the two countries made one impossible. By contrast, he felt 
that such a relationship was possible in Europe.73 He was aware that British influence 
on  US  policy  was  nominal at  best, a  perception enhanced  by the lack  of  US 
consultation  over  S.A.L.T.,  Nixon’s  visit to  China, the ‘Year  of  Europe’ and the 
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termination  of the  Breton  Woods  monetary system.74 Similarly,  Heath felt that 
Britain was too dependent on the US for the maintenance of its nuclear deterent and 
that the  perception  of  Britain as an  American  Trojan  horse  was  not limited to  de 
Gaule.75 He felt it necessary to ensure that there could be no repeat of the charges of 
the 1950s and 1960s: namely, that Britain was coluding with the United States to the 
detriment of Europe in general and France in particular.76 
 
In the late  1960s  he advocated  pooling  Britain’s  nuclear  deterent  with the 
French Force de Frappe.77 He  did this  primarily to reduce  Britain’s  dependence  on 
the United States where Polaris was concerned and to demonstrate his commitment to 
European integration. In practical terms this idea was a non-starter. Despite his desire 
to reduce  British  dependence  on the  US,  he could  not escape the fact that  Britain 
could not share its nuclear deterent with third parties such as France under the terms 
of the agreement  with the  US.  Moreover,  by the late  1960s  France  did  not  need to 
develop a  deterent in tandem  with  Britain as it had already  developed its own.78 
Although more political and wishful thinking in concept, Heath’s vision does serve to 
highlight the extent to which he was serious and commited to taking Britain into the 
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EEC. He was aware of the problems that had faced Macmilan, and himself, in 1962, 
and  Harold  Wilson in  1967,  with trying to convince the French that the  British 
government was sincere in its entry applications and overcome French suspicions that 
said applications were designed to ensure US dominance of European afairs.79 
 
Throughout his time as a Whip, the short period as Minister of Labour, during 
the Brussels  negotiations, and in  opposition to  Wilson’s  Labour  government,  Heath 
was aware that  much  of the anti-Common  Market feeling  prevalent in  Britain  was 
centred on an emotional atachment to the Commonwealth.80 Tied in with the concept 
of a strong Sterling Area, the Commonwealth and the remnants of the British Empire 
were seen as the forum for  British leadership.81 They  were seen as  providing the 
irefutable  proof for the claim that  Britain could  not entertain  more active 
participation in the  European integration  process  because that  process  was 
incompatible  with  Commonwealth  obligations.  The  Commonwealth  gave  Britain its 
world role and provided such a large share of British trade and trading obligations.82 
Even in his capacity as head of the negotiating team for the first EEC entry bid, Heath 
had to  maintain some semblance  of this  belief as indicated  by  his  opening speech 
during the negotiations: 
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In particular we had to think very deeply about the efect on the Commonwealth 
of so important a development in United Kingdom policy. I hope you wil agree 
with me that the Commonwealth makes an essential contribution to the strength 
and stability of the world and that sound economic foundations and prospects of 
development go hand in hand with this. We believe that it is in the interests of al 
of  us round this table that  nothing should  be  done  which  would  be likely to 
damage the essential interests  of its  Member  Countries.  Some  people in the 
United  Kingdom  have  been inclined to  wonder  whether  membership  of the 
Community could in fact  be reconciled  with  membership  of the 
Commonwealth…In  particular I  have  noticed a  growing  understanding  of the 
importance of the Commonwealth and, of the problems which would be created 
for Commonwealth countries by our entry into the Community. 83 
 
The above quote from his speech in Paris should not be taken to suggest that Heath 
personaly held such views. In his role as lead negotiator he was required to represent 
the  views  of the  British  government and,  given that  government’s concern  with the 
impact  of  Community  membership  on the  Commonwealth,84 and also  EFTA,  his 
stressing it should not be taken as anything more than representing the views of the 
government.  Heath’s  personal  views, and the  basis  of  his  policies in  government 
between 1970 and 1974, were that the public’s perception of the Commonwealth and 
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its importance to Britain was emotional in nature, lagged behind reality, and that said 
atachment should be shelved.85 
 
In  his autobiography  Heath  described the  knowledge  within the British 
government that the Commonwealth countries would be opposed or even, depending 
on the specific member, openly hostile to the prospect of Britain joining the EEC. He 
did stress  his surprise that  many  of the  non-white  members  of the  Commonwealth 
were so implacably  opposed, although  by the  1970s  he  noted that their atitude  had 
changed somewhat.86 During the  1962  Commonwealth  Conference  he  noted the 
desire  of certain  members  of the  Commonwealth and the  British  public that  Britain 
joining the  EEC  would irevocably  damage the relationship  between the 
Commonwealth and Britain. Moreover, the same groups wished Heath and his team to 
demand conditions that the  Six  would  never accept.  Heath  was certain that the 
Commonwealth  would survive and that the  EEC served the real economic  needs  of 
Britain as  opposed to the  Commonwealth,  which represented  nostalgia.87 In  his 
lectures at  Harvard in the late  1960s  Heath  used the term ‘fissiparous’88 to  describe 
the Commonwealth and while being no more hostile in this arena than he was to good 
relations with the US, his overiding aim was to secure for Britain the membership of 
the EEC that would provide economic enhancement and the cherished world role. 
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‘Europeanist’ from the Start? 
Although Heath has the reputation today as the most pro-European of Britain’s post-
war  Prime  Ministers, there is some  debate as to  when  he actualy  developed the 
commitment to  European integration that  he is  perhaps  best  known for.  His 
biographer, John Campbel, in describing his move from Minister of Labour to Lord 
Privy  Seal, and  number two to  Lord  Home at the  Foreign  Ofice,  with special 
responsibility for Europe, atributes to Heath the finding of his life’s cause. He states 
that the cause  of  geting  Britain into the  EEC  gave  Heath a transforming vision  he 
could pursue with passion.89 
 
It is a source  of scholarly  disagreement  how far  back  Heath’s  pro-European 
views actualy  went, and therefore  whether they can  be considered a factor in 
Macmilan’s moving him from the Ministry of Labour to the Foreign Ofice in July 
1960. Miriam Camps includes Heath in the list of Cabinet appointments consisting of 
pro-Europeans being moved into key positions within the government. She cites it as 
evidence  of  new  British thinking  on  Europe and that relations  with the EEC  had 
become a foreign policy priority. However, Camps also states that despite his maiden 
speech urging the Atlee government to adopt the Schuman Plan in 1950, few in 1960 
were aware  of it and  he  was seen as a  new face to the  group  of  pro-European 
Conservatives.90 Nora  Belof, as  we  have already  noted, claimed that  Heath’s 
appointment was based on his record as Chief Whip and that if Europe were a factor, 
Macmilan  would surely  have chosen  Thorneycroft,  Soames  or  Duncan  Sandys, the 
noted pro-Europeans already in the Cabinet. Belof also cited Heath himself as teling 
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her  he  was  not a commited  European  prior to  1960.91 Heath  biographer John 
Campbel referenced the Financial  Times as  writing in July  1960 that  Heath’s 
European views were not known, and also wrote that it was the opinion of those who 
worked with him while he was Lord Privy Seal that, apart from personal opportunism, 
no motivating factor could be discerned from his European stance.92 
 
The views of Belof and others are only one side of the argument, and a side 
that this author does not find convincing. In the first instance, while Heath is reported 
to have said to Belof that he was not pro-European prior to 1960, his autobiography 
is clear in its portrayal of his Europeanist views as being deep rooted, and in existence 
long  before  he  became  Home’s  number two.93 While  Heath could  be seen as 
employing  hindsight in  1998, and seeking to  portray  himself as  he  would  wish, 
irespective of reality, it is equaly plausible that his statement to Belof was less than 
frank, at a time when public opinion was ambivalent and confused regarding British 
membership.94 Moreover, the article cited  by John  Campbel  makes  no  mention  of 
Heath’s European views at al, merely remarking that he had been given responsibility 
for  European afairs and that this appeared to  be in the context  of a  general shift in 
emphasis  on the  part  of the  government from a  purely economic approach, to 
encompass political as wel as institutional and procedural issues.95 
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The second claim is that while Chief Whip he seemed to have no problem or 
dificulty in silencing  pro-European  MPs, such as  Geofrey  Rippon in  1955.  Both 
Ziegler, and former New Labour MP, Denis MacShane, refer to this incident but make 
clear that Heath was doing his job despite his personal feelings on the mater. Ziegler 
for instance  describes  Heath ‘finding  himself arguing against cases  he  held  most at 
heart,’96 and MacShane states that, even on Europe where his sympathies lay, he had 
to support Eden’s hostile position.97 Heath as the Chief Whip was required to support 
the  government  whether  he agreed  with its  policy  or  not, and the fact that  he told 
Rippon that he could not continue as Parliamentary Private Secretary if he continued 
to advocate  British  membership  of the  Common  Market should  be interpreted as 
nothing more than a Whip doing his job.98 
 
There is a  greater  preponderance  of evidence to support the  view that  Heath’s  pro-
European sentiments  were  developed long  before the July  1960 reshufle.  Early 
biographer and childhood friend  Margaret  Laing  was in  no  doubt  when she said  of 
Heath’s European views: 
 
His view of Europe was no sudden inspiration. It was a deeply held conviction 
based  on a triumvirate  of ideas:  his love  of  his country, sense  of  necessity  of 
European  unity that  would lead to  greater economic and  political  opportunity, 
need for  greater independence  of the  United  States…Conflicts and  possible 
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solutions in Europe had been a pre-occupation since he observed the Nuremburg 
Raly in 1937.99 
 
Heath’s  Parliamentary  Private  Secretary  was similarly certain  when it came to 
Heath’s  European  views and their  origins.  Quoted  by Jacqueline  Trat, this  MP 
asserted that Heath was intent from the onset that Britain should go into the EEC and 
that,  when  he  was  given responsibility for  European  maters  by  Macmilan,  his 
mandate was to do just that.100 MacShane’s 2006 biography of Heath states that signs 
of  Heath’s  European credentials  were clear from the  moment  he rose to  make  his 
maiden speech in the House of Commons.101 Even Campbel described his interest in 
European travel as being unusual for an undergraduate and that there is no compeling 
reason to  doubt  his  Europeanism.  That  his  views  were  not  more  widely  known  was 
more a case of his having dificulty communicating his passions than not possessing 
them in the first place.102 This last point is reinforced by the fact that as Chief Whip 
he was prevented by convention from making his personal views known. As he had 
been in the Whips Ofice since 1951, and only came to public prominence as a result 
of the Suez Crisis more than five years after that, it is perhaps not surprising that his 
views were not widely known. Moreover, his only ministerial role after he ceased to 
                        
99 M. Laing, Edward Heath (1972), p. 98. 
100 J.  Trat, The  Macmilan  Government  and  Europe:  A  Study in the  Process  of  Policy  Development 
(Basingstoke, 1996), p. 129. 
101 D. MacShane, Heath (2006), p. 34. 
102 J. Campbel, Heath (1993), pp. 114-115. 
 275 
be  Chief  Whip  was at the  Ministry  of  Labour.  There is a second convention that 
Ministers do not usualy pass comment outside of their departmental purview.103 
 
Beyond the  views  of  his  biographers, there are two reasons that this author 
considers to  be compeling  when it comes to the issue  of  Heath’s  pro-European 
credentials.  The first is  his  maiden speech in  Parliament, and the second is the July 
1960 reshufle.  Many authors  have cited  Heath’s  maiden speech as evidence  of  his 
conviction, indeed his only one prior to entering the Whips’ Ofice.104 It took place in 
June 1950 during a Parliamentary Debate about the Schuman Plan that would create 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and whether or not Britain should 
join it. Eden led for the Conservative opposition, despite his own ambivalence if not 
outright  hostility, to the  project.  Heath spoke after the then  Chancelor,  Sir  Staford 
Cripps, and sought to address his points specificaly: 
 
Now the Chancelor of the Exchequer spoke looking at the worst point of view 
the whole time. He spoke of the high authority, suggesting that we should have 
no say in aranging the power of the high authority. Surely that would not be the 
case. He said that we should be taking a risk with the whole of our economy. We 
on this side of the house feel that by standing aside from the discussions, we may 
be taking a very great risk with our economy in the coming years – a very great 
risk indeed. He said it would also be a great risk if we went in and then withdrew. 
We regard it as a  greater risk to stand aside altogether at this stage…I appeal 
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tonight to the Government to go into the Schuman Plan to develop Europe and to 
co-ordinate it in the way suggested.105 
 
The speech does not read as one writen and presented by a man in any doubt as to his 
opinion. It  demonstrates clearly  Heath’s  views as  he espoused them later,106 and as 
presented by biographers such as Margaret Laing.107 Given that it was only after 1960 
that the  balance  of  opinion in the  Treasury suggested continued absence from the 
Common Market represented a grave economic risk, Heath’s speech was remarkably 
prescient.108 Eden,  Churchil and  Macmilan sent  him  notes  of congratulation, and it 
has been suggested that the speech was a factor in the decision to ofer him a place in 
the Whips’ Ofice.109 
 
The second reason for this author’s belief that Heath held pro-European views from 
an early  point in  his  political career is the reshufle that saw  him  move from the 
Ministry of Labour to the Foreign and Colonial ofice as number two to Lord Home, 
and spokesman in the  Commons.110 This author rejects in,  particular  Belof’s 
assertion that, if entering the EEC was a factor, Macmilan would have entrusted it to 
one  of the existing  heavyweights in the  government. It is true that  Thorneycroft, 
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Sandys and  Soames  were  beter  known, and  were considered the leading  pro-
Europeans,  but they  were also appointed to  Cabinet  or  Ministerial  position.  Duncan 
Sandys, who had been Minister of Aviation, was promoted and appointed Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, and Soames was made Minister of Agriculture.111 
As two of the biggest obstacles to British accession to the Common Market were the 
system of Imperial and Commonwealth trade preference, and British agriculture, it is 
not surprising that  Macmilan  placed those two  dificult,  but crucial,  departments in 
the hands of known pro-European alies. As for Peter Thorneycroft, he had resigned 
as Chancelor of the Exchequer in 1958 over a dispute with Macmilan over the extent 
of departmental spending cuts.112 He was brought back into the Cabinet as Minister of 
Aviation in  1960,113 but,  given the  manner  of  his  departure, it  was  perhaps to  be 
expected that  he  was  not entrusted  with a significant role (and risk another 
disagreement and public resignation) until Macmilan’s ‘Night of the Long Knives’ in 
1962 when he became Secretary of State for Defence.114  
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Did Macmilan therefore select Heath based on his European convictions? His 
diaries  make  no  mention  of  his reasons for selecting  Heath,  but they  do reveal that 
they thought the  promotion  would  be  good for  Heath, and  his acceptance  would  be 
helpful; to Macmilan.115 Heath for his part did not publicly speculate as to the Prime 
Minister’s reasons and Macmilan’s biographers have had litle to add either. Alistair 
Horne describes the move as Macmilan promoting a new star but questions Heath’s 
European credentials.116 Sampson states that  Heath joined the  Foreign  Ofice  with 
new enthusiasm for  Europe  without  providing any insights into that enthusiasm.117 
John Turner describes Heath as being admired by Jean Monnet but does not ofer any 
suggestions for the  promotion,118 and  Thorpe’s recent  work Supermac:  The  Life  of 
Harold  Macmilan, confines itself to the fact that  Macmilan  briefly considered 
Freddie Erol,119 later to serve as President of the Board of Trade and succeeded in 
that role by Heath, for the role before he chose Heath.120 One possible reason for both 
the 1960 promotion, and the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ two years later, was a desire 
on the part of Macmilan to promote and bring on younger, more professional types of 
Conservative, and Heath fited into that mould perfectly. 
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Heath’s biographers appear to be undecided on the issue. Ziegler asserts that 
he was known to be wel disposed to Europe, but not a Europhile, and critical of the 
failure  of  Atlee’s  Labour  Government to adopt the  Schuman  Plan  when it  had the 
opportunity in 1950.121 Campbel referenced the views of some of Heath’s coleagues 
who could  discern  nothing  beyond  personal ambition in  his acceptance  of the 
position.122 MacShane suggests Heath’s views when he talks about Macmilan having 
an eye  on  Europe  when  he  made  his reshufle appointments,  but  does  not state 
outright that Heath’s views were a factor.123 
 
Given that  neither  Heath,  nor  Macmilan,  gave any solid indicators as to the 
reasons for the former  being  moved from the Ministry  of  Labour to the  Foreign 
Ofice, it is dificult to make a pronouncement that wil not be subject to chalenge. 
There is, however, evidence that this author considers suficient to tip the balance in 
favour  of  Heath’s  views  on  Europe  being a factor. In the first instance, it is  known 
that Macmilan was aware of Heath’s maiden speech on the Schuman Plan a decade 
before,  having sent  him a  note  of congratulation.124 Moreover,  Belof’s suggestion 
that the  promotion  was  based  on  his record as  Chief  Whip seems to ignore the fact 
that Macmilan had already given Heath the job of Minister of Labour in 1959 on the 
back of his prior service in the Whips’ Ofice. He would therefore have been unlikely 
to give him a payof for that service twice and must have thought highly of him for 
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other reasons.125 Moreover, Heath had asked to be alowed to serve a ful term in this 
role and it  does  not folow that  Macmilan,  having  given  him  one job for services 
rendered, would then move him after less than a year, despite his undertaking that he 
would have a ful term, for exactly the same reason. 
 
Overal, this author is  more convinced  by the argument that  Heath’s 
Europeanist convictions  were in evidence long  before  he  was  placed in charge  of 
geting  Britain into the  EEC.  His  maiden speech contained al the  halmarks  of the 
views he was later known for. His childhood friend Margaret Laing was unequivocal 
in her belief regarding how long he had been pro-European, several of his biographers 
take a similar line, and the arguments of Belof and others regarding the reshufle do 
not bear further scrutiny. What is necessary now is to turn to how much of an impact 
Heath had on the nature and evolution of Anglo-European relations. 
 
Heath’s Impact on British Policy 
Heath’s impact  on the  nature and state  of  Anglo-European relations can  be  divided 
into the short-term and the longer term, although the former  had an efect  upon the 
later. His best known contribution is obviously that as Prime Minister he took Britain 
into the  EEC in  1973,  but outside  of  Britain it  was the failed  negotiations  he led in 
1961-1963 that,  despite their ending in  disappointment,  made  his reputation.  This is 
significant, as although  his  pro-European reputation in  Britain  may  have  had litle 
practical impact, it is indisputable that for Heath, or any other Prime Minister for that 
mater, to take  Britain into the  EEC  would entail convincing the  Six,  France in 
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particular, that it  was a  viable  proposition.126 For this reason,  Heath’s reputation  on 
the continent was the more important. 
 
Despite the fact that the EEC entry bid he led in 1961-1962 ended in failure, 
Heath emerged in Europe with an enhanced reputation. It is known that Jean Monnet, 
one  of the founding fathers  of the  European integration  process,  knew and  greatly 
admired  Heath and  his stance  on  British  membership.127 Even  before de  Gaule 
delivered the coup de grace, it  was clear that  Heath  was  wel  viewed in  European 
circles. Biographer Margaret Laing described the feeling of extraordinary warmth that 
Heath’s skil, patience, amiability and knowledge in European circles, and went on to 
say that  his  wholehearted  belief in  Europe  was endearing and that  he  was acquiring 
the reputation of a statesman.128 Heath was featured on the cover of Time on 13 July 
1962, and the article dedicated to the Common Market negotiations not only refered 
to him as a lifelong European, but also said the folowing: 
 
Though  many  were skeptical  of  Britain's  motives at first,  Heath  has convinced 
Common Market oficials of his government's deep commitment to membership 
in the community. "If this is not so," remarked a Belgian oficial, "then Heath is a 
truly marvelous actor."129 
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Once it became clear that the British bid was doomed, Heath furthered his reputation 
in Europe via the tone and content of his final press conference. It was wel received 
by the European press in atendance, many of whom were commited Europeans and 
who sympathised with him, as wel as with Britain, and were furious with France.130 
Heath did receive one consolation from the failure of the negotiations. The University 
of  Aachen,  which  had  been  due to award its  prestigious International  Charlemagne 
Prize131 for those  who embody the  hope for  European integration, to  General  de 
Gaule, instead awarded it to Heath.132 
 
As  Leader  of the Opposition  between  1964 and  1970 there  was litle that 
Heath could  do in  practical terms to further the cause  of  British  membership  of the 
Common  Market.  He continued to campaign for  British  membership in  public, as 
shown by his Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1969, but could do litle beyond this.133 
The issue had been efectively shelved as de Gaule remained in power in France and 
there seemed no prospect of his leaving soon, or changing his mind once it was made 
up.  The  Conservative  Party  was  broadly speaking, although  not  unanimously, in 
favour  of  British  membership and  had  Heath’s  known sentiments in this regard  did 
not prevent him succeeding Lord Home as leader in 1964,134 nor remaining as leader 
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in the aftermath  of the  1966  General  Election  defeat.135 At a time  of  public 
inconsistency  when it came to support  or  opposition for the  Common  Market in 
general, and British membership in particular, Heath and his brand of pro-European 
sentiment was a constant.136 
 
There is one area of Heath’s impact on relations between Britain and Europe 
during his time as Leader of the Opposition that is a source of disagreement amongst 
his biographers. In 1966 Wilson announced that the Labour Government would make 
a fresh atempt to enter the  EEC.137 Ziegler  has registered  his surprise that  Heath, 
despite  his  desire to see  Britain at the  heart  of  Europe,  did  not  publicaly support 
Wilson’s initiative. He did state that Heath did not feel Wilson’s bid was genuine and 
that because of this it would do nothing to further Britain’s case, but there was also 
the sense that  Heath felt  Wilson  was intruding  upon ‘his teritory’.138 Campbel,  by 
contrast, while also refering to Heath targeting Wilson, and his belief that the atempt 
was misguided, nevertheless makes clear that Heath honourably lined his own MPs up 
to support the Government in the Commons.139 
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In the event  Heath  was  proved right.  De  Gaule  wasted  no time in 
demonstrating that he had not altered his position from 1963, and the Soames Afair, 
where the contents  of a  meeting  between  President de  Gaule and the  British 
Ambassador to France, Sir Christopher Soames, were leaked to the press by Embassy 
staf,  did litle to convince the  French that  Britain’s application  was  worth 
entertaining.140 Even if de Gaule had not stil been in power in France it is unlikely 
that the Wilson application would have succeeded. The then French Prime Minister, 
Pompidou, had visited London in 1966 and had left unimpressed, feeling that Wilson 
had deliberately snubbed him.141 British policy at the time was to try to isolate France 
and use the Five to compel it to abandon its opposition to British entry, a tactic that 
had failed in January 1963, and one that Heath argued would fail again.142 
 
It is here that we come to the crux of the mater. Although Heath in opposition 
could not do anything practical about Britain’s continued absence from the Common 
Market, there is evidence to suggest strongly that he thought that the situation would 
change if he were in ofice. In the first instance, Wiliam Rees-Mogg, Editor of The 
Times from 1967-1981, reported that in an interview in Le Monde De Gaule had said 
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that ‘The Labour Party would come to power for a short and disastrous experiment; 
then the Conservatives wil come back with Heath at their head and it is he who wil 
bring  Britain into  Europe’.143 This  was a remarkably  prescient  prediction from the 
General,  but  one  based admitedly  on  personal experience and  knowledge  of  Heath. 
More significantly,  Heath’s reputation  with  Pompidou  was extremely  high.  Back in 
1960  Heath  had  met and  greatly impressed  Michel Jobert (Pompidou’s  General 
Secretary  by the  1970s),  who later reported to  his superior that  Heath  was a  good 
European who should be supported, encouraged and relied upon.144 Heath had known 
Pompidou since 1962 and had got on wel with him. Pompidou, for his part, felt that a 
British bid led by Wilson was not credible, but that one led by Heath was.145 
 
That Heath was able to lead Britain into the EEC was in part due to the fact 
that de Gaule had retired in 1969 and could no longer veto British bids. De Gaule’s 
view that Heath would succeed in taking Britain into the EEC is known and has been 
referenced here, but, he was not a man ruled by sentiment, and there is no reason to 
suppose that Heath being pro-European would have induced him to remove his long-
held  opposition.  Moreover,  Heath’s  biographers al  make the  point that  de  Gaule’s 
departure merely exposed a crack in the hinges: it did not push the door to entry wide 
open. It was stil for Britain to convince France that it was sincere in its desire to play 
a ful role in a  unified and evolving  European  Community.  Heath’s reputation  with 
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Pompidou, and  other  European leaders  made that  possible.146 His career-long 
advocacy of the principles of European integration, and the desire that Britain play a 
ful and active part convinced the Six that under Heath, Britain was serious and that 
French opposition should be dropped.147 
 
The  day  before  Britain signed the  Treaty  of  Rome,  Heath  was awarded  his 
second prize for European statesmanship. In a manner representative of the regard in 
which Heath was held in European capitals, Joseph Bech, President of the commitee 
that awarded the European Prize for Statesmanship, paid fulsome tribute to him: 
 
My Dear Prime Minister, Since October 1961, you have been constantly to the 
fore and have conducted, in your country’s name, highly dificult negotiations 
with  E.E.C.  You  have  done this  with extraordinary zeal and a  profound 
knowledge of the situation. 
 
Bech chose to  quote at length from the speech  given  by  his counterpart in  Aachen 
nine years before when that institution awarded Heath the Charlemagne Prize: 
 
We have al the impression that he has made of the task oficialy entrusted to 
him a  deeply-felt  personal  mission,  because  he  himself is  profoundly 
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convinced of its supreme importance. As long as we in Europe have such men 
in leading positions, we shal have no reason to lack faith.148 
 
Beyond the accession of Britain to the European Community, Pompidou had further 
cause to see Heath as a genuine European partner. Although a fixture of modern life 
since the early  1990s, the  Channel  Tunnel  was envisaged  more than two  decades 
before, and  Heath  put  his  political  weight  behind it.  When the  Channel  Tunnel 
Agreement came to be signed in 1974, Pompidou declared that ‘Hitherto, virtualy the 
sole link between the Continent and Britain has been caled “Heath”. Now we are to 
have another link’.149 
 
Conclusion 
The Suez Crisis made its impact on Britain, Europe and the wider world felt in many 
diferent  ways. In the context  of British and  French  policy revaluations towards 
membership of the European Communities one man best ilustrates this: Ted Heath. 
As the  Government  Chief  Whip  during the  Crisis,  Heath  had an extraordinarily 
dificult task.  The  operation itself, and especialy the  withdrawal  under sustained 
American  pressure,  polarised the  Conservative  Party and forced  Heath to  deploy 
every  weapon at  his  disposal to  maintain the  unity  of the  government,  not  once  but 
twice. That he did so successfuly has ensured that he was one of the few members of 
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the Government to come out of the Suez Crisis with an enhanced reputation compared 
to that he maintained at the onset.150 
 
Described  by  his  peers and the  press as  having  handled the crisis  with  quiet 
skil, and as never losing command of the situation,151 Heath went from being a Chief 
Whip who was wel respected within Westminster, but virtualy unknown outside of 
it, to one considered by many to have been one of the men who ran the government 
during  Anthony  Eden’s convalescence in Jamaica.152 More controversialy as far as 
his  biographers are concerned,  he  was intimately involved in the leadership contest, 
fought  out  between  R.A.  Butler and  Harold  Macmilan,  which folowed  Eden’s 
decision to resign in January  1957.  Alternatively accused  of  having intervened to 
ensure  Macmilan’s succession,  or at the  very least  having  played an influential, if 
stil impartial, role,  he  was the  man  whom  Macmilan chose to accompany  him to 
celebrate when he was duly chosen as the new Conservative Party leader.153 
 
Suez in this respect  made the career  of  Ted  Heath.  He  was respected  but 
unknown before the crisis,154 and publicaly known as one of the most powerful men 
in the  Conservative  Government after its conclusion.155 He remains to this  day the 
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only  Chief  Whip  of either  of the two  main  parties since the  Second  World  War to 
have gone on to become Prime Minister. Many factors explain why this progression 
was almost  unheard  of.  Chief  Whips lack the  policy expertise and  public exposure 
that are  usualy prerequisites  of climbing  what  Wilson caled ‘the  greasy  pole’, and 
they inevitably  make too  many enemies in the exercising  of their  duties.156 Heath 
however, thanks to Suez, gained so much public exposure, almost uniformly positive, 
that after the  1959  General  Election  Macmilan appointed  him to the  Cabinet as 
Minister of Labour. Heath, despite his avowed wish to serve a ful term in this role, 
was  moved a  year later  when  Macmilan reshufled  his  Cabinet, and  was appointed 
Lord Privy Seal. The title was a device to give him the required seniority as he was in 
fact the  number two  man at the  Foreign  Ofice and, as the  Secretary  of  State,  Lord 
Home,  was in the  House  of  Lords,  Heath  was the de facto representative  of the 
government on foreign afairs in the Commons. He also had a particular brief, to take 
Britain into  Europe, a cause that  had  been close to  his  heart from the start  of  his 
political career.157 
 
Although there is disagreement amongst his biographers as to just how early 
he  developed the  pro-European  views that  were to  define  his career,158 this author 
feels that  his  maiden speech in  Parliament,159 his  own  pronouncements in  his 
autobiography, the account  of  his  Private  Secretary,160 and that  of childhood friend 
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and  biographer  Margaret  Laing161 are  more convincing interpretations than those 
labeling him as a pragmatist or late convert on Europe. Moreover, it is unlikely that 
Heath, with the reputation of a man who would not trouble to hide his feelings, would 
have been able to develop such a commited position as late as 1960 and convince a 
man as sceptical and mistrustful of Britain as General de Gaule of his conviction.162 
 
Heath in  his role as  Lord  Privy  Seal,  with responsibility for  Europe,  was 
appointed to lead the  negotiating team tasked  by  Macmilan  with securing  British 
entry to the EEC and, although de Gaule’s veto in January 1963 prevented him from 
accomplishing this  goal, the  manner in  which  he  undertook it impressed  many in 
Europe.163 Before the negotiations had even started he impressed Michel Jobert, who 
would later work for Pompidou and assure him that Heath was genuine in his desire to 
see Britain enter the European Community, and should be supported and encouraged 
in this endeavour.164 His conduct in  Brussels  was such that  he  was awarded the 
prestigious Charlemagne  Prize in  1963, and in  opposition  he supported  Wilson’s 
abortive  EEC  bid in  1967,  despite  his  personal, and as it turned  out,  prescient 
misgivings about its prospect of success.165 He continued to push for Britain to play 
the role he felt it always should have played. Upon becoming Prime Minister in 1970 
he succeeded in overcoming French opposition, convinced Pompidou and in 1973 was 
able to sign the Treaties of Rome on behalf of his country. 
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The Suez Crisis gave Heath the opportunity to make his name, and started him 
on the road that would lead, via the first EEC application, to his taking Britain into the 
European  Community. In so  doing,  Suez  gave  Britain a leader  whose  passion and 
commitment to the cause of Britain as a ful partner in Europe was such that it was 
enough to convince European leaders, Pompidou above al, that Britain’s desire was 
genuine and that de Gaule’s veto should be lifted. Suez may not have pushed Britain 
into the  EEC immediately,  but it  brought to  prominence the  man  who eventualy 
would, and changed the  nature  of  Anglo-European relations.  While  we  wil  never 
know for sure, it is  worth  wondering  how  Britain’s relationship  with  Europe  would 
look today if Heath had remained Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party 
after  1975 rather than losing to  Margaret  Thatcher. In any event,  Suez  made  Heath, 





Chapter VII: Conclusions 
 
At the time  of  writing (December 2015),  Britain’s continued  membership  of the 
European  Union is in  doubt. In recent  months the  Prime  Minister  has laid  out the 
areas in  which  he  wants  Britain’s relationship  with  Brussels to  be renegotiated  with 
more powers being repatriated to Westminster. Britain, although an EU member since 
1973, has never been entirely comfortable with its membership, which has remained 
one lacking conviction. A generation of British policymakers saw Britain as having a 
global role that set it apart from the rest  of  Continental  Europe, a  view that  was 
seemingly strengthened by the retention of many elements of the Empire in 1945 and 
the fact that  Britain  was the  only  European  beligerent  not to sufer  defeat and  or 
occupation during the Second World War. Although Winston Churchil spoke of the 
need for a United States of Europe, he saw Britain as an aly, a supporter, a facilitator 
of such an entity, but, crucialy, not a member.1 The Labour government rejected the 
chance to join what became the European Coal and Steel Community in June 1950, 
and the Conservative governments of Churchil and Eden opposed the creation of the 
European  Defence  Community, as  wel as refusing to actively  participate in the 
1955/56  Messina  discussions.2 This last  has  been the  basis for the accusation that 
Britain ‘missed the boat’, losing the opportunity to shape Europe to its own designs 
and preferences.3 
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 293 
 
In the summer of 1956 Chancelor Harold Macmilan and President of the Board of 
Trade Thorneycroft presented ‘Plan G’ to their coleagues in the British government.4 
This was a proposal for the creation of a partial free trade area as an alternative to the 
Customs Union being discussed by the Six. After the Six signed the Treaties of Rome 
in March 1957 the British government adapted the plan and proposed to the Six that 
their new European Economic Community form part of a wider free trade area. When 
France  vetoed further  negotiations in  November  1958,5 Macmilan’s  government, 
along  with the  governments  of  Austria,  Denmark,  Norway,  Portugal,  Sweden and 
Switzerland formed the  European  Free  Trade  Association (EFTA).6 EFTA  was 
designed, at least from the perspective of the British government, to force the Six to 
alow the rest  of the  OEEC to enjoy the  benefits  of the  Common  Market  without 
having to agree to membership. By May 1960 Macmilan had accepted that this was 
unlikely and began the process that would end with Britain’s first application for EEC 
membership.  De  Gaule’s  veto in January  1963 ended  Macmilan’s  bid,  which  was 
folowed  by another in  November  1967  with identical results.7 It  was  not  until the 
General retired in  1969 that the  main  obstacle to  British  membership  was removed. 
Heath’s  Conservative  government  opened  negotiations and signed the  Treaties  of 
Rome in January 1973.8 
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At the start  of this thesis  we established that  while the  Suez  Crisis and the 
development of British and French policy re-evaluations towards membership of the 
European  Communities  have  been the subject  of extensive  bodies  of literature, they 
have not received much academic atention in conjunction with each other. Historians 
who  have considered  Suez in the context  of  European integration  have tended to 
either  dismiss it is  having any impact, either  on  British  policy reappraisals  or the 
evolution of French ideas,9 making relatively unsubstantiated claims that it served as a 
point of realisation that provoked a policy review,10 or limiting its impact to one very 
narow area such as  Plan  G.11 It  has  been this author’s  opinion that the  under-
developed arguments  put forward thus far  have  not  done justice to significance that 
Suez  had  on  British and  French  policy re-evaluations towards  membership  of the 
European Communities. Accordingly this thesis first tested the arguments of George, 
Milward and Young, then set out three ways in which this author believes Suez was 
partly responsible for  policy re-evaluations and for the existence  of the  European 
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Communities themselves: the rise to  power  of  Harold  Macmilan; three significant 
changes in  France (the creation  of the  EEC itself, the return to  power  of  General 
Charles  de  Gaule, and the  development  of the  French  nuclear  deterent); and the 
longer-term impact through the rise of Edward Heath. 
 
Although there are numerous studies that have examined the role of Whitehal 
departments in the formulation  of  government  policy, this thesis  has taken a ‘high 
political’ approach, emphasising the decision-making role of elected ministers.12 This 
is not to diminish the influence of Civil Servants such as Sir Frank Lee, nor to suggest 
that  Whitehal  had  no role to  play in advising  Ministers.  The focus  on the role  of 
elected leaders reflects three things; that it is  hard to  definitively  quantify the 
influence that  Whitehal  had  on  Cabinet  Ministers and the  Prime  Minister; that 
Whitehal’s role was constitutionaly to advise and then implement government policy 
whether it folowed  Whitehal’s advice  or  not; and that  ultimately,  decisions  were 
made  by  ministers and the  Prime  Minister.  The  Prime  Minister  was  of  particular 
significance in this  work  because the  Conservative leaders  of the  period  1955-1963 
were al  men  who sought to  dominate their cabinets, and  were  prone to appointing 
ministers likely to agree with them, as wel as interfering in areas they deemed to be 
their  own  preserve.  Churchil acted as  his  own  Minister  of  Defence  until  1954 and 
even after  Macmilan formaly took  on the role  Churchil interfered.  Eden  was a 
foreign policy expert and while he was forced to appoint Macmilan as Secretary of 
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State for  Foreign  Afairs in  1955,  he replaced  him  with the  more  maleable  Selwyn 
Lloyd as soon as he could. Macmilan also saw himself as an expert in foreign afairs 
and while Minister of Housing, Defence and Chancelor of the Exchequer, at various 
points,  was in the  habit  of  dictating and  despatching  memoranda  on foreign  policy, 
much to the annoyance of Eden. His cabinet changes reflected his desire to maintain 
control  over  government  policy,  particularly  his reshufle in July  1960,  which  has 
long  been interpreted as a  precursor to the first  EEC  bid,  based  on the  number  of 
noted ‘Europeanists’ he promoted. 
 
This thesis  has also atempted to  deal  with an issue that is  problematic for 
historians  of  Britain’s relationship  with the  European  Communities.  This is the 
problem of assigning categorical definitions to political figures based on retrospective 
analysis  of their  views  on  Europe.  Despite the  presence and  usage  of  generic terms 
such as ‘Eurosceptic’ and ‘Europhile’  or similar,  politicians rarely conform to  one 
extreme or the other. There are exceptions such as Nigel Farage in the modern era or 
Lord Beaverbrook in the 1950s and 1960s, but, as the debates amongst historians of 
Harold  Macmilan and  Winston  Churchil  demonstrates, things that these  men  have 
said and  done  over the course  of lengthy careers can  be taken  by either side  of the 
debate and used to suggest the figure in question was of a similar mind-set to them. 
Macmilan was no more in favour of federalism than Eden had been, partly the basis 
for the  views  of  historians  who  have  questioned  his reputation as a  broadly ‘pro-
European’ politician.13 This author would submit that this is entirely irelevant. What 
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made  Macmilan’s accession at the expense  of  Eden and  Butler significant to the 
development of British policy was the way he viewed ‘Europe’ as an issue compared 
to his coleagues, and the ability he had to adapt his personal views when he deemed 
it necessary. Butler was sceptical in both the modern and contemporary sense about 
the  value to  Britain  of  membership  of a  united  Europe and it is notable that  his 
memoirs and the  biographies that exist about  his life  make litle to  no  mention  of 
‘Europe’.14 In a sense  he  was similar to  Eden in that  both  men  would  deal  with 
‘Europe’ as and when it presented a specific issue to be dealt with. At other times they 
appeared to have no interest in it at al.  
 
Macmilan  was  diferent.  His  views  on specific aspects  of  European 
integration  were similar to  Eden’s,  but  unlike  his coleagues ‘Europe’  was an issue 
that  occupied  his thoughts  whether it  was a  political  priority for the  government  or 
not. The overal idea of uniting a continent previously divided by ideology and riven 
by warfare was the sort of high political scheme that appealed to him and as has been 
stated, he would try to change government policy on the mater even when it did not 
directly concern his ministerial responsibilities. Modern historians may disagree as to 
the extent of his support for an integrated Europe, but this does to a certain extent rely 
on  modern interpretations and the application  of flawed,  generalized  definitions  of 
what it means to be ‘Europeanist’. Macmilan’s contemporaries certainly saw him as a 
European. Indeed,  Butler  predicted that  Macmilan  becoming  Prime  Minister  would 
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lead to Europe assuming a greater importance as his coleague was determined to take 
Britain into it.15 
 
A third area of broad focus in this work was the extent to which the policies 
Macmilan,  De  Gaule and  Heath  pursued  were  driven  by their  personal  views  on 
European integration.  To an extent this is something that  wil almost always  be 
impossible to state with any certainty, particularly in the case of Heath and De Gaule 
whose  papers are at the time  of  writing inaccessible to researchers.  Moreover, even 
Macmilan  whose  diaries  have  been  published in edited form  by  Peter  Cateral  did 
not make clear-cut statements as to why he made the decisions he did.16 What we can 
do as researchers is examine those  decisions and try to apply them to the  known 
views.  Heath is  perhaps the simplest  here  because the  policies  he  pursued in  ofice 
were in line with the Europeanist views for which he is best known. He believed that 
a united Europe was in the best interests of al the European nations including Britain 
and although his most famous act was taking Britain into the EEC, this author would 
suggest that the  best example  of  his actions  being  dictated  by  his  views  was  his 
support for Harold Wilson’s il-fated membership in 1967. Heath did not believe the 
bid  would  work as it lacked credibility,  but,  despite  his role as  Leader  of the 
Opposition,  he supported the  Government’s atempt  on the  basis that  EEC 
membership was in Britain’s interest whoever took it in.17 
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P.  Cateral (Ed.), The  Macmilan  Diaries  Vol. II:  Prime  Minister  and  After  1957-1966 (Macmilan, 
2011). 
17 P. Ziegler, Edward Heath: The Authorised Biography (London, 2010), p. 191. 
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Macmilan, as appears to  be the case  with every facet  of  his life and 
premiership, is rather  more complicated.18 In  1951  he  wrote  Churchil a lengthy 
memorandum in  which  he  urged the  new  Conservative  government to  be  more 
positive towards  Europe than the  previous  Labour administration  had  been.  His 
references to Europe assumed that it was an issue that the Conservatives could unite 
behind in contrast to the policies of the Socialists, which suggested a certain degree of 
party-political calculation.  However, in  1952  he joined  with  pro-European  Tories 
including David Maxwel-Fyfe and urged Churchil and Eden again to adopt a more 
pro-European stance.19 Once  he  became  Prime  Minister it is this author’s argument 
that Macmilan’s personal views on Europe influenced his policies even if they were 
not solely responsible for them. His atempts to create an alternative to the EEC and 
then subsume it within a wider free trade area both fited in with his preference for a 
confederal approach to European integration whereas his decision that Britain would 
seek  membership  of the  EEC, the federal  nature  of  which  he  disliked, strongly 
suggests more pragmatic than conviction based motives. Overal it is fair to say that 
even though  he  disliked federalism,  his  pragmatic approach to  politics and the fact 
that  European integration as an ideal and a concept appealed to  him suficiently to 
enable him to take a decision at odds with one aspect of his personal views. 
 
This thesis had two specific aims: firstly to corect what this author sees as a 
historiographical imbalance that  has seen  Suez and its influence  on  Europe 
                        
18 M.  Francis, ‘Tears,  Tantrums, and  Bared  Teeth:  The  Emotional  Economy  of  Three  Conservative 
Prime Ministers, 1951-1963’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 354-387. 
19 J.W. Young, ‘Churchil’s ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ of European Union by Churchil’s Post-
War Government, 1951-1952’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), p. 923. 
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diminished,  dismissed  or insuficiently considered; secondly to  provide a  new 
interpretation that recognises the contribution that  Suez  made to  British and  French 
policy re-evaluations towards  membership  of the  European  Communities.  Suez  was 
one of many events in the post-war era that played a role here including the decisions 
by  Britain and  France to  begin to  divest themselves  of their empires, the failure  of 
Macmilan’s four-power summit in May 1960, and of course the wider context of the 
Cold  War.  However, this thesis  has atempted to  demonstrate that  Suez  not  only 
influenced  British and  French  policies,  but  was to an extent responsible for the 
existence of what is now the European Union. 
 
One of the arguments that has been put forward by British historians is that Suez was 
such a disaster for Britain that its government embarked upon a period of reappraisal 
that led ultimately to the decision to accord greater significance to links with Europe. 
This argument  has traditionaly  been somewhat  under-referenced and so three 
research questions were asked: Did the crisis make clear to British policymakers the 
weakness  of its  world  position?  Did the  government  undertake a reappraisal?  Was 
there any evidence of a shift in policy towards closer ties with Europe? The research 
undertaken for this  project at the  National  Archives  demonstrated that  not  only  was 
the  government acutely aware  of the  damage that  Suez  had  done to its economic 
position as  wel as its relations  with the  United  States and the  Commonwealth,  but 
that it actively  began to review its  policies.20 Some  of these reviews, such as the 
‘Defence Outline of Future Policy’, predated Suez but others including an operational 
                        
20 TNA  CAB  134/4108,  C.M. (56)  90 ‘Minutes  of  Cabinet  Meeting’ (28  Nov.,  1956),  p.  3;  CAB 
195/16, C.M. (57) 3 ‘Minutes of Cabinet Meeting’ (8 Jan., 1957), p. 3; PREM 11/1138, ‘Thoughts on 
the General Position After Suez’ (28 Dec., 1956), pp. 1-5. 
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study  by the  Ministry  of  Defence, the  broad ‘Future  Policy  Study,  1960-1970’ and 
two smaler foreign policy studies were conducted after it. In each case the influence 
of the crisis is clear, either by direct reference to it,21 or by the use of phrases such as 
‘recent events’  or references to the  need to ensure that  military action is  based  on 
economic capabilities.22 
 
The most important issue was the third question, the extent to which closer ties 
with  Europe  were an  outcome  of this reappraisal.  What is clear from the research 
material considered is that despite some advocacy of a ‘turn to Europe’ on the basis 
that neither the Commonwealth nor the US were reliable partners,23 the initial priority 
of  Macmilan’s  government  was to repair the relationship  with the  US.  However, 
despite the initial focus on the United States, there is ample evidence to support the 
claim that closer ties with Europe became British policy after and as a result of Suez. 
The  French  Ambassador,  who  witnessed the  debate in  parliament that led to the 
adoption of Plan G in late November 1956, atributed a shift in atitudes as much to 
                        
21 TNA DEFE 5/73, C.O.S. (57) 17 ‘Operational Requirements For Emergencies or Limited War in the 
Ministry of Defence: Note by Major-General W.G. Stirling’ (11 Jan., 1957). 
22 Cmnd. 124 ‘Defence Outline of Future Policy’ (Apr., 1957); TNA CAB 129/100, C. (60) 35 ‘Future 
Policy  Study,  1960-1970’ (29  Feb.,  1960),  pp.  1-58;  CAB  130/39, ‘The  Position  of the  United 
Kingdom in World Affairs: Report by Officials’ (1 May., 1958); CAB 129/92, C. (58) 77 ‘The Effects 
of  Anglo-American Interdependence  on the  Long-Term Interests  of the  United  Kingdom’ (10  Apr., 
1958). 
23 ‘The  Year is  1957’, The  Economist (19 Jan.,  1957),  p.  180;  CPA,  CRD  2/34/2 ‘Conservative 
Parliamentary  Foreign  Affairs  Commitee:  Record  of  Meeting’ (14  Nov.,  1956),  p.  1;  TNA  CAB 
129/84,  C.P. (57)  6 ‘”The  Grand  Design”  Co-operation  with  Western  Europe:  Memorandum  by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’ (4 Jan., 1957). 
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Suez as to party politics.24 Moreover, the focus on the US meant in practice a greater 
care for Europe through Macmilan’s policy of interdependence. Prior to Suez, British 
policymakers  had  been  dismissive  of the  desire  of the  US that  Britain  participate 
actively and fuly in atempts to further integrate Europe. The experience of facing US 
opposition and  being forced to  withdraw in  humiliating circumstances  meant that 
British leaders were now prepared to accede to US desires. Ultimately, one of the two 
most  oft-cited reasons for  Macmilan’s  EEC  bid  was a fear in  London that the 
growing economic strength of the EEC would see it replace the UK as the European 
partner of choice for the US.25 The shift in emphasis may not have been immediate, 
but it is clear that  Suez contributed to the  wilingness  of the  British  government to 
engage actively with the integration project. 
 
As far as  British  policy re-evaluations towards  membership  of the  European 
Communities is concerned, the  most significant contribution  of  Suez  was its role in 
the careers  of two  British  Prime  Ministers:  Harold  Macmilan and, later,  Edward 
Heath. The Suez Crisis destroyed the political career of Anthony Eden and also halted 
that of R.A. Butler, who had been seen as the heir apparent for some time.26 Indeed, 
given his age and the presence in Butler of the likely successor to Eden, it is fair to 
say that without Suez or at least a crisis of a similar nature, Macmilan would never 
have become Prime Minister. The crisis gave him a unique opportunity, as Butler was 
                        
24 DDF  1956  Tome III, ‘Chauvel to  Pineau’ (29  Nov.,  1956),  pp.  426-427.  Translated  by  Dan 
Whyman; H. of C. Debs., Vol. 561, Cols. 34-164, ‘European Trade Policy’ (26 Nov., 1956). 
25 K.  Steinnes, ‘The  European  Chalenge:  Britain’s  EEC  Application in  1961’, Contemporary 
European History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 62-64; M. Camps, Britain (1964), p. 336; W. Kaiser, 
Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans (Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 122-123. 
26 ‘The Heir Too Apparent’, The Economist (22 Dec., 1956), p. 1034. 
 303 
beginning to lose support  within the  Conservative  Party – partly a reflection  of  his 
support for appeasement and a sense that he was too weak and indecisive to defend 
British interests.27 Butler had been sceptical about Suez, a position known to the rank 
and file  of the  party  but  had  done  nothing to try to stop it.  He  was also in the 
unfortunate position of deputising for Eden when the decision to withdraw was made 
and announced, associating  him  with it.28 It  was easy for  Macmilan to  put  Butler’s 
appeasement record in the minds of the Conservative party in his speech to the 1922 
Commitee and it was reported that many made their decision for Macmilan based on 
that speech.29 
 
 Despite  his  biographers  disagreeing as to the extent  of  his ‘Europeanism’,30 
and remaining cognisant of the problems in assigning broad definitions to individuals 
based  on  modern  understanding  of the terms, this  work took the  view that 
Macmilan’s accession to the  Premiership  was  of fundamental importance to  British 
policy on the European Communities. Even though he possessed the same distaste for 
federalism as his predecessors, Macmilan was seen by his contemporaries as a friend 
of  Europe, a ‘European’  Conservative and there  were certainly stark  diferences 
                        
27 K. Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London, 1991), p. 534. 
28 E.  Pearce, ‘Part  One:  Richard  Austen  Butler’, in  E.  Pearce, The  Lost  Leaders:  The  Best  Prime 
Ministers we Never Had (London, 1997), p. 90. 
29 D.R.  Thorpe, Supermac:  The  Life  of  Harold  Macmilan (London,  2011),  pp.  354-355;  P.  Ziegler, 
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30 D. Carlton, Anthony Eden (1981), p. 285; N.J. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmilan and the Cold War: The 
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between  him and  Eden and  Butler.31 Firstly  Macmilan  was  much  more  pragmatic 
than Eden or Butler and was thus able to adapt when the occasion caled for it. His 
decision that Britain should try to enter the EEC if acceptable terms of membership 
could  be secured  was an example  of this. He  had  not altered  his  negative  view  of 
federalism but accepted that atempts to find another way had failed and so as it was 
in Britain’s interest to join, he would atempt to facilitate it. While we remain aware 
of the risks of making counterfactual arguments, it is doubtful that Butler would have 
made such a decision. The second mark of distinction for Macmilan in comparison 
with his peers was that unlike either of them he actively thought about European unity 
believed in it passionately. Dislike of federalism merely meant he disagreed with one 
type  of  European  unity;  Butler,  by contrast,  had litle interest  beyond a feeling that 
EEC membership was incompatible with Britain’s Commonwealth links and existing 
agricultural arangements.32 Eden saw  Europe as an issue  of some importance and 
certainly felt that a united Europe was beter than a divided one, but if it were not a 
pressing concern he was not inclined to devote much thought to it at al.33 
 
Macmilan’s initial  policy endeavours in  Europe  once  he  became  Prime 
Minister  were a continuation  of  his  pre-Suez atempts to find a  way to  maintain 
British influence in Europe and also prevent the creation of a Common Market. In this 
way his policies were motivated more by his personal views as the proposed FTA was 
                        
31 ‘The Year is 1957’, The Economist (19 Jan., 1957), p. 180. 
32 D. Gowland et al, Britain and European Integration (2010), p. 107; A. Howard, Rab (1987), pp. 295-
296; A. Milward, The United Kingdom and the European Community Volume I (2002), p. 229. 
33 D.  Carlton, Anthony  Eden:  A  Biography (London,  1981),  p.  272;  V.  Rothwel, Anthony  Eden:  A 
Political Biography (Manchester, 1992), p. 96. 
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more to his taste than the new EEC.34 There was also a pragmatic element at work but 
as his views were in line with the policies he pursued it is reasonable to conclude that 
his views on European integration were at least as significant. The EEC bid appears to 
have been more a pragmatic consideration than one of conviction. Nevertheless, while 
the specific nature of the EEC was not to his taste, the broader scheme of creating a 
united Europe with Britain at its heart certainly was. 
 
The second  way in  which this thesis saw  Suez as influencing  British and 
French policies in Europe concerned France. France had a similar experience to Suez 
as Britain in so far as it was humiliated by the outcome of the crisis, striking as it did 
at the heart of its identity and self-perception as a great power. What difered though 
was the way in which the French government reacted to it. The French government’s 
principal  motivation in atacking  Egypt  was its  belief that  Nasser  was a source  of 
financial and  military support for the rebels in the  ongoing  Algerian  uprising.  The 
interception of an Egyptian cargo ship carying weapons to Algeria was evidence of 
this,35 and  French leaders  declared that  Egypt  was simply another theatre  of the 
Algerian  war.36 The experience  of  being forced to  withdraw, at a time  when they 
considered themselves to be pushing the Egyptians back, made the French army more 
determined to  win in  Algeria, and also reduced their respect for and loyalty to the 
Fourth  Republic.37 Eighteen  months later this  was to result in an atempted coup 
                        
34 HMD vol. II (29 Nov., 1961), pp. 429-431. 
35 A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (Basingstoke, 1977), p. 158. 
36 M. Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford, 2012), p. 183. 
37 J.  Talbot, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria 1954-1962 (London,  1981),  pp.  71-72;  A. 
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d’etat by the forces in  Algeria that ended  when the  President  Michel  Debre caled 
General  de  Gaule  back to  power as  Prime  Minister.38 Through the  Algerian crisis, 
Suez had played a role in de Gaule’s return.39 
 
De Gaule had perhaps more impact on Anglo-European relations in the 1960s 
than any  other  man.  Despite  having a  view  of  European integration,  known as the 
Union  des  patries, that  was close to the  British  preference,40 and  having a 
longstanding association  with  Harold  Macmilan,  he consistently  prevented  British 
aims from  being realised.41 He  vetoed the  Maudling  negotiations in  1958, and in 
trying to ensure that France was accorded equal weight in the western aliance, as wel 
as atempting to  obtain  British  help for the  French nuclear  deterent,  he  presented 
Macmilan  with an acute and  ultimately iresolvable  problem.  Macmilan  knew that 
he  needed the  General’s  goodwil and cooperation if  Britain  were to succeed in 
obtaining closer ties  with  Europe, and  was inclined to assist  him  where  possible. 
Unfortunately,  he  was constrained  by the limits  of  Anglo-American  nuclear 
cooperation and the fact that the US did not want Britain to have a more influential 
voice in  NATO, let alone add  France as  wel. In ultima ratio de  Gaule’s  greatest 
impact between 1958 and 1963 was his decision to veto Macmilan’s EEC entry bid, 
ensuring that for the time being, Britain remained outside of a growing market with 
the potential to supplant it as the Americans’ European partner of preference.  
                        
38 J. Fenby, The General: Charles De Gaule and the France He Saved (London, 2010), p. 397. 
39 P. Mangold, The Almost Impossible Aly: Harold Macmilan and Charles De Gaule (London, 2006), 
pp. 170-171. 
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The Suez Crisis had two additional impacts on France and French policy that 
translated into  Anglo-European afairs.  The threat  by the  Soviet  Union to launch 
rocket atacks  on  London,  Tel  Aviv and  Paris in  November  1956  had a  more long 
lasting efect than either Bulganin or Khrushchev realised. The threat was holow, but 
coming at a time  when  France  was  being frustrated  by the  US and then forced to 
withdraw when its British aly gave in to American demands, the threat added to an 
existing feeling,  dating  back to  Dien  Bien  Phu, that  France could  not rely  on  US 
support when its vital interests were at stake. During a meeting on the night of the 6th 
of  November,  Guy  Molet said as  much to the  German  Chancelor  Konrad 
Adenauer.42 France  drew two conclusions from this: the first  was that in  order to 
retain any semblance of great power status it had to press ahead with the creation of 
the Common Market and ensure that a united Europe was led by France. The second 
was to that to be truly independent and have the ability to defend its interests in the 
face of superpower opposition, it must possess nuclear weapons of its own. 
 
There has been disagreement among commentators as to the influence of Suez 
in the creation of the EEC. French historians such as Maurice Vaïsse, Piere Guilen, 
and Isobel  Tombs, and  German  historians  Clemens  Wurm and  Hans Jurgen  Küsters 
have credited the crisis with removing French doubts about the Common Market thus 
ensuring its creation in  1957.43 Others,  most  notably  Alan  Milward and  Andrew 
                        
42 DDF,  1956  Vol. III, ‘Conversation  Between  Adenauer and  Molet’ (6  Nov.,  1956),  Translated  by 
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Moravcsik,  have  dismissed the role  of  Suez as a coincidence, claiming that the 
accounts linking the crisis to the  EEC are  based solely  on the recolection  of a 
conversation in  which  Adenaeur reportedly told  Molet that  Europe  would  be  his 
revenge for the US and British abandonment of France in Egypt,44 and that a French 
oficial at the  Spaak  negotiations  had told  his  British counterpart  on  26th September 
that France had decided to sign the Treaties of Rome.45 
 
Although  Milward and  Moravcsik  may  have a  point  when they  question the 
reliance on Pineau’s recolection as the sole source for an argument, their own case is 
itself not borne out by the evidence. Robert Marjolin’s memoirs state explicitly that 
Suez emboldened Molet, who had hitherto hesitated to defy sceptical French opinion 
opposed to the  Common  Market, to  bring  his influence to  bear and  overcome it.46 
Moravcsik, somewhat  grudgingly,  has conceded that  Suez  gave  Molet an extra 
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weapon to  use, and if  Pineau’s recolection could  be  questioned then so could 
Marjolin’s.  However, this is  not the limit  of the evidence.  Contemporaneous  media 
articles such as The Economist’s 19 January 1957 piece on the Common Market, as 
wel as the accounts  of  US  observers, refer to the  Common  Market  discussions 
hanging in the balance as late as October-November 1956.47 Moreover, Spaak and the 
Belgian Chef du Cabinet, Robert Rothschild, both stated that the enthusiasm for the 
Common  Market that  France  was  displaying  by  mid-December  1956 amounted to a 
virtual about-face and was atributable to Suez.48 
 
The impact  of the creation  of the  EEC  on  Britain’s  European  policy  was 
straightforward. It removed the  basis for a long-held  British  belief that  French 
opposition to supranational institutions would stymie the proposed Common Market, 
as it  had the  EDC.  Furthermore, it forced  British leaders to confront the  possibility 
that if Britain were to remain excluded from this new body, its trading and diplomatic 
links outside of Europe would be at risk.49 Maudling’s negotiations and the creation of 
EFTA  were atempts to  deal  with the  EEC  without  having to accept supranational 
institutions, but ultimately they simply delayed the inevitable and Britain duly applied 
for  membership.  Even so,  were it  not for the  Suez  Crisis and its impact  on  French 
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atitudes towards  European integration, there  might  have  been  no  EEC to cause 
Britain such problems in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
 
The final consideration is to return to the  French  nuclear  deterent.  Best-
known in historical terms for the period in which de Gaule was in ofice, the French 
Force De Dissuasion emerged out of the Fourth Republic. French nuclear technology 
and the institutions that  dealt  with it  were created in the late  1940s, and the  French 
defeat in Indochina in 1954 has been mooted as a catalyst for the decision to develop 
nuclear  power for  military  purposes.50 However, there is a case to  be  made for the 
influence  of  Suez in this regard as  wel.  The experience  of  being threatened  by the 
Soviet  Union  with  nuclear atack and the  perception that the  US would  not  defend 
France convinced  French leaders that a  French  bomb  was a  mater  of  national 
necessity.  Explorations  had already  begun in  1954 about  developing  one,  but  no 
oficial policy decision had been made. Molet’s government, which came to power in 
February 1956, was opposed to nuclear weapons, and there was a crucial diference 
between 1954 and 1956. In 1954 the US seemed to be unwiling to assist France by 
using nuclear weapons to support the garison at Dien Bien Phu. Two years later, the 
perception was that the US nuclear umbrela, which had previously made the creation 
of a  French  deterent  unnecessary,  was  not reliable and  France  was  vulnerable to 
nuclear atack. 
 
On  November  30th a  protocol  was signed establishing an atomic  military 
program and work formaly  began  on  developing a  French  deterent.  The impact  of 
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this deterent was to add an extra dimension to Anglo-French negotiations on Europe. 
The aforementioned  desire  of  de  Gaule to increase  French influence extended to 
seeking the assistance of  Britain in the  development  of the  French  deterent, and 
Macmilan explored  ways in  which  he could exchange that support for  de  Gaule’s 
help in Europe.51 As we have seen this was impossible, not just because the US would 
not  have agreed to it,  but  because  Macmilan  was sceptical as to  whether  de  Gaule 
would  deliver  his  promises  once  he  had achieved  what  he  wanted.  Beyond this, 
Macmilan’s  decision to  purchase  Polaris from the  US  under the terms  of the  1962 
Nassau  Agreement,  gave the  General the excuse  he  had  been seeking to  veto the 
British EEC bid.52 
 
The third way in which Suez was influential returns us to British politics and 
may also form something of a postscript for this work. One of Macmilan’s Cabinet 
changes in July  1960  was to  make  Edward  Heath the  Lord  Privy  Seal  with special 
responsibility for Europe. In the same way that Suez made it possible for Macmilan 
to become Prime Minister, it directly influenced the course of Heath’s political career. 
His  biographer John  Campbel claimed that  Suez  made  Ted  Heath, and this  was  no 
exaggeration.53 Chief  Whips  do  not as, a rule,  go  on to subsequently  hold senior 
Cabinet  ofice and  Heath is the  only such  man since the  Second  World  War to 
become  Prime  Minister.54 Heath  was the  government  Chief  Whip  during the Suez 
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Crisis and while he had come to the atention of Churchil, Eden and Macmilan with 
his  maiden speech in June  1950,  he  was largely  unknown  outside  of  Westminster.55 
His tenure as  Chief  Whip saw  him  deal  with  one  of the  most  dificult and fraught 
situations in  post-war  British  politics, trying to  prevent  not  one,  but two significant 
backbench rebelions  over  Suez from  bringing  down the  government.56 One 
contemporary article considered  him to  be  one  of the  potential future leaders  of the 
Conservative Party, based on his performance during the crisis.57 
 
Heath was without a doubt the most pro-European UK Prime Minister of the 
modern era. He used the occasion of his first speech in Parliament during the debate 
on the  Schuman  Plan to argue for  British  participation.58 More recent  biographers 
including Denis MacShane, who was an MP himself towards the end of Heath’s life, 
saw him as a lifelong Europeanist. If the feature Time caried on him in July 1962 is 
any indicator, many contemporary observers saw him thus.59 Whether or not he was a 
Europeanist from  1937  or  1961,  his impact  on  Anglo-European relations cannot  be 
doubted. Macmilan appointed him to lead the negotiations for his government’s il-
fated EEC membership bid in August 1961 and even though he was unsuccessful, his 
eforts  were recognised  by the  University  of  Aachen  which awarded  him the 
                        
55 ‘Our London Correspondence’, The Manchester Guardian (12 Jan., 1957), p. 3. 
56 Earl  of Kilmuir, Political Adventure: The Memoirs of the Earl of Kilmuir (London,  1967),  p.  168; 
‘The Middle Ranks’, The Times (17 Jan., 1957), p. 9. 
57 ‘Notes of the Week: Revolt Dampened’, The Economist (8 Dec., 1956), p. 857. 
58 H. of C. Debs, Vol. 476, Cols. 1907-2056, ‘The Schuman Plan’ (26 Jun., 1950). 
59 D. MacShane, Heath (London, 2006), p. 34; ‘Common Market: Crossing the Channel’, Time (13 Jul., 
1962), p. 2. 
 313 
International Charlemagne Prize, given to those who embody the hope for European 
integration.60 More importantly,  he  had established  Britain’s intentions to  become a 
member of the Common Market, and, in what this author sees as the most convincing 
evidence for  his impact,  General  de  Gaule,  who  had so completely stymied the 
eforts of two of the most successful Prime Ministers of the post-war period (Harold 
Macmilan and  Harold  Wilson),  predicted in  August  1965 that a  Conservative 
government led by Heath would enter the EEC.61 Seven years later, after establishing 
his and his country’s credibility as a potential member of the European Communities, 
Heath proved the General right and took Britain into Europe. 
 
As  with  Macmilan, it can  be said that  without the  Suez  Crisis  Heath  would 
most likely  never  have  been in the  position to  have the impact  on  Anglo-European 
relations that  he  did.  Even if  we  place  greater emphasis  on  his  being a protégé of 
Macmilan’s and the  beneficiary  of  Prime  Ministerial  patronage,  we  have already 
established that Suez was chiefly responsible for Macmilan’s ability to provide said 
in the first  place.  Moreover,  Heath  was the  only  post-1945  Chief  Whip to become 
Prime Minister, and one of only four Conservative Chief Whips to have held one of 
the  Great  Ofices  of  State.  Numerous articles  have  provided explanations as to  why 
Chief  Whips rarely achieve fame and  high  ofice,62 and the contemporary accounts 
that demonstrate his enhanced reputation and where it came from, make a compeling 
case for Suez being absolutely critical in Heath’s rise to power. 
                        
60 htp:/www.aachen.de/en/sb/pr_az/karls_pr/charlemagne_prize/index.html, accessed 18 Mar., 2013. 
61 W. Rees-Mogg, ‘Avec Heath a leur Tete’, Sunday Times (1 Aug., 1965), p. 8. 
62 ‘Do  Government  Chief  Whips  Have an  Afterlife?’  htp:/notspolitics.org/2012/10/22/do-
government-chief-whips-have-an-afterlife-2/ Accessed 1 March 2013. 
 314 
 
Final Conclusions  
In the  next two  years (2016 and  2017)  Britain and  Europe  wil  mark the sixtieth 
anniversaries of the Suez Crisis, and then of the signing of the Treaties of Rome that 
created the European Communities. Although much scholarship to date has seemed to 
consider these two events as separate, having litle or no relevance to each other, this 
thesis has demonstrated that they are, in fact, intrinsicaly linked. By showing British 
leaders that their pre-crisis perceptions of Britain’s strength were eroneous, Suez set 
in motion a process of review that saw greater consideration given to closer ties with 
Europe. It ended the political career of Anthony Eden, halted that of Rab Butler and 
played a decisive role in the rise to power of Britain’s two most pro-European Prime 
Ministers. Harold Macmilan moved his country towards the point where membership 
of the EEC was palatable, Edward Heath made British membership credible in Europe 
and in 1973 succeeded where Macmilan had failed, taking Britain into the Common 
Market. 
 
Suez also influenced Britain’s partner in Egypt. France, feeling betrayed and 
abandoned by its Anglo-American alies, responded by reversing its own hostility to 
supranationalism and signing the  Treaties  of  Rome, and  by  oficialy launching a 
nuclear weapons programme. Furthermore, Suez made France even more determined 
to  hold  onto its  position in  Algeria, and in so  doing,  played a role in the return  of 
General  Charles  de  Gaule. In this  way  Suez represents something  of a  paradox for 
Anglo-European relations. The event that did so much to make British membership of 
Europe a  viable  prospect  was also the  one that  prevented that from  happening for 
another sixteen years. 
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Although the twenty-first century  question  of  Britain’s relationship  with 
‘Europe’ can be vitaly informed by these intertwined histories of imperial crisis and 
European  union, and  highlights just  how interdependent the  UK and the  EEC  had 
become, it also is important to consider the specific historical implications of the Suez 
Crisis and  Europe.  Britain  has in the  past  been accused  of  being ‘absent at the 
creation’ and ‘missing the boat’. The Suez Crisis helps to demonstrate the worldview 
that  had to  be altered  before that could change – a  more analytical and  useful 
approach than this simple condemnation.  By  prioritising its Atlantic and Imperial 
links and so refusing to join the Six in creating the EEC, it lost the ability to shape its 
institutions and  direction.  The  Suez  Crisis  demonstrated  more clearly  perhaps than 
anything else, the fact that after 1945 the era of European powers able to dominate the 
world was over. The new bipolar world order dominated by the superpowers made it 
imperative for any European power to accept that European colonialism was finished, 
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